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Introduction

Thl. i. a .tudy of the attitude
of the British Labour Party
and
of Labour group, generally. in Britain,
on questions of foreign policy
during the year.. 1931-19*. It
is easier. at this time, to
arrive at
b

reasonably clear picture of the attitude
and motives of Hi,

LjMlf*.

opposition ou questions of foreign
poUey than it is to inter pre! the
policy of the Oovornment, itself. Altho^h
the manifest*!**, of the
British Government »• foreign policy are
reasonably clear, it is difficult to discover the reasons and notives
behind that policy.

Undoubted-

ly there are many documents, still
unavailable, which *ould help to

explain the reasons which motivated the Government's
foreign oolioy.
The Government may often have had information,
unknown to the general
public, which had a direct bearing on Briti«n
policy.

For example,

er^ct information a. to Germany's military strength
in 1938 may have

dictated the

wlicy of

ao-easement at Munich.

On the other hand,

there 1. material available which makes it possible

1-termine with

reasonable assurance the Labour Party attitude on question of
foreign
policy, and the re- sons for that attitude.

The Labour Party w°s not

handicapped by responsibility, and, therefore, could freely express
its opinion,

lor that reason, the material necessary for a study

of the Labour Party*, attitude end the basis for that attitude is
available, while some information nece<*s~ry t-

a

study of the British

Government's foreign policy is still unavailable,
The central problem of the thesis is this:

In what respect and

to whrt extent did the attitude of the Labour v\~rty on question, of

foreign policy differ from the -oolicies oursued by the British Government during 1931-1938.

Some account?, such as Europe on the "Ve by

Frederick

L.

Schuman, Interpret British
pcltey durin* the

being merely en expression of
conservative oplnl©.
servative Party leaders.

i

a

11^ by

Con-

In any objective approach we
must ask the

question. -Is this interpretation correct,
or did British policy reflect poet-war attitudes held by all
classes and groups in Great

Britain?"

A study of the attitudes of the Labour
Party and Labour

groups will help to answer this question.

Following are some of the important problems
which will be considered:
1.

Was the attitude of the Labour Party on
questions of

disarmament essentially different from that of the

Government?
2.

Did the Labour Party ov 0 se the Government* s policy
of

appeasement?

If the Labour Party did, how soon and to

what extent?
3.

Did the Labour Party take a different position than the
Government in regard to international collective security

and the enforcement of existing in t -motional agree-

ents?
k.

Did the Labour Party differ from the Government in its
attitude toward fascism in Italy, Bazisra in Germany, and
the franco regime in Spain?

If the Labour Party had

been in power, would its policy have been radically different from that followed by the British Government?

The study has been confined to the attitude of the Labour Party
and the groups which supported the Labour Party.

The r>nlicies of the

Independent Labour F»rty, the Rational Labour Party, and the Communist

taif

have been omitted fro.
consideration.

Support for the labour

Party came fro, the Trade Unions
an, Socialist Societies
and. of course,
from individuals outside of
these .roup.. Most of the
membership of
the Labour Party came from
the Trade Unions. The labour
Party had the
support of many British voters.
|, evtd«t from the General
Section
of 1935. In this election. Labour
candidates polled 8.3?6,l l votes,
3

M

while the Conservative candidate.
poiud lO.U9g.3io votes.

of the election the Conservatives had
378 members
members in the House of Commons. 1

As a result

to Labour's l-M

As in every other political oarty,

there were members who did not support ail
of the program of the Labour
Party.

George Lansbury. for example, was a pacifist,
so extreme in

belief that he was opposed to any sanctions
which might lead to war
during the Italo-Abyssinian conflict.

On the other hand. Colonel Wedge-

wood early in the period decided that the only
way Britain could handle
such situations we. to rearm.

Interesting as their statements may be.

they were not representative of the Labour Party.

More representative-

of the Party were auch men as Clement Attlee. Hugh Dalton,
and Morgan
J ones.

Resolutions of the Trades Union Congress or of the Labour
P^rty«s

Annual Conference may usually be considered to represent a
considerable

number of the persona attending, and thus Labours attitude.

In both

cases, however, it is usually true that the resolutions are
introduced

by the executive group

*

each body and accented by the vhole conference.

This approval does indicate majority support for the policy "f the

executive groups.

As both executive groans ere closely associated with

the Labour Party, such support is nlso supr.ort for the Labour Party.

1.

Bean 1. McHenry, Bis Majesty's Opposition
of California Press, 19' -0, p. I90t

.

Berkeley:

University

By considering the statement,
of Labour Party member, in the
Common*, the
resolutions of the Trade Union groups,
and

the opinions in Labour public*,

tione. it has been possible.

I

believe, to arrive at some fairly
tentative

conclusions concerning the alleles supported
by British labour.
This has been chiefly a source study.

Almost all statements con-

cerning Labour's foreign policy have been
drawn directly from source
references.

Statements concerning the policy of the
British Government

have come from secondary works concerned with
the international situation

during the years 1931-193*.

Tour main sources have supplied the neces-

sary information on Labour attitudes:

(1) Mansard's Parliamentary

Debates. House of Commons, which is in the Converse Library
at Amherst
College;

(2) The Labour Magazine and its successor. Labour,

the Mount Holyoke College Library;

found in

(3) The Annual Reports of the Pro-

ceedings o f the Trades Union Congress ;

ft) The Resorts of the Annual

Conferenc e of the Labour Party, which are available in the Hew York City

Public Library.
In using The Labour Magazine and Labour,

read

£.11

it was necessary to

articles pertaining to foreign -policy, and to find statements

concerning the major topics of this study.

This magazine is a Joint pub-

lication of the Trades Union Congress and the Labour party.

The editors

preface their publication with a statement that the opinions of the
authors are their own and do not represent the official policy of either
organisation.

In spite of this, the magazine did offer illustrations of

the opinions of Labour people.

When articles by such persons as Clement

Attlee are included, it is clear that the magazine was used to present
the Labour viewpoint to the British people.

The Annual Reports of the

Proceedings of the Trades Union Congress and the Reports of the Annual

Conference of the
Lfegg » Hrty were r*to*

U because

clearly the opinions of the respective
groups.
at each

Their resolutions adopted

mating indicated what courses of action

approval.

stents

each report showed

met the delegates*

made in support of. or in opposition
to, the resolu-

tions, showed whether 1 plan had unanimous
or divided support.
Hanaardt 8 ^rliamentary Debates. Hous
e o1 Commons va. the most

important source.

In the course of the debates, the Labour
members of

the House of Commons showed how and why
they differed or agreed with the

Government's policy.

In the debates the Labour members often
stated

what they believed the correct policy should
be in regard to the problems

which faced Britain.

In using the Commons Debates , it was
necessary to

secure r list of the Labour members of the House of
Commons.

A list was

secured from the London Weekly Times following the
general elections in
1931 and 1935.

With this list it was possible to go to the index
for a

year of the Commons Debates and to find in what volume and
column a
Labour member's speech on foreign policy was printed.

Although they

must be examined critically, the Commons Debates present an
excellent
picture, both of Labour Party views which had vide support vithin the
Party, and the views of minority groups.

Chapter I

Disarmament

Throughout most of the period
1931-1938, Labour supported international disarmament without taking
into consideration the events
and political philosophies which made the
realization of this aim impossible.
It
'
TOS Ub0Ur S content ion that
disarmament brings peace and security,
but
the events of the 1930's have not
borne out that contention. Rather
it

has been proved that armaments are
necessary to bring security and to keep
peace. International conditions in the
1930's made disarmament impracticable.

Tho attitude and actions of the
aggressor nations, Japan, Italy

and Germany, made it imperative for other
nations to have military strength

sufficient to prevent undesirable actions.

Yet, at that time, many sought

disarmament when the acceptance of disarmament would
have r suited in

weakening the nations who sought to maintain
international law, - the very
1
law which those who advocated disarmament wanted
to uphold.

Disarmament could have been effective only when prefaced
by military
force, or a threat to use force, preferably by collective
action.
tive

action could have taken two forms:

Collec-

military alliances, providing

for a guarantee of mutual aid in the event that any part to the
alliance

were attacked, or an international police force, under a world organization
1,

Robert T :. Seton-Watson, Britain and the Dictator s.
MacMillan, 1938, p. 107"

~~

John F . Kennedy, ^liy England Slept .
1940, Chap. I -VI I, XIII, passim.

York:

New York:

W. Funk, inc.,

Frederic H. Soward, Twenty Troubled Years 1918-1943 .
Oxford University Press, 1944, Chap. II, passim.

New York:

C.G. Haines and R.J.S. Hoffman, Origins and Background of the
Second World V.ar . New York: Oxford University Press, 1943,
Chap. VII, passim.

The introductory section, pp. i-iii is based largely on the works
mentioned above.

7.

such as the United Nations, to pretect
the community of nations or any

member of that community from aggression.

If either of these two forms

of collective action had been provided,
there would have been security for

nations belonging to the system.

Under the former each nation would
have

had to keep its armament strong enough
so that combined with other nations
it could have prevented an attack from
succeeding.

tial disarmament might have been possible;

Under such a plan par-

on the other hand, an increase

in arms might have been necessary so that the
coalition could be strong

enough to meet any nation or coalition of aggression.

If an international

police force had been formed, it, too, would have needed
sufficient strength
to meet any attack.

It would have made possible the reduction of any
one

nation's arms, but the cost of such a force might have exceeded
the usual

appropriations of the member nations.

Neither alternative would have led,

necessarily, to disarmament, yet only these two plans could have created

security in a world where some nations were determined to use force to
achieve their aims.
If a world organization had been responsible for the security of its

members, that organization should have been given special powers, designed
to prevent aggression.

Assuming that all member states had disarmed, the

system should have included a plan by which any nation could have been

prevented from rearming.

This could have been accomplished by creating

an international commission to make sure the disarmament pact was not

violated.

This commission should have had the power to search for ille-

gal arms and the means of producing arms.

If violations had been found,

then the commission should have had the power to destroy the arms and

the factories which produced them.

Such action would have made it im-

possible for one nation to create a force strong enough to defeat collective action.

The ideal situation would have
been for all nations to
belong o an
organization which stood for both
disarmament and collective
security
and. most important, for each
nation to support in practice
the

Sanction
nations

and its ideals.

1th

^

Unfortunately, during the
1930's there .ere

isolationist tendencies outside the
League, 11* the United

States, and nations within the League
of Nations which desired not
collective strength but collective
meekness. Except for the United
States,
these countries looked to disarmament
with the hope that their relative

strength would be increased
security.

arid

gave no support to any plan to
provide

It was security, however, which had
to be provided with dis-

armament, or better still, before disarmament
took place.

Not until ag-

gression is honestly renounced by all nations
nor until collective strength
is powerful enough to meet and defeat
aggression is disarmament possible.

Neither condition had been fulfilled by the 1930
»s.

Disarmament, there-

fore, was a policy of idealism, not realism.

ifter Vorld

Wftr I

Britain reduced her arms to a very low level.

She

entered into naval agreements which limited her naval
strength to a very
great degree.

Britain agreed to accept naval parity *ith the United
States

the first time she had accepted equality with any
nation.

In 1922 at the

Washington Naval Conference, battleship and aircraft carrier
strength was
placed at a ratio of 5-5-3 for Britain, the United States, and
Japan respectively, with a ratio of 1.67 for France and Italy.
reached at that time for other types of nav-l craft.

No agreement was
In 1930 as a result

of the London Naval Conference, it was decided that the capital ship

strength of Gret-t Britain, the United States, and Japan was to bo 15-15-9

respectively in 1936.

The United States and Great Britain were to have

approximately the same tonnage in cruisers, destroyers, and submarines,

but Japan's ratio was increased
fro* 60* to 7 <# in cruisers
an, destroyer, and Japan wag given equality
in submarine*. 1

Many had high hopes that a reduction
of other

argents

would come

from the League of Hatlons Disarmament
Conference which first met at

$mm

on February

2,

193 ?,

but these hopes were not he realised.

H0

compromise was found which would satisfy
aermany's demand for equality
and Prance's demand for security. A a
8
result Germany withdrew from the
Conference.

She returned for a brief period, hut
withdrew permanently

from the League in October,
1933.

It was not until March of I933 that
the

British government presented the Conference
with a definite plan for reduction of arms.

This plan included the French suggestion
for short ser-

vice armies, limited war material on

military aircraft entirely.

ft

qualitative baaia.and abolished

It was also proposed that t permanent dis-

armament commission with wide powers of inspection
be established.

The

British plan fared no better than other plans presented
to the Conference
which en fled in failure.
At home Britain reduced hor armaments to a minimum,

amounted to uni lateral disarmament.

a

policy which

This policy has been considered by

many to hare been extremely c>ngerous and partially responsible for the
diplomatic defeat at Munich.

Prom 19?6 to I53I appropriations for arms

decreased from X 116,000,000 to i 110,000,000.

The total appropriations

for the years 193?- 193^ showed no sharp increase, although

crease was voted in Commons in

1

ft

definite in-

9 3^« The appropriations approved in 19 ^5

provided for an increased air force end increased efficiency of the army
and navy, leading to a rearmament program in 19 3 6.
were to be increased, particularly the air force.

All military services

The years 19*7 and

1938 saw these amounts increased to strengthen the military ~*>wer of

1.

Haines and Hoffman, op. clt., p. 258.

Britain still .ore.

_

The appropriation made
in 1938, h M2.664.000.
.as
an increase of h 34.879.000
over the
voted in 1937. These
espies
show the decrease in anient
expenditures until the threats
of the dictators forced Britain to turn
1
to rearmament.
The British Labour groups went
through an evolution regarding
agents
similar to the policy pursued by
the Government, but with a
difference in
emphasis. Labour supported disarmament
until it was more than apparent
that current international events,
end those which seemed imminent
necessitated British rearmament. The
arguments Labour offered as reasons
for
a disarmament program were chiefly
three:
(l) the effects of War upon

civilization;

nation, and

(

(

3)

2

)

the internal effects of an armament
program upon the

the benefits of peace to Labour.

I

ince the Labour Party

*as not in power at this time, it could
only urge the Government to folio*
certain plans at home end abroad to achieve
disarmament. Because hopes
ran very high that the Geneva Disarmament
Conference would decrease world

military forces, some of the plans put before
the Disarmament Conference
received Labour support.

The Labour groups wanted any disarmament to

apply to all military forces, some forms of which
they wanted completely
abolished.

Their final objective was to secure the elimination
of all

national military forces.

In their stead arbitration, sanctions, and
the

League of Nations would be used;

and, if force were necessary, an inter-

national police force should settle disputes or prevent them
from leading
to war.

The desire to avoid war «*a one of the reasons British Labour
favored
a

policy of disarmament.

Labour believed that war is futile - that even

victory in war would not bring peace.

1. Kennedy, op. cit ., pp.

The one person in the Labour Party

18 and 170

"

*ho put forward this claim most strongly
.as the pacifist, George Lansbury. during and after the Ethiopian
affair he re P eatodly made this
point
in the House of Commons.

For instance, in 1935, he said,

"I

WO uld like

to call your attention to the fact
that the piling up of armaments or
the

putting y*ur faith in armaments has not
saved the world from war, and even
victory in war does not save us." 1
A year later he again stated that
war
would only start another war. A permanent
peace could not result from war
because war leaves the seeds of future wars. 2
Two or three other nations
would be crushed, but soon they would rearm to
start another war. 3

Lans-

bury's solution was complete disarmament.
In support of Lansbury's viev/point, Mr. G.
Hall was of the opinion
that

it is madness to assume that more armaments
are required to

preserve peace, to give security, and doter aggression....

Arms have never

saved a nation from war nor have given s-curity to
either weak or strong

nations against attack."

4

Arthur Henderson also believed in the futility of war, but went
further in insisting that it was not inevitable.

H e also added that there

could be no progress until the war system had been stamped out.
stitute for armaments was the Pact of Paris.

His sub-

5

Clement Attlee summed up Labour's early attitude by saying, "We
do not believe there is such

a

thing as national defense.

He are not

persuaded in the least that the way to safety is by piling up armaments.
We think that you have to go forward to disarmament not to the piling up

1.

George Lansbury, House of Commons , Hansard's Parliamentary Debates,
CCCIV, August 1, 1935, col. 2891.

2.

Ibid., CCCXY1I, November 5, 1936, col. 30G.

3.

Ibid., COCXXVIII, October 27, 1937, col. 162.

4.

G. Hall, Commons

5.

Arthur Henderson, Labour's Foreign Policy .
Transport House, July 1933, pp. 18-9.

,

CCXCIX, March 14, 1935, col. 614.
London:

Labour Party

of

argents."

1

By 1938, however, most of the Labour
groups recognized

the need for armaments, but still
aiaintained that arms and war would
not

settle anv problem justly or permanently.

I

n general, the Labour vi ap-

point held that "Just treaties and generous
behaviour still rteaia

mm

powerful for Peace than all the arsenals." 2
Labour stressed the horrors
If war

MM,

of

war even more than its futilitv.

they believed that it would be a conflict

the world had e,or experienced.

mm

horrible than

Labour made the gloomy prediction that

the next war would destroy civilization, particularly
western civiliza-

tion.

?Jr.

Henderson mm* of the opinion that, unles

be built upon • firm foundation, sooner or later,

!,

world peace could
s

cataclysm will come

upon the world which will engulf all we care about western civilization

which

N

have inherited

trm

the pasta"

of the Labour Party, the Right Honorable

At the 1933 annual Conference
r

ir Charles Trcvelyan proposed

a resolution, which was accepted, sotting forth a policy to prevent war.

One of his proposals

WM

to publicize the appalling nature of the modern

methods of warfare and their results <

in Labour

4

Two years later Noel-leaker warned

thtt if the pre-war arms race was repeated, "our western civi-

ligation would collapse in ruin about our heads."

Greenwood presented

the picture vividly by declaring that within sixty minutes of a declara!•

Clement Attlee, Conroons, CCCV, October 22, 1935, col. 46.

2.

J.S. i'iddleton, r Labour's Load for the Victory of Peace", Labour ,
February 1358, V, London: Transport Sou**, p. 132.

3»

Arthur Henderson, n 'Vork for Peace Turing 1930" \.Text for ktftdMit
to U.S.) Labour ?ia^ar,ine , January 1331, IX, London: Transport
louse, p. 387.

4*

5.

6.

Sir Charles Trevelyan, Report o f the Thlrty-TMrd nnual Conference
of the La bour Party* held at Haati gs # October 2-6, 1933. London:
Transport louse, p. 138.
Philip Noel-3akor, "'Rearmament' and Collective Security", Labour
Hovemher, 1935, III, p. S2.

Arthur Greenwood, Jr., "The Var .gainst
July 1933, XII, p. 199.

Y.-ar",

Labour Magazine ,

13.

ticn by a European Po*er, bombing planes
could be orer ^ nglandf and a
single bomb could poison every living thing
in an area of three-quarters
of a square mile.

1

A writer in Labour states that the
workers would be

murdered by the tens of thousands, that any
survivors would starve, and
that hunger would be followed by disease.

The wealthy would ,nove to the

country where they would be safe, but the workers
would have to remain
in the crowded cities which offer an easy target. 2

Class feeling was

stressed er well as the danger of war.
Labour looked at the positive side of the picture as
well, realising
the selfish as well as the humanitarian values of
peace.

The economic

and political advantages of peace and a peace policy
became a center of

Labour thinking.

In 1931 the President of the Trades Union Congress in

his annual address recognized the economic advantages when he stated
that

success of the i'isarmament Conference would go far to produce international conditions leading to the revival of industry and trade.'

While Labour believed that economic advantages would result froa Disarmament, the party also used disarmament as a reason for criticizing Government policy.
dar

Thus Labour leaders could isarn the country of possible

gars resulting from rearmament or place the blame for ;he need of arms
J

upon the Government, in each

casr:

seeking to discredit the Government.

In 1935 and thereafter, in advocating disarmament Labour W83 in direct

opposition to the Government.

In foreign affairs the Government was

1.

Arthur Greenv/ood, Jr., "The
July 1933, XII, p. 199.

2.

Alexander
1935, III

3.

!!.
,

.ar

/gainst War", Labour Magazine ,

Thompson, "Beware of Imitations", Labour , November

p. 52.

"President's .ddress", Keport of Proceedings at the Sixty-thi rd Annual
Trade s Union Congress held at Bristol, September 7-11, 1031, Walter M.
Citrine, editor; J. Mcintosh, reporter; London: Cooperative Printing
Society Ltd., p. 71.

14.

attached by Labour because.
according to Labour, the
Government's poli .
oiee could not be trusted to
k eep Engl a„d out of „ar.
I B 1M6 , Milner
.aid that increased anns „ero
driving Cngland to „ar. He
stated that
the Government „as sincere
enough in believing that they
vould prevent
~r. but such a policy . as one of "absolute
1
despair".
Attlee said that
he opposed the increase in arms
in 1935. because there „as
no guarantee
that the a™, „ould be used in
2
pursuit of a sensible foreign
policy.
A
statement appeared in a Labour editorial
in 1938 to the effect, that if
the
"Tories" had honored their obligations
in foreign affairs, the wasteful
spending for armaments could have been
avoided during the period 19311938.

1
3

In addition to the political advantage
gained by placing themselves
in direct opposition to the official
government policy, the Labour Party

felt that a peace policy was popular
with the voters.
this policy would bring the Labour Party
into power.

It was hoped that

Also, peace was a

necessary basis for the type of government they
wished to provide.
Cro pton said in 1933:

As

"Socialism is impossible without settled peace.." 4

Henderson also was of this opinion. 5
peace must come together.

Attlee believed that socialism and

He said, "We shall go into this fight with
our

1.

J. Milner, Commons

2.

Attlee, Commons , CCCXII, May 21, 1936, col. 1428.

3.

"All the V;orld Over", Labour , iky 1938, V,
p. 195.

4.

Crompton, "Chairman's Address", L.P. Annual Report 1933.
,
pp. 135-6

5.

Henderson, Labour's Foreign Policy , p. 2.

.

CCXCIX, March 13, 1935, col. 883.

prog™,

of

is that

tf you want Socialism you mugt

Social^

and Peace

you must have socialism." 1

w

peftce#

^^^^
^ ^^ ^
^

If the Lebour Party could
convincQ

eiec _

torate of this policy, it could
come into po.er.

Since disarmament .as the chief
me thod advocated by the
Labour Party
in support of its peace policy,
the Labour members used
almost every oppor
tunity to oppose ne. expenditures
for armaments. Their first
point of opposition .as based on the idea that
Britain could hot .in an armament
race
if one should develop. Mr. Baker
said that an increase of
aircraft .ould
only force Germany to build more. 2
Attlee pointed out further that air-

peer threatened

Britain's security.

Still the Government .ould not
con-

sent to the abolition of military
planes at the peace conference. 3
ines .ere another serious throat to
Britain.

Submar-

Despite Britain's superior

fleet in European .aters, the battleships
and cruisers . re only targets

for submarines,

vation in 1935.

4

Mr. Adams in the House of Commons
made the same obser-

He regarded as "sinister" the chance
of the Germans build-

ing as many submarines as the English.

Submarines had threatened British

existence more than any other single .eapon
in World

T/ar I.

5

England had

Just signed a naval treaty, permitting Germany to
build a navy equal to
35 per cent of the tonnage of the royal navy, and even
more submarines. 6

Secondly, the Labourites emphasized the expense
involved even if

Britain should be able to .in the armament race.

Because they were

1.

Attlee, Commons, CCCXXVTII, November
1, 1937, col. 1669.

2.

Noel-Baker, " Rearmament and Collective Security", Labour
'
November 1935, III, p. 63.

3.

Attlee, Commons . CCCXXVTII, November 1, 1937, col. 1669.

4.

Crompton, pp. cit ., pp. 135-6.

5.

V. Adams, Commons , CCCIV, July 22, 1935, col. 1598.

6.

Haines and Hoffman, op. cit ., p. 363.

•

»

expensive, money for an increase in
social services *as lacking.

In the

President's address before the Trades
Union Congress in 1931 the statement
was made that the crushing burden of
expenditures "upon argents is one
of the factors which keeps the world
impoverished." 1

increase of

Attlee opposed an

4,581.000 for the military services the same year.

He pointed

out that this increase came at a time when
the Government was at its wit's
end to balance the budget. 2

motion concerning the

amy

m

l951# the Labour Party made the following

estimates*

"That this house is of the opinion

that the expenditure on armaments is a crushing
burden on the people of

the world and a menace to the continuance of Peace,
and that in the interests of mankind a speedy and substantial reduction
should be made in warlike expenditure. ,,S

Even Colonel V'edgewood, who soon came to favor a

rearmament program, said that an enormous amount of money
could be saved
4
by not building the ships which the Government wanted to
build.

The same

trend of thought existed in Attlee' s mind when he asked,
"Is the burden of

defense to go on and crush us?"

6

In 1937, Mr. Greenwood stated that rear-

mament had been paid for in increased taxes, a lower standard of
living,
and increased prices.

g

The Labour party members of the House of Commons stressed the point
that it would be better to cut the amount spent for arms and turn it over
to the social services.

This opinion was held throughout the period under

1.

"President's Address", op. cit ., p. 71.

2.

L. MacNeill-T.eir, "The Rebellion of the Bright Young Things",
Labour Magazine , April 1933, XI, p. 567.

3.

L.P. Annual Report , 1932, p. 97.

4.

Colonel J.C. Wedgewood, Commons , CCLXXXIII, November 27, 1936,
col. 999.

5.

Attlee, Commons , CCCXVII

6.

A. Greenwood, Coiiimons, CLCXXVIII

,

November 12, 1936. cols. 1095-6.
,

November 27, 1937, col. 92.

discussion.

possible

.. 1, ciynes sald in

m2

a high standard of health
and education. 1

2
the appropriation, for the
ar» y .

^

that the Mpeaclltureo

A couple of years iater

Morsan Jones also believed that
the costs

of arms took m oney from the
social services.

He said before Colons
in

1936 that if the expenditure upon anas
>,ent on, Britain's social
services
would be "in pavm" for
o
a generation.
generation 3 Aa month
x.,
i
later
he said that rearmament
puts up obstacles to social progress.
He claimed that the House
of Commons
had no right to deprive future
generations of social progress because
of the
confronting international relations. 4

It may be well to examine Labour's
reasons for advocating disarmament
and consider their validity.

Is war futile?

In a world

w

r

many millions

of people are killed, and many millions
more die from disease and starva-

tion which follow war.

Too often, as Henderson pointed out, a
defeated

nation lives only to avenge its national pride
and to regain lost territory,
and another war is the result.

On the other hand, victory in war for a

nation may preserve a way of living and prevent its
people from living in a
condition of servitude.

The history of the world would be quite different

if victories had not been won at times when a particular
civilization was

threatened.

The

pas;:

twenty-five years would unquestionably be of a dif-

ferent character if the Central Powers had been victorious in

1

or Id War

I

and had imposed terms similar to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
on the western

allies

•

1.

J.R. Clynes, L.P. Annual Report , 1932, p. 229.

2.

Lawson, Commons

3.

M. Jones, Commons

4.

M. Jones, Commons , CCCXVTII

,

CCLXXXVII, March 15, 1934, cols. 617-8.
.

CCCXVII, November 5, 1936, col. 371.
,

December 18, 1936, col. 2827

The claim that huge

argents

have never prevented

«U

not more true

than the idea that disarmament
by one nation prevents war.
Britain followed
a policy of disarmament hut
became involved in ..orld r„
II.
other nations
lacking means of defense such as
/byssinia and China also found
this to be
true. Unilateral disarmament
does not guarantee freedom
from war.

When the Labour members pointed out
that arms cost money, they were
right.

A large portion of any nation's
debts result from spending for

armaments and the costs of war.

If money spent for war and

capons had

ever been spent In any nation for
social services, there would
undoubtedly
be a better fed, clothe*, educated,
and housed people in that country
than
there are today. On the other hand, a
rearmament program or a war practi-

cally wipes out unemployment and raises
wages for labor.
often leads to inflation and its problems.

This, of course,

The contention of Labour, how-

ever, that the costs of armaments are
oppressive and that money is taken

away from social services for these costs is true.

*

full rearmament pro-

gram may leave little to be expended for social
services.

Since Labour

was thinking primarily in terms of the welfare of
the labouring man, it is
not surprising that it opposed rearmament.

A fe

Labour members even wanted Britain to undertake disarmament
by

herself as an example.

They hoped that this example would be followed by

the nations of the world.

The majority, however, held that it would be

far better to achieve disarmament as a result of agreements with
the other

nations of the world.
One important change in Britain's armament program, which Labour ad-

vocated, was the nationalization of the manufacture of arms in Britain.

During the entire period being discussed, continued agitation was carried
on for this step.

It

wf>s

thought that nationalization would prevent profits

19.

from being m*Ue by war. and thereby on*
of the causes of war *ould be removed. The chance was advocated in articles
in Labour Ka-^lne bv Arthur
"reenwood, C. I*li,ie !3um., Francis

presented the following

ftlUaw,

WgmmU In

and

"

red A. Smith,

Oreonwood

our fight against war ,o K ust strive

to destroy the influence of the amumcnt
manufacturers."

Ho continued. "If

armaments are necessary... then they must be produced
under national control,
and the industry oust be freed fron the intrigues
of the Secret International
of aroaments manufacturers who, in common with
capitalists are the only ones
who profit from war." 1 C. Delisle Burns said that a future
Labour overn2
ment would abolish the private laanuracture and trade in
anas.

Lillians

protested in 1936 "that in the bluest rearmament program of
this country*,

peacetime history thoro is to b© no real check on profiteering.* 5

r.

Smith objected to the sending of armaments to nations with whom Britain
«ni

c ht go to

war.

He did not want British men killed with British bullets.

He added that potential enemies could not build up their stores of arms

from their own resources.

4

These examples show that Labour writers wanted

to plac- the manufacture of arms under ri ~id govo,"nment control.
t

1.

Greemood, "The War

In addition,

gainst ?'er", Labour Magazine . Julv 1933,

XII, pp. 118-9.
2.

C. Delisle Durns, "war and Labour Policy", Labour , September 1933,
I, p. 9.

3.

Francis
Labour ,

4.

Fred A. ;,mith, "Why Should We Arm Our ^nemies". Labour.
IV, pp. 205-6.

-illiams, "The Rational Government Backs an
pril 1936, III, p. 194.

rms Kamp",

August 1937,

20.

the same thing was urged in the House
of Commons by Gordon MacDonald,*

Morgan Jones, 2

J. Milner,

3

and Clement Attlee. 4

Arthur Header son ex-

pressed the same opinion before the Annual
Conference of the Labour Party
in 1933.

Their speeches in the House of Commons
show the unanimity of

British Labour in de airing the nationalization
of the manuf- cture of arms.

•

That government control of private manufacture
of arms would aid disarmament was another viewpoint of Labour groups.

If Britain did not add

to its military forces during discussions of
disarmament, that failure, too,

would facilitate disarmament.
ed

this idea.

Hall and Cripps were the persons who support-

In 1933, Hall said that it would be a good "gesture"
to the

Disarmament Conference to "have some relaxation regarding the
laying down
of these cruisers."

Q

i„ i 93 5, Cripps said that unless the government would

do its utmost to bring about a standstill agreement in armaments while
the

negotiations for limitations went on, Labour would not support the proposed

increase of air forces.

If an agreement was not forthcoming, then Britain

alone should hold up its own expenditures for a specified time.

Such a step

would make it unnecessary to scrap the program in three months when limitations
would come into effect.

7

Labour members of Commons had other reasons for voting against the
service estimates besides a standstill agreement.

From 1931 to 1936 Labour

1.

Gordon MacDonald,

2.

M. Jones, C ommons

3.

Milner, Commons , CCLXXXIII, November 27, 1933

4.

Attlee,

5.

A. Henderson, L.P. Annual Report , 1933, p. 189.

6.

Hall, Commons , CCLXXV, March 16, 1933, col. 2174.

7.

Sir Stafford Cripps, Commons , CCCII

C ommons

,

^

,

ommons

,

CCLXII, March 8, 1932, col. 1736.

CCLXXX, July 5, 1933.

CCXCIII, November 8, 1934, col. 1293.

,

March 3, 1935, Col. 1460-2.

members of the Commons consistently opposed
the estimates for the military
and naval forces of Britain.

0* March 8, 1931, the Labour Party put forth

a resolution asking that a "speedy and
substantial reduction should be made

in warlike expenditures" because they were a "menace
to peace". 1

Two years

later Morgan Jones opposed air armaments because they
might cause the Disar-

mament Conference to fail.

2

Hall and Attlee opposed the h 1,000,000 in-

crease for work at Singapore. 3

Hall else stated his determination to vote

against the naval estimates. 4

In 1934 Attlee declared his intention to

vote against the increased air estimates because of the striking
power of

an air force.

He preferred to see air forces internationalized. 5

opposed the army estimates in the same year.

Lawson

g

In 1935, MacLean was on

his feet in oommons to object to his country being committed to an air arms
race.

He denied the /ir Minister's claim that the planes could be used for

civil purposes, because the civil airplane could easily be changed to
death dealing machine."

7

a

Jones opposed the rearmament program because

even if the navy were a hundred time3 stronger, Britain still would not be
able to ca ry out its League duties any bettor.

8

Attlee said in 1936

that the Labour Party could not support the Government's request for arma-

ments because Labour did not trust the Government with tho use of the arms

1.

L.P. Annual .Report , 1931, p. 97.

2.

M. Jones, Commons , CCLXXXIII, March 23, 1933, col. 1007.

3.

Hall, Commons , CCLXXXVII , March 12, 1934, col. 61.
Attlee, Commons , CCLXXV, March 9, 1933, col. 1383.

4.

Hall, Commons , CCLXXXVII, March 12, 1934, col. 62.

5.

Attlee, Commons , CCLXXXVI

6.

Lawson, Commons, CCLXXXVII

7.

N. MacLean, Commons", CCCIV, Jul} 22, 1935, col. 1578.

8.

i.'i.

Jones, Commons, CCCVTI

March 8, 1934, cols. 2047-8.

,

,

,

March 15, 1934, cols. 617-8.

December 5, 1935, col. 421.

22.

or the building up of the efficiency of the services. 1

Even in 1937, there

were still some disarmament die-hards in the Labour
Party.

At the Annual

Conference of that year a resolution was introduced opposing
support of
the Government's rearmament policy.

This resolution was supported

Harrison, T. Kennedy, H. Harvey, and Lord Ponsonby.

fcj

S.

The wind had changed,

however, and the resolution was defeated* 2
Some Labour members proclaimed that if the Labour Party won an election

and thus controlled Commons, it would make this opposition to rearmament
the official policy of Britain by passing a peace act.

This peace act would

provide all necessary machinery to make disarmament successful*
cover all phases of disarmament and its corollaries*

C* Delisle Burns dis-

cussed in Labour the action he believed was necessaryi

would pass an

n

It would

A Labour Government

Act through Parliament making it necessary for any British

Government to submit its international disputes to peaceful settlement,
preventing any British Government from the use of threats in

a

dispute, end

enabling it to take immediate action when economic, financial pressure,
or other measures" were required under the Covenant of the League,

son, in his Labour's Foreign Policy,

Act in considerable detail*

ifender-

described the provisions of the Peace

He would pass a Peace Act for two reasons:

first, to make clear to the world Britain's position and to enlighten public

opinion upon Britain's stand in regard to non- recourse to war, arbitration,
and co-operation, with other nations to keep peace:

and secondly, to show

that the value of a law depends upon the belief that it will be enforced*

Great Britain could do much to help that attitude*

The Peace Act would

1.

Attlee, Commons , CCCXII, July 21, 1936, col. 1428.

2.

L.P. Annual Report , 1937, pp. 196-7.

3*

Burns, op* cit . , p. 9*

23.

^
^
..^^ ^ ^

provide that in all oases.
without exception, the
SoTOrnment
-t its international disputes to
peaceful

^^

^

would the Government mobilise
its earned forces exee t
P to repei actual aggression, and that the , 0TOmn
ent should have ta
powers to take ali economic, financial and other
measures retired to fulmi
al! obligations
under the Covenant, the
Treaties, and other instrument,
by which
1
Britain may b, bound.
In 1934 , the Gene^l Counoil
of the Trades Union
Congress said that the next labour
Government would bring before
Parliament
a bill to accomplish all
that Henderson had proposed. 2

U

U «».

Although there

mm mm

opposition to rearmament, and some
su,port for

a Peaoe Act,

there is only a little support
recorded for a policy of unilateral disarmament. In the
President's address before the
Trades Union
Annual Congress in 1931 there is a
statement to the effect that a Labour
Government would set a good example
in the matter of armaments. 8
The same
year Sir Ben Turner asked. "Is it
feasible? I recognise that amongst
a
great mass of the people themselves they
have not brought themselves to
the idea that we can afford to do without
war weapons, but I believe there
is a gre, t moral force behind example and if Britain led the way. I think

4
it would be safer for Britain and safer
for the world.

Turner was .peaking

in opposition to the resolution proposed at
the Labour Party's Conference

by Hugh

C lton

and supported by Arthur Henderson.

theless, adopted by the conferences

by mutual agreement."

it called for

The resolution was, never-

adduction of armaments

5

The idea of multilateral disarmament expressed
in

1.

Henderson, Labour's Foreign Policy , pp. 19-20.

2.

T.U.C. Report . 1934, p. 1S9.

3.

"President's Address" , op. cit ., p. 71.

4.

Sir Ben Turner, L.P. Annual Report . 1931, p. 186.

5.

L.P. Annual Report , 1931, p. 42.

24.

this resolution «as the one *hich the
majority of British Labour supported.

Attlee stated clearly the Labour Party's
opposition

Britain alone,

to disarmament by

"As a party W e do not stand for unilateral
1
disarmament."

It W as disarmament of all nations by an
international agreement *hich Bri-

tish Labour and the Labour Party stood for.

Eventually some hoped to achieve

total disarmament

Such words as "drastic" and "substantial" frequently
described the

extent of disarmament desired.

W. Arnold-Forster made such a statement!

"•••I want immediate limitation and drastic and progressive
reduction of

the armaments of all nations..." 2

Burns said that one action of a future

government would be a "drastic reduction of British armaments
under international agreement..." 5

Arthur Henderson said exactly the same thing

except that the "drastic" disarmament would be accomplished by
"international agreement.

4

Numerous other examples could be quoted,

'hat

Labour specifically wished to accomplish was best summed up by Morgan Jones

in his proposals which he desired to have presented at a Disarmament Conference meeting at Geneva
"(a) the general abandonment of all air bombing

"(b) the general abolition of all weapons at present forbidden

Germany by the Treaty of Versailles
"(c) the international control of civil aviation
"(d) an immediate reduction by all nations in their expenditure

upon armaments

May 2, 1935, col. 375.

1.

Attlee,

2.

Hm Arnold-Forster, "Our Case in the Disarmament Campaign",
Labour Magazine , December 1931, X, p. 350.

3•

Burns , op. cit .

4.

C ommons

,

,

CCCII

,

p• 9

Henderson, Labour's Foreign Policy, pp. 21-2.

"(e) the suppression of all private manufacture
and trade in armaments
"(f) international inspection and control of
armaments in all countries
"(g) the creation of an international police force;
and
n

(h) the definition of aggression on the basis of
the proposals made

by the Conference committee,"

A disarmament conference seemed to Labour in Britain the
only way to
achieve these objectives.

They believed that all nations should sit down

at a conference table under the auspices of the Lea-ue of
Nations and reach

an agreement.

Here all phases of disarmament would be discussed and settled

for the benefit of the world.

All organized groups of Labour supported the Disarmament Conference of
1932-1934.

/trthur Henderson who had been Foreign Secretary in the Labour

Government expressed his support at the Labour Party's Annual Conference in
this manner:

M

I

believe if you are ever going to get any serious measure

of disarmament, you will get it through the joint efforts put forward through

the League of Nations.

The Disarmament Conference is a League of Nations

Conference and if we go to the League of Nations Conference and put up the
strong case thet can be put up by international agreement,
are more likely to succeed.

2

At the

seine

meeting a resolution was re-

ported which expressed unqualified support for the
the Executive Committee of the Labour Party.
f,

believe we

He was urging this as the better method as

compared to unilateral disarmament.

ted /pril 21, 1931, said,

I

i

isarmament Conference by

This resolution which was adop-

The National Executive of the Labour Party records

its conviction that the General Disarmament Conference which will be held

early next year is one of the most momentous events in the history of the
Jones, Commons

CCLXXXI

November 13, 1933, col. 579.

1.

If.

2.

Henderson, L.P. Annual Report, 1931, p. 187.

,

,

1
Y'orld, and especially of European
civilization."

Hugh Dalton at the Party's Conference moved, aiaong
other thi gs, that
"It ^the conference/

welcomes the opportunity afforded by the BfcrM
Dis-

armament Conference to deal effectively with this
question ^/disarmament/.

2
.

.»'

This resolution wkb adopted by the Labour Party's
3
Conference.
It was in 1931, also, that the Trades Union Congress
put its support

into

a

resolution which was adopted.

The resolution expressed the belief

of the Congress that the future of the League of Nations
would be "jeopar-

dized" unless the Disarmament Conference of the next year reached an
agree-

ment upon disarmament. 4

In 1934, the National Joint Council wanted the

British Government to put forward certain proposals at the Conference to
aid disarmament.*'
In the House of Commons the Labour members strongly supported the Dis-

armament Conference,

/'ttlee stated that

it would be a "tragedy" if the Dis-

armament Conference resulted in rearmament.

Here is a good indication that

the progress of the Conference was not regarded with favor.

In general many

of the Labour members of Parliament seemed to be most concerned with the con-

ference when it appeared that nothing would be accomplished.

In 1S34, Cocks

asked for a statement on the position of the Disarmament Conference.

7
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Henderson, L .P. Annual Report , 1931, p. 42.
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Ibid ., p. 184.

3.

Ibid ., p. 187.

4.

T.U.C. Report , 1931, p. 374.
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"General Council's Annual Report", T.U.C. Rep ort, 1934, pp. 156-7.
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Attlee, Commons, CCLXXXIV, December 21, 1933, col. 1501.

7.

F.S. Cocks, Commons, CCXC, June 4, 1934, col. 553.

in

1935 Morgan Jones asked the Government
to call the Disarmament
Conference
aeain-to give evidence that the idea
of disarmament had not been
given
1
up.
McLean, a week and a half later,
also .anted a conference to
dis2
cuss armament.
He .as followed by Lansbury
with the same revest. 3
As late as 1936 Grenfell asked for
information on the position of the
Dis4
armament Conference.
He probably needed no answer.
VShen the

discussion of the Hoover Proposals. which
consisted of the

suggestions that all existing arms be reduced
by one third, took lace at
P
the Disarmament Conference, considerable
approval was expressed. Before

Commons on June 28. 1932. Lansbury called
the Hoover Proposals the "most
5
magnificent proposals that have yet been
put forward."

The Labour Magazine

in an editorial said that these proposals
would save from h 2,000,000.000
to I 3,000.000,000 annually.

The editorial said that Hoover's proposals

were the "minimum programme" which the working
classes would accept.
these

would have to be supplemented by other measures. 6

Even

The s^me editor-

ial said that it was the only "simple and comprehensive
proposal devised to

reduce the number of soldiers on the continent of Europe." 7

That the Labour Party supported whole-heartedly these
proposals can be

proved by following the progress of the Annual Conference of the Labour

1.

M. Jones, Commons , CCCIV, July 11, 1955, col. 609.

2.

MacLean, Commons . CCCIV, July 22, 1935, col. 1584.

3.

Lansbury, Co mons , CCCIV, August 1, 1935, col. 2892.

4.

D.R. Grenfell, Commons , CCCVIII, February 4, 1936, col. 56.

5.

lansbury. Commons, CCLXVII, June 28, 1932, cel. 1773.

6.

"Editorial", Labour Magazine , July 1932, XI, p. 123.

7.

Ibid., p. 122.
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Party in 1932.
this,

The executive report to the Labour
Conference contained

"The National Executive Committee of the
Labour Party cordially *e l-

cor^s President Hoover's proposals for immediate
disarmament.

They regard

these proposals... as a substantial first step
towards total disarmament..."
The statement continued to say that the same
persons "express the hope that

everything will now be done to secure the immediate
adoption of President
Hoover's proposals as a minimum programme." 1

June 23, 1932.
Clynes.

This statement was mode on

At the same conference a resolution was introduced by
J.R.

Part of this resolution was devoted to the Hoover Proposals
in

these words:

"The Conference is of the opinion that loyal and effective

co-operation with the United States on the basis of President Hoover's
proposals is in the highest interests of the world peace..." 2
was carried by unanimous vote.

3

This resolution

It was only during the year of 1932 that

this active support was carried on.

It is interesting, however, that Morgan

Jones as late as 1937 said that, the Hoover proposals could have been accepted. 4
He meant by this statement that the Hoover proposals were workable and should

have been accepted by the Disarmament Conference of 1932-34.

His statement is

an indication of the impression which the Hoover Proposals made upon the Labour
Party.

Another plan which received some support from Labour

\*as

that all nations

1.

"Executive Keport" , L.P. Annual Report , 1932, p. 60.

2.

L.P. Annual Report , 1932, pp. 228-9.

3.

Ibid., p. 232.

4.

M. Jones, "Don't Despair of disarmament", Labour , February 1937, IV,
p. 139.

2(

disarm to the level of Germany as
imposed upon her by the Tr aty of
Versailles. This would have limited
greatly armies and navies, and
abolished
some of the means of waging
The treaty l imi ted Germany to
an army of
100.000 men.

1

Arnold-Forster, writing in the Labour

Marine

gain his

whole-hearted support to the Federation of
the League of Nations Societies*
proposal to abolish all weapons prohibited
by the Peace Treaties. 2 1

3"

In

the House of Commons Cocks said that the
nations at the Disarmament Conference

should agree to "abandon every -weapon forbidden
to Germany". 4

Jones and

Milner supported this view and the latter wanted
Britain to take the lead
in proposing this plan. 5

These members of Parliament were evidently
follow-

ing the position taken by the Labour Party at its
annual conference in 1933.

/t this conference J.R. Clynes proposed that the
Arty's conference take this
stand on disarmament.

His proposal was accepted by the conference. 7

If all nations had agreed to accept the degree of
armaments which Ger-

many possessed, there would have been equality among all nations.

W« Arnold-

Forster quoted and supported the resolution of the I.F.T.U. and L.S.I,
concerning equality, in his article published in the Labour Ma^asi ne.
said

"
,

The resolution

'The system of Disarmaments will only be complete and durable if
it
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Victor L. Albierg and Marguerite Hall lbjerg, From Sedan to Stresa
,
Fur ope S ince 1870. New York: D. Van Nos trend Co., Inc./ 1937,
pp. 743-4.

2.

Arnold-Forster, "Our Case in the Df sarmatnent Campaign", Labour Magazine
December 1931, X, pp. 350-2.

3.

Arnold-Forster, "The Crisis in Disarmament" , Labour , kprll 1934, I, p. 205.

4.

Cocks, op
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Milner, Commons , CCLXXXIII, November 27, 1933, col. 629-30.
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6.

J.R. Clynes, L.P. Annual Rep ort, 1933, p. 192.
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L.P. Annual iteport , 1933, p. 194.
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inions

,

CCLXX, November 10, 1932, col. 1571.

.

is based on equality of rights and duties.

11,1

Annual Report carried the sane statement. 2

The Trades Uni on Congre ss

Arnold-Forster still held to

this principle in 1934. 3

Not only did Labour want equality in rights and duties but
also equali-

ty of armaments - in disarmament.
keeping, Germany at the bottom.

This idea hit straight at the idea of

Arnold-Forster openly said that he believed

in equality for Germany in aims. He continued to say that disarmed
countries

should not be permitted to rearm.
equalize by leveling down,..."

"Obviously, it is most desirable we should

4

The Trades Union Congress agreed with the

joint resolution of I.F.T.U. and L.S.I . which Arnold-Forster discussed. 5
In 1935, Morgan Jones stated in the House of Commons that Germany should

have been granted equality by disarmament

S

Another phass of disarmament which Labour wished to see come about was
a

scheme of international control of the manufacture of arms.

Cripps, speak-

ing before Commons, proposed that both the manufacture and the sale of arms

be placed under international control.

7

It may be assumed that the instru-

ment of international control would be the League of Nations.

Jones was of
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Arnold-Forster, "Cur Case in the Disarmament Campaign", Labour Magazi ne,
December 1931, X, pp. 350-2.
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"Disarmament Resolution", T.U.C. Report , 1931, pp. 241-2.

3.

Arnold-Forster,

4.

Arnold-Forster, "Our Case in the Disarmament Campaign", Labour Magazine ,
December 1931, X, pp. 350-2.
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"Disarmament" , Resolutions, T.U.C. Report , 1931, pp. 241-2.

6.

Jones, Commons

7.

Cripps, Commons, CCLXXVI

,

''The

Crisis in Disarmament"

,

Labour , April 1934, I, p. 205

CCCIV, July 11, 1935, col. 609.
,

March 23, 1933, col. 307.

the same opinion, enlarging upon the suggestion
to include the suppression
of all private manufacture and trade in armaments. 1

Not all the Labour

members of Commons believed that this would be accomplished
with ease.
Cocks said that an international system f 0 r the control
and inspection of
arms would only bring about evasion.

He was of the belief that no country

would divulge to international police the location of any arms
or factories.
It may be assumed, however, that Cocks was in the minority
because

supported this plan.

ttlee

Attlee criticized the Government because it opposed

the proposal of the United States to inspect the private manufacture
of

arms.

3

A resolution of the Labour Party Annual Conference, which was

adopted in 1933, called for the suppression of all private manufacture of
4

arms •

The magazine Labour printed erticles which included demands for international control of armaments.

C. Delisle -urns said that the abolition

of the manufacture of arms under international agreements would bo one of

the first steps of a Labour Government.

W* ''rnold-Forster wrote that

"...we ought to support the French in pressing for supprwssion of manufac-

ture of arms for private profit.

Failing that we ought to at least support

6

In the same article Forster said that an

the French scheme for control."

international agreement for disarmament must provide for the abolition of
the private manufacture of arms.

7

Henderson wanted to control the sale of

CCLXXXI, November 13, 1933, col. 579.

1.

M. Jones, Commons

2.

Cocks, Commons , CCXCV, November 23, 1934, col. 321.

3.

Attlea, Commons , CCXCIX,
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Hums ,
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11, 1935, col. 39.
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Labour, April 1934,

anas by a system similar to that
used to control the sale of drugs
by a
convention.*

Another check upon the building of anus
of all types which Labour
wished
to obtain nas a cut or a check on budgetary
allotments of all nations for
armaments.
The Labour Magazine printed the draft
resolution of the National
Executive of the Labour Party Annual Conference
of 1531 which expressed this
desire.

This resolution urged the British Government
to "put forth at that

Conference (Disarmament Conference) proposals for
drastic and far-reachine
reductions, by international agreement, in the
numbers and equipment of all
2
armed forces and in military, naval, and air
expenditure."

was adopted at the Labour Party's Conference. 3

v7.

The proposal

Arnold-Forster, as might

be expected, supported a cut in appropriations for
armaments.

He placed his

si'pport behind the Federation of the League of Eations
Societies' proposal

to cut world spending for armaments by twenty-five per cent. 4

This twenty-

five per cent was the only definite clue as to how much Labour wanted
to

reduce spending for arms.

The Trades Union Congress also favored cutting expenditures for anas.

It supported a petition, representing the British Trades Union Movement,
the Labour Party, ana the British Cooperative Union, which was sent to the
PrL-ne

Minister and Arthur Henderson (who was President of the Disarmament

Conference).

Included in the petition was a request for a reduction of ex-

penditures for war materials.

5

In 1934, the National Joint Council, on

June 23th, called upon the British Government to submit proposals for
1.

Henderson, Labour's Foreign Policy, pp. 21-3.

2.

"Labour Constructive Proposals - raf t Resolutions for the Scarborough
Conference" submitted by the National Executive of the Labour Party to
the Scarborough Conference, Labour Magazine , October 1931, X, p. 263.

3.

L.P. Annual Report, 1931, p. 137.

4.

Arnold-Forster, 'Our Case in the Disarmament Campaign", Labour Magazine ,
December 1931, X, pp. 350-2.

5.

"International" T.U.C. Report, 1932, p. 174.

I

"immediate reductions of expenditures" f
or anus to the Disarmament Conference.
These examples she™ clearly that the
Trades Union Congress and the

groups W hich it represented wished to reduce
the

W

mm*

or

mm»y

This trend of thought is reflected in the
speeches of

bers in the House of

for arms.

Labour mem-

Morgan Jones said, in discussing disarmament,

that there should bo "budgetary limitations,
for that, after all, is not an

unimportant part in the problem.'*

2

Four months later he included the same

idea in his proposals which he wanted the Government
to send to the Disarma-

ment Conference.

3

Sir Stafford Cri PP s also suggested that the funds
avail-

able for erms be cut at the Disarmament Conference. 4

Arthur Henderson supported a limitat: on upon the amount
of money spent
on arms.

his Labour's Foreign Policy he said that "strict limitation
of

budgetary expenditure upon armaments" would be one of the things
which the

next Labour Government would try to bring about*

This, of course, would

have been included in a Disarmament Treaty.
There is a wealth of printed material which states Labovr
achieve disarmament.

f

s

desire to

On the other hand, there &re only a Tew men who had

definite ideas as to what they wanted to reduce or abolish.

It is only

hy examining considerable material and examining the support of the various

plans that one is able to get a complete picture of lust what the Labour

groups desired in the way of disarmament.
In regard to the army. Labour had proposals which touched upon peace
time effectives, the period of service, the size of guns, tanks and of
the army.
1.

"International", T.U.C. Re port, 1934, pp. 156-7.

2.

M. Jones, Commons

,

CGLXXX, July 5, 1933, col. 443.

3.

M. Jones, Commons

,

CCLXXXI

4.

Cripps, Commons

CCLXXVI

5.

Henderson, Labour's loreign Policy , pp. 21-3.

,

,

,

November 13, 1933, col. 579.

l.'arch

23, 1933, col. 607.

It was pretty well agreed that the
size of an army should bo limited
or, at least, that all

amies should bo reduced.

The Trades Union Congress

1
said that tho peace time effectives must be
reduced.

In 1932, * petition

was presented to the Prime Minister in which
a request

»S

•immediate and substantial reduction of effectives..." 2

included for an
The National

utive of the Labour Party in 1931 submitted
resolutions to the annual confer-

ence of the Party which included a proposal for
"drastic and far-reaching

reduction by international agreement, in the numbers
and equipment of all
3

armed forces..."
ualton;

This resolution was proposed to the Conference by Hugh
4
its acceptance was voted.
These are the only comments made in

Labour publications which refer directly to the size of national
armies.
Labour also hoped that some agreement could be reached on the terms
of

enlistment in a national army.

The Trades Union Congress hoped that an

agreement could be reached at the disarmament Conference on the "period of
service in the conscript armies." 5

The Hoover Proposals made no mention

of how long enlistments should be.

The Treaty of Versailles fixed enlist-

ments for enlisted men at fifteen years and for officers at twenty-five

years.

6

It is difficult to know ezactly how long Labour thought enlistments
should be.

They did, however, hope to modify the conscription policies of

other nations such as France.

It is more than likely that Labour in Britain

would have supported the plan to reduce all armies to 100,000 men and fix
1.

"Political

spects of the Unemployment Crisis", T.U.C. Report , 1957,

p. 133.
2.

"International", T. U.C. Report , 1932, p. 174.

3.

"Labour Constructive Proposals", T.U.C. Keport , 1932,

4.

L.P. Annual report , 1931, pp. 184 and 187.

5.

T.U.C. Report , 1937, p. 133.

6.

Albjerg and /.lbjerg, op. cit ., pp. 743-4.

p. 263.

enlistments for enlisted Men and for
officers for

.

specified time, as in-

dicated by its support of the proposal
to reduce all arms to Germany's
level

Labour also wished to take some action
in regard to reserves.

The

Trades Union Congress said that "reserves
available for mobilisation" should
be reduced. 2
TC. Arnold-Forster said that
disarmament at the outset would
be unequal because of conscription.

He added, "Some means must bo found
to

mitigate this inequality which is given to the
Pavers With short service-en3
listment reserves available for rapid expansion
in *artir ie ."

It is hard

to believe that Labour wanted conscription to continue,
yet the period of
service in conscript

amies

opposed conscription;

is mentioned.

Probably the troth is that they

but, as Arnold-Forster suggests, they thought it
coul d

not be abolished at this time.

Although the size of an army is important. Labour also saw that en army's
equipment might

ma.ke

aggression possible, as well as its size.

wanted to abolish all heavy artillery and tanks. 4

with Henderson's suggestion of action as a

Arnold-Forstor agreed

rieans of

sion in which the victors promised to disarm.

Henderson

carrying out the provi-

The Hoover Propcsals also

proposed to abolish "all mobile land guns of more than six inch calibre"
and to prohibit tanks.

6
Front the

enthusiasm expressed for the armament

proposals of the Peace Treaties and the Hoover Proposals, it is probable
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Albjerg and Albjerg, op. cit ., pp. 743-4.

2.

"Disarmament", T.D.C. Annual Report , 1921, pp. 241-2.
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Arnold-Fcrster , "Our Case in the Disarmament Campaign", Labour Magazine ,
December 1831, X, pp. 350-2.
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Henderson, Labour's Foreign Policy , pp. 21-2.
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Arnold-Korster , "Cur Case in the Disarmament campaign", Labour i-iagazine ,
December 1931, A, pp. 350-2.
Arnolo-Fcrster , "The Crisis in Disarmament", Labour . May 1334, I. p. 204.

6.

Mlliam Starr Meyers,
.

Kew York:

The Foreign Policies of Herbert Hoover , 1929?1933.
C. Scribners Sons, 1940, p. 142.

that all Labour E roups ^ere in accord
.ith the plan to abolish tanks and to
limit the size of heavy guns to six inches
calibre or less. Arnold-Forster
thought that reductions of arms should take
place to the "point of abolition
of all arms except such as may still genuinely
be required to prevent, or

in the last resort to put a stop to, breaches of
1
the public peace.
The navies of the nvorld

Wmld

also be reduced.

marines were the chief targets for abolition.

went on record in 1951 as favoring

e

Battleships and sub-

The Tredes Union Congress

reduction of all navies.

2

Sir Staf-

ford oripps believed that "naval disarmament" should be
part of disarmament.

W. Arnold-Forster supported the Federation of the League of
Nations Societies' proposal to proceed in negotiations on the basis that all
a*T*3 vessel

be limited to the size imposed upon Germany. 4

Arthur Henderson wcs of the

same opinion in his Labour's foreign Policy . 5

From the above example it is clear that the Labour groups wished to
abolish all warships over 10,000 tons and all submarines.

Versailles permitted Germany to have the following navy:
six cruisers, and twelve torpedo ships.

The Treaty of
six battleships,

Germany was permitted to have no

6

submarines

.

This plan would have reduced many navies to token forces.

The Hoover -Proposals w re not so f ar-reachi> g;

plens to reduce existing
ships,

m vies

they were chiefly

by one-third and abolish some types of

loover suggested that aircraft carriers and submarines be abolished;

that Japan, Britain, and the United otates reduce cruisers, destroyers,
1.

Arnold-Forster, "Our use in the Disarmament Campaign", Labour Magazine , December 1951, X, p. 3o0.
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"Disarmament", T.U.C. Report , 1931, pp. 241-2.
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Henderson, Lab o ur
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Albjerg and i.lbjerg, op. cit,, pp. 743-4.

r

s

foreign Policy , pp. 21-2.

and battleships by one-third

1
and that Italy and France build no new
ones.

;

If there was any one weapon which Labour
groups most wanted to abolish,
it was military aircraft.

All sections were united in desiring
particularly

to have bombing planes outlawed.

Attlee was one of those who thought that

Hitler's proposal to agree to nor-aggression pacts, to
fix limits on armaments and to place "restrictions" on bombing planes should
be considered by
a

Disarmament Confereuoe.

2

I'acLean stated that he supported a plai; to

reduce the air forces of other nations to the size of England's
and then to

reduce all air forces by another one- third. 3

Both of these men later made

other statements calling for the abolition of all national air forces.

In the House of Commons Attlee, ^'acLean, Lansbury, Jones, Crinps,
Milner, and Adams all w&nted to see every national air force destroyed.

Morgan Jones said he wanted "the complete abandonment of all air bombing."

Sir Stafford Cripps declared that an increased air force would

not give any protection to Britain.
"abolish aerial warfare altogether ."5

The only sound defense would be to

Attlee agreed, laying that although

air power theeatoned England's security, the government did not try to
6

abolish military aircraft at the Disarmament Conference.

The Trades I'nion

Congress also went on record as favoring the abolition of national

a5 r

forces.

It supported a joint resolution o^ the I.F.T.U. and the L.S.I, calling for
7

the abolition of national air forces "without delay" in 1931.
1.

Meyers, op. oit ., p. 142

2.

Attlee, Commons , CCCII

3.

MacLoan,

4.

M* Jones, Coimuons

5.

Cripps, Commons, CCCII, May 22, 1935, col. 471.

6.

Attlee, Commons, CCCXXVTII, November 1, 1937, col. 328.
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T.U.C. Annual Kaoort. 1931. on. 241-2.

In 1934, the

Congress said that in order to achieve international security "all
national
air forces" must be abolished,*

The Labour Magazine and its successor, Labour , carried articles by
NoelBaker, MaoNeil, Weir, Smith, and Arnold-Forster which advocated the abolition of national air forces,

Walter R. Smith wrote:

n

lt is of very parti-

cular importance to get rid of the air armaments which the nations now main-

tain.

This statement is characteristic of others in the publication.

The

Labour Party Annual Reports mentioned this phase of disarmament only once,
in 1033, when the report included a request for the abolition of military

aircraft.

It is a little surprising that there were not more requests in

view of the activity of the Labour Members of Parliament on the behalf of

destroying national air forces.
One other weapon which Labour wished to abolish was poison gas.

The

Trades Union Congress expressed its approval of the joint resolution of the
I.F.T.U. and L.S.I, which included a statement calling for the prohibition
4
of chemical and bacteriological munitions.

Arnold-Forster seconded the Fed-

eration of League of Nations Societies' plan which included the prohibition
on chemical warfare.

5

Noel-Baker also said that since there was no protec6

tion against gas, it should be abolished.
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and Collective Security", Labour , November

39.

It was hoped that the limitation of some aras
and the abolition of

others xvould gradually lead to the end of all national
amies and navies.

According to Arnold-Forster and others "complete" or "total"
disarmament
was the final objective,

ried as rapidly

t.s

Amold-Forster wanted the reductions to be "car-

possible to the point of abolition of all arms except

such as May genuinely be required to prevent, or in the last resort to
put
a stop to, breaches of public peace. 1,1

The petition of the British Labour

Party and the British Trades Union Movement called for a reduction which

would lead "to complete, universal, and controlled disarmament at the earliest possible moment

2

At the Annual Conference of the Labour Party in 1933, J.R. Clynes in-

troduced a resolution -which

accepted.

»£,s

This resolution called for the

3
'-total

disarmament o" all nations".

Henderson, before the Conference of

the next year, stated that "Labour's policy is directed towards the aboli-

tion of war .. .by. • .the substitution of an international police force under
the League's authority for national armed forces."

4

In the House of Commons Afctl.. and Grenfoll expressed
see partial disarmament £ive way to complete cisarmanent .

trie

desire to

Grenfeli said

that he w nted complete disarmament from the Disarmament Conference.
19313,

Attlee said that the Labour Party's

5

in

>olicy was to reduce and then

abolish ail armaments.
The achievement of complete disarmament would not automatically end
the Disamaaient Campaign", Labour ila^azine,

1.

Arnold-Forstor, "Our Case
Daceauer 1931, X, p. 350*
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"International", T.U.O . Rgggrt ,

3*

L.P. Annual

4#

L.P. Anuual xiepart, 1934, p. 154.
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174.
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,

March 23, 1933, col. 525.
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The achievement of complete disarmament would
not automatically
the possibility of international disputes.

0rid

Since these disputes could not

be settled by war, some other means had to be
provided.

Labour, therefore,

supported arbitration under the League of Nations,
economic sanctions, and
an international police force to maintain international
order.

these - the International Police 7orce -

>iill

Only one of

be discussed here because

the others are treated in later chapters.

This international force would provide all the protection necessary.
It was to bo under the authority of the League, or, in othor
words, under

the direction of all nations who were members of the League.

said that such an organization was one of the steps in Labou>

Henderson
»s

policy to

abolish war, and emphasized the point that this force would be substituted
for national armed forces.

1

It was the opinion of most Labour leaders that

this police force should be established as a result of a disarmament confer-

ence.

Jones included the proposal for

a

police force among several to be

made to the Geneva Disarmament oonference in 1933.

2

iiander asked that the

Foreign Secretary call upon the President of the Disarmament Conference to
call it together to achieve reduction of arms and "spocifc.1 consideration as
to the possibility of establishing an international air police forco."°

ins Italy's attack on Ethiopia, V,
v/ould ha TT e

r.darrs

Dur-

said that an international force

made it impossible for Mussolini to "flout the League

1

".

4

In Labour's support of disarmament there is much evidence that it had
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Henderson, L.P. /nnual Rep ort, 1934, p. 154.

2.

Jone3, Caaraons, CCLXXXI, November 13, 1933, col. 576.

3.

£».

4.

"The International Situation", L#P. Annual Report, 1936, p. 182.

Mander,

CotTimons,

CCCIII, July 3. 1935, col. 1841.

the support of the British people.

found in the Peace ballot of 1936

Interesting evidence on this point

am

another poll conducted in 1933.

this latter poll, according to the Labour
Party's Annual deport .

questionaires *ere sent out to all classes of
people,
questionnaires were returned;

U
In

34,000

une-nalf of the

57> of those returned favored unconditional

probably unilateral, disarmament by Great Britain. 1

The more fanous poll

was the Peace Ballot vjhich was sorted by the x-eague
of Nations Union and
carried out by a "National declaration Committee"
and thirty-eight other organizations.
f ollc'ws

v.-nich

included the Union

The questions and rosuits were as

s

"Are you in favor of an all around reduction in armaments
by international

agreement?
Yes - 10,470,459;

It

-

662,775;

Doubtful - 12,052

Abstentions - 213, 589.
"Are you in favor of an all around abolition of national /nilltary and naval

aircraft by international agreement?
Yes - 9,533,558;

It - 1,689,786;

Doubtful

-

16,376;

Abstentions - 318, 845.
"Should the manufacture and sale of armaments for private profit ba prohi-

bited by international agreement?
Yes - 10,417,329;

No - 775,415;

Abstentions - 361, 345."

Doubtful - 15,076;

2

It is not surprising, in view of the results of the ballots, that Brit-

ish Labour favored disarmament;
(Jovernuent's policy.

indeed, the Peace Ballot inf luenced the

As tho minority party, the Labour Party could not af-

ford to oppose the electorate and still hope to gain more votes.
1. Ma.ior Bellerly, L.P. Annual

2. Frederick L.

1933-1939.

R

It is

e port , 1933, pp. 192-3.

human, Europe on the Eve; The Crisis of Diplomacy
Ne*i York:
Alfred >\. Knopf, 1942, p. 175.
Sic
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possible that this public opinion for disarmament
may have been created,
in part, by the activity of the British Labour
groups.

If this is true,

then there was a circle which could only have
been broken by a change of

policy by the Labour groups or by the impact of
a crisis in foreign affairs.

Whatever the cause. British Labour maintained its
support for disarmament
after the British Government had turned to rearmament,
and public opinion is

unquestionably one factor which led Labour to continue to work
for disarmament throughout the period, 1931-1937.
The position of the British Government

i

n regard to armaments in the

period 1931-1938 has been the subject of considerable comment;
that comment was adverse criticism.

much of

An examination of Labour's position

does not lead one to think that its policy would have been much different
or that it would have been wiser from the standpoint of British interests.

Labour's policy on armaments was directed towards achieving international

disarmament, a policy which became increasingly impossible as the years
passed.

Labour's policy was probably motivated by two considerations:

first, their pacifist background, and second, their opposition to Government

policy.
There can be little doubt of Labour

armament.

1

s

sincerity in its belief in dis-

Too much was written and said on the behalf of disarmament over

a considerable period of time to classify Labour's aim as only politics or

chicanery.

This belief is at least partly the reason why Labour was blind

to certain aspects of world conditions.

Labour made many statements concern-

ing the danger of the totalitarian nations to peace, yet still worked for

disarmament.

Either Labour did not feel that there was a real threat or did

not realize that arms alone could prevent aggression from succeeding.

Along

with this sincerity of belief was the factor of the Labour Party being the

43

party of opposition.

This factor alone would have prompted
the Labour Party

to oppose the Government when it started
its rearmament program.

This atti-

tude could have prompted Labour to advocate
rearmament before the Government
had started to press for a greater
rearmament program. But at that time
the Labour groups had good evidence that
the British people believed in dis-

armament.

Thus. Labour could not afford to give up
the policy of disarma-

ment, expect an increase of its power at the
polls.

This belief of the

British people may have been partly the result
of Labour's continual agita-

tion for disarmament.

If this is true, then Labour groups must
share the

responsibility for the position in which Britain found herself
in 1939.

Whatever the cause or effect Labour did not support rearmament
until some
time after the British Government had taken steps to increusr.
British arma-

ments •

The British Government moved towards rearmament in 1934 starting
with
1

the air force.

In March of 1936 the Government provided for large scale

increases for military and naval forces.

2

Yet, it was in 1936 in debate

on these increases that Attlee moved,". ..as the safety of this country

cannot be secured by reliance on armaments but only by the resolute pursuit
of a policy of international understanding, adherence to the Covenant of the

League of Nations, /find/

general disarmament. . .this House cannot agree to

a policy which in fact seeks security in national armaments alone..."

Not

until November 1, 1937, did Attlee say, "In the conditions which now exist
as a result of their ^the Government's^

policy we agree that any govern4

ment would have to provide an increase of armaments."

Here is clear evidence

1.

Summarised by Arnold V.'olfers, Britain and France between Two
Conflicting btrategies of -Peace Since Versai lles^ New Y 0 rk:
Brace and Co., 1940. p. 374, footnote 14.

2.

Loc. cit .

3.

Attlee, Commons , CCCIX, March 9, 1936, cols. 1841-2.

4.

Attlee, Co.mons, CCCXXVIII, November 1, 1937, col. 670.

>rs,
Hare ourt
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that Labour lagged behind the Government in supporting
rearmament.

Cer-

tainly there were signs which pointed clearly to the need
of armaments before November of 1937.

Abyssinia had fallen to Mussolini;

had been fortified by Hitler;

both dictators.

the Rhineland

and Franco was receiving military help from

If their activites were to be halted, a threat of force

backed by real strength, or force, had to be used.

Labour's policy until

1937 would have made such a step impossible.

Ideally, it is the duty of a political party to keep a nation informed
as to the nation's needs.

A party should take any opportunity to point to

certain matters either domestic or foreign which need attention, and offer
a program to correct these conditions,

^abour to some extent was able to

do the former, but completely unable to do the latter in regard to armaments.
Since, in many respects, the government had failed to take that step, then

it was of the utmost importance for the opposition to provide the necessary
leadership.

Labour leaders quickly saw Hitler as a menace to democracy and

peace, but failed to offer a program which would have destroyed that menace.

Certainly in the beginning of the Government's rearmament program, labour's
attitude may heve in part been responsible for the slowness with which the
rearmament program proceeded.

If Labour had supported the rearmament program,

more British people would have supported the program.

Britain would have

been able to present a united front to aggression.
The disarmament program put forward by British Labour and the Labour

Party was idealistic rather than practical.

Throughout the greater part of

the period 1931-1938, Labour groups failed to realize that the dete mi nation
of Japan, Germany, and Italy to expand at the expense of weaker nations

would not be prevented by adverse public opinion.

It is one of the incon-

sistencies of Labour's foreign policy that on the one hand, L abour advocated

44.

collective action and at the same time would have denied the
means by which
collective action could have succeeded.

Labour would have weakened the

ability of Britain and other nations to make collective action
effective by
disarmament*

Even if all other nations had agreed to international disar-

mament, these three nations would have violated the agreement*

Thus, at the

time when collective action should have been strong, there would have been

no power with which to meet the

fcgj

ressor nations.

The chief reason why disarmament was not achieved during this period

was the fact that the nations of the world were compelled to rearm to meet
the aggressor nations who did not believe in disarmament and certainly did
not intend to disarm no matter what other nations did about their arms.

Consequently, the peace-loving nations could not see hem they could disarm
and still have security.

It was evident to many nations that disarmament

was not the way to security with sane nations outside of the League who would

not accept disarmament.

On the contrary, the way to security was by rearma-

ment —force to meet force.
The point

which most needed to be emphasized concerning disarmament

was the matter of security.

No nation cencerned vath its own security could

cotisider disarmament by itself, without regard to the overall question of

security and defense.
degree.

:3ut

It is true that Labour groups recognized this to sone

for the most part they took the stand that security would come

after disarmament.

The skeptics insisted that security wes necessary before

disarmament could be achieved.
tics showed wisdom and realism.

V

ith world conditions as they were, the skepThe redeeming feature of labour's policy

towards disarmament was Labour's insistence that disarmament be universal,
and also that a world police force be established to deal with the violators
of the peace.

These two conditions were certainly necessary to make disarma-

ment successful.

The chief criticism is that Labour's
drive .as for inter-

national disarmament primarily, and for
an international police force,
secondarily. The order should be reversed
even In time, of tranquillity, and
it is imperative that it should be in
times of stress.

The years, 1931-

1938, constituted a period of suspicion and fears-fears
which could only

have been allayed by security.
this remedy.

The policy of the Labour Party did not
offer

Thus, it *as working for an objective which
could not be

fulfilled, and Labour's efforts were fated for defeat.
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Chapter II

Manchuria

The first example of the aggression, which was
to become almost commonplace in the 1930 's was the Japanese conquest of
Manchuria.

In the summer

of 1931, there were two conflicts between Chinese and
Japanese nationals.

The first of these came at the end of June when a Japanese
captain and three

assistants were murdered by Chinese soldiers in Manchuria.

This action was

followed in early July by the Wanpaoshan affair, a riot caused by a
dispute
between Korean and Japanese farmers in Manchuria, which led to anti-Chinese
riots in Korea in wh ch five hundred Chinese were casualties, and to an anti-

Japanese boycott by the Chinese.

Although Baron Shidehara, the Japanese

Prime Minister, desired a policy of conciliation, Japanese military authorities decided to use force.

Following an explosion on the South Manchurian

itailroad, Japanese troops seized the barracks, arsenal, and airfield in

mukden on the night of September 18th and the following morning.

Within the

next four days many strategic points along and near the railroad were in
Japanese hands.

ern Manchuria.

By the beginning of 1932, Japanese troops held all of SouthThis aggression w^s continued until all of Manchuria was

occupied and a puppet state under Japanese control was established.*

The Chinese Government brought the matter before the League of Nations
on September 21, 1931, under Article XI of the Covenant.

2
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Article XI of the Covenant reads:

London:

1. "Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any
of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a
matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall
take any action deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the
peace of nations. In case any such emergency shall arise
the Secretary-General shall on the request of the Members
of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.
2.

"It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member
(Continued on next page (47) as footnote)

The next day the matter

viae

debated by the Council, to whom-

the Japanese

delegate said that the question could best be settled
by direct negotiations
of the two nations directly concerned.

After some discussion, the League

council decided to try t e persuade both sides to stop fighting
and return

their troops to their original positions.

to both nations.

A report of the meetings of the Council was sent to the

United States because it had signed the
Treaty.

An appeal to this effect was sent

shington Pact and the Kellogg

The United States indicated its approval of the League action, but

said that it did not wish to take part in a commission of inquiry.

Although

the Council had received a note from Japan stating that troops would be

withdrawn to the railroad zone, the Japanese forces pushed forward.

Further

League Council discussion produced no plan leading to the cessation of hostilities.

In December, on request of the Japanese delegate, a commission

(which came to be known as the Lytton
gate the facts of the case.

coiiLiaission)

was appointed to investi-

On January 7, 1932, Secretary Stimson sent

his famous nonrecognition note to Japan.

The Stimson Doctrine stated the refusal of the United States to recognize any agreement which would "impair the treaty rights of the United

States or its citizens in China including those which relate to the sover-

eignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity
of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China,

commonly known as the open-door policy, and tha~ it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means

contrary to the Covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27,
(Footnote continued from page 46)
of the League to bring to the attention of the
Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding be-

tween nations upon which peace depends."

48.

1928, to which treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United
States,

are parties."

Not until March 11th did the Council of the league of Na-

tions adopt a resolution, drafted by Sir John Simon, which stated
that no

member of the League would recognize any new situation contrary to the

Covenant or to the Pact of Paris.
The Lytton Commission made its report to the League in October of
It was recommended in this report that Manchuria be given autonomy

1932.

under

£

hinese soverilgnty and new

tr-

aties be signed by both China and Japan

to safeguard the rights of both parties.

The Council began consideration of

this report on November 21st, and on November 28th sent the report to the

Assembly.

The Assembly asked the council of Nineteen to study the report

and to make recommendations to the assembly.

tions which implicitly condemned Japan

1

s

This Council made recommenda-

actions;

it urged that Manchuria

be restored to Chinese sovereignty and that Japanese troops be withdrawn
to the railway zone, where they had the right to be.

The Assembly accepted

the proposals by the vote of all members present except Japan.

This was

followed by the withdrawal of the Japanese delegation from the Assembly,
and on March 27, 1933, the Japanese Government announced its intention to
2

withdraw from the League of Nations.

This mere condemnation of Japanese

action by the League, without any attempt to enforce sanctions, was ineffective, and Manchuria still remained a Japanese protectorate.

The British Government's policy during this period was, generally

1.

Quoted by Irving S. Friedman, British Relations with China . New York
International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, Publications Office, p. 19, footnote 1.

2.
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speaking, directed towards mediation.

A few days after the Japanese attack

on Mukden, China brought the matter to the attention of the
Council of the

League, which called upon both China and Japan to withdraw their
troops
immediately.

Viscount Cecil, the British member of the Council, approved

of the Council s action and stated that only when peace w-

the dispute be settled.

s

assured, could

On September 28th, Cecil expressed approval of the

Chinese suggestion that a committee investigate the dispute.

He also hoped

that by direct negotiations the Chinese and Japanese Governments could reach

an agreement for the evacuation of troops.

On October 16, 1931, Prentiss

Gilbert, an American, attended the Council meeting at the Councils invita-

tion which was supported by the British delegate.

The British delegate

assured the Japanese that Prentiss Gilbert would not sit as a member.

On

October 22nd, Lord Cecil stated that the British Government had been made

uneasy by the bombing of Manchurian cities and could not see the justification for such action.
the

.

At a later meeting of the Council on November 16th,

ritish delegate gave his support to the resolution which provided for

sending a commission (the Lytton Co mission) to Manchurie to investigate.
On the same day Lord Cecil took note of the "difficult and exceptional"

position in Manchuria, but hoped that such a condition would not lead to
more hostilities.

Thus,

ritain accepted in part, the Japanese assertion

that disorder in Manchuria made military action necessary.
On

January 7, 1932, Secretary Stimson sent his non- re cognition note

to China and Japan, expressing the hope that Britain would take similar
action.

In an official reply the British Foreign Office stated that

Britain still supported the open-door policy, but, because Japan had stated
that it intended to continue the o-en-door, such a note was unnecessary.

This was considered as a rebuff to the United States by many, and evidence

so.

that the United States and Britain would not
present a united front to Ja-

panese aggression.

This reply, it was explained in 1938, was not
intended

to alienate the United States, but had been drafted
by permanent officials
of the Foreign Office and sent to the newspapers
without realization of its

implications.

When Manchukuo asked for Britain's recognition, Simon
told

the House of Commons that recognition would be premature.

From February 28,

1933, to March 13, 1933, an embargo was placed on the shipment of
arms both

to China and Japan by the British Government, the only government
which did

this.

On December 6, 1932, the League Assembly began its discussion of
the

Lytton Report.

At that time bimon called attention to the parts of the

report that mentioned disorderly conditions in China.

He stated that it

was necessary to recognize "realities" and indicated that a restoration of
the status quo

tion.

before the Mukden incident would not be the correct solu-

He, however, did wish to uphold the principles of the League, and he

thought the League might be able to offer its good offices for conciliation
of the dispute.

This speech was pro-Japanese and indicated 3ritati's ac-

quiescence in the Japanese conquest of Manchuria.*
There is evidence that British Labour would have preferred a more aggressive policy.

Some Labour members wanted financial and economic sanctions

levied against Japan, as well as the moral sanctions of non-recognition and
the withdrawal of ambessadors.

arms to China.

In addition, some Labourites would have sent

The great danger to the League of Nations, to peace, and to

other possible victims of aggression were foreseen.

In November of 1931 Lsnsbury warned Commons by saying that if Japan
succeeded in its attack upon Manchuria, other nations might commit aggression
2

by the "same method".

The Labour Magazine

presented a similar warning in

1.

Gilbert "rnest dtibbard, British Far "astern Policy . New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943, Chapter II,
passim.
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Lansbury, Commons, CCLX, November 25, 1931, cols. 462-3.

editorial in February

of 1932 which stated that the League
of Nations and

the 3riand-Kellogg Pact would become scraps of
paper if the war were ig-

nored.

The writer went on to say that it was a "grave
situation which

threatens the peace of the world..." 1
second danger point after Austria. 2

Attlee believed that Japan was the
In 1934, one delegate to the Trades

Union Congress said that the immediate danger of trouble was Japan,
not

Germany which was incapable of waging war at this time. 3
In 1935, Attlee, with the advantage of hindsight, said that the
British

Government had defaulted on all of its pledges, such as the Pact of Paris
and the Wine-Power Treaty.

He quoted Secretary of State Stimson's statement

that if Japan were permitted to violate .hina*s territorial integrity, a
new naval race would be inevitable, and war was possible in the Pacific.

Attlee continued by saying that the failure of the British Government and
other governments to uphold the rule of law had killed security throughout
the world.

"From that moment rearms nent became the order of the day, and

the advocates of physical force all over the world were encouraged, includ-

ing Hitler."
The conflict, moreover, placed the British people and British interests
in jeopardy.

These things were quickly recognized by all section

Labour movement.

s

of the

A statement to this effect by the National Joint Council

which represented the General Council of the Trades Union Congress, the
National 'ixecutive of the Labour Party, and the Parliamentary Labour Party,
was published in the /nnual Reports of the Labour Party's Annual Conference
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and the meeting of the Trades Union
Congress of 1932.

that the Japanese attack was unwarranted.

If the nations of the world did

nothing to support the League, the League
would fall;

tainly follow;
for disarmament.

This statement said

other wars would cer-

and if the situation became worse, there
could be no hope

Furthermore. British lives and interests were
in danger

and should be protected.

1

This statement contained suggestions for
action

to stop the war which will be stated later.

The aggressor was declared to be Japan.

It was admitted in some quar-

ters that Japan had seme rights, but not the right
of breaking treaties and

seizure of Chinese territory.

The National Joint Council feared that Japan

wanted more than Manchuria, -that

-

hanghai as well was a goal of Japanese ag-

2

gression.

The Council stated definitely:

"It is clear that a state of

war exists between China anc Japan for which Japan is responsible."
It was admitted by inference that there was political disorder in

China.

Nevertheless the National Joint Council did not consider this any

justification for attack.

"Political disorder in China is no justification

for the invasion of its territory by any foreign power."

The Council pointed

to the British Memoranda of 1926 as the basis for this opinion.

This memor-

anda said that no nation should interfere in ~hina but rather should maintain

friendly relations with China while waiting for the establishment of a strong
national government.

It was this policy which Japan should follow.

4

Cocks, Jones, and Henderson were quick to point out that the Japanese
1.
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attack was a violation of treaties guaranteeing
the political and territorial integrity of China,

Cocks pointed out in Commons in March of
1932

that the invasion of Manchuria affected the
Nine-Power Treaty. 1

Morgan

Jones repeated this assertion a year and a half later
saying that the present regime in Manchuria (1933) violated China's
integrity, as guaranteed

by various treaties and was incompatible with peace in the Far
2
Eest.
his pamphlet, Labour's Foreign Policy.

in

Henderson said that treaties should

not be "torn up with impunity." 3

Not only did some Labourites believe that the Nine-Power Treaty had
been violated, but also that the Covenent of the League of Nations had
been ignored, - making this conflict the conrern of the League.

Therefore,

Labour leaders urged the British Government to take an active part in proposing to the League such plans as a request for the cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of the ministers from Japen, and the denial of recognition

to Japan's conquest by the League states.
In 1932, the Executive Report made to the Labour Party's Annual Conference stated that any war or threat of war is of concern to the entire League

and to every citizen of a League member.

a

Lansbury declared, "There is an

obligation not only upon Japan to honour its word, but upon those who
signed the Covenant to honour their word.

„5

A few minutes before he had

said that Japan's attack was in defiance of the Covenant of the League.
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If the League were to take up its duties,

uni

Labourites wanted the

cooperation of the United States and Russia in any action.
Labour member of the House of Commons, said in 1934
that

Wellhead, a

agland, with the

backing of France and the United States and several other
powers, would be
enough to deter Japau.

A couple of months later

V.'edgewood asked the

Foreign Secretary if he was in communication with the United states,
trying
to secure concerted action in regard to China. 2

Cripps made the definite

proposal that England get as close cooperation ag possible with Russia
and
the United States as well as with the League in dealing with the Far-

Eastern situation*

3

The cooperation of the.se two nations would make more effective any

League action such as a request for cessation of hostilities -which some

wanted the League to make.

A week after the Japanese attack on Manchuria,

Lansbury urged the roreign Secretary to press for a cessation of hostilities
ana urge that the "whole question be referred to an impartial tribunal for
4

settlement.
League

1

'

After

Tardieu announced that the "full authority of the

would be placed behind the proposal for an armistice and an arrange-

ment for a neutral zone for the protection of the International Settlement
at Shanghai, the Labour kla^a&ine in an editorial stated that any settlement
or agreement should apply to Manchuria as well.

5

If hostilities continued, it was suggested that all nations should

withdraw their ambassadors and ministers from Japan,

It was hoped that

such expression of disapproval toward Japanese aggression would cause the
JU

R.C
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Japanese to withdraw from China.

This plan can be found in the Annual

ports of 1932 of the Trades Union Congress and the Labour
Party.

e-

<

The Exe-

cutive Report of the Labour Party urged the Government to request
the Council
of the League of Nations to consider the withdrawal of the ministers
or am-

bassadors from Tokyo of the members of the League.

It was hoped that this

action would not be necessary, but that this expression of public opinion

would not be "unheeded" by the Japanese Government. 1

The Anrual Peport of

the Trades Union Congress contained the same thought, word for word. 2
and one-half years later

.Sir

Throe

Stafford Cripps said that this should probably

be the first step to stop Japan.

1

The withdrawal of ambassadors from Tokyo might, under the Loague Cove-

nant, have been followed by sanctions, pcrticnl&rly economic and financial

measures, which would have denied to the Japanese resource

to wage war.

A

statement of the National Joint Council which represented the General Council of the Trades Union Congress, the National executive of the Labour Party,

and the Parliamentary Labour Party urged the British Government to propose

"measures of financial and economic constraint".

In fact it was believed

that the British Government was "obliged" to recommend such action under
its obligations to the League of Nations.

These measures were to be "co-

operative and gradual" and "in association and agreement with the United

States and the members of the Lea rue."

4

The above statement was not the only reference to economic and finan1.
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cial pressure which could be used against Japan,

ft,

Amold-Forster wrote

in 1934 that if the British Government had taken the lead
in defending the

collective peace system and restraining Japan "if necessary by
economic
pressure", the^challenge to British and world interests would
not have been
so "menacing".

mic pressure.

Cripps, a year later said, "it was our duty" to exert econo-

2

As ,late &s 1937 an editorial in Labour said that "universal

condemnation" was not enough to stop Japan.

In addition, action had to be

taken "to convince her rulers that political and economic isolation and
strict accountability are the penalty for their criminal misconduct."

3

One of the forms of economic and financial constraint which could

have been used against Japan was the boycott.

This means that all nations

would refuse to buy Japanese ^oods, thus depriving the Japanese of one source
of revenue.

L. MacNeill-V;eir quoted Lansbury as saying that if the League

was not going to use sanctions and compulsion there was no use of belonging
to the League.
a boycott.

4

Others made specific statements recommending or supporting

A resolution of the Trades Union Congress General Council and

the National Executive of the Labour Party, dated February 22, 1933, came
out definitely in support of a boycott.

The resolution recommended that if

Japan rejected the proposals of the League Committee of Nineteen, all sec-

tions of the Labour movement should pass resolutions "calling for the appli-

cation of an economic boycott in accordance with Article XVI of the Covenant
of the League of Nations."

5

In Commons Railhead said, "The only thing that

will bring her ^Japan^7 to her senses is a form of keen economic boycott."
Labour's choice".
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Another economic measure suggested was an embargo
upon shipments
to Japan, and some persons wanted this to apply to
China as well.

In I933

the Executive of the Labour Party wanted an embargo
of arms to both China
and Japan.

The Trades Union Congress was of the same opinion. 1

was desirous of an embargo, but only on goods to Japan.

Cocks, too,

He wanted to make

"arrangements between the nations, members of the League and the United
States, to place an embargo on certain goods going to Japan
0 r to bring

pressure in various ways which would put her at a disadvantage."

Specifi-

cally mentioned was the following: "all loans should be forbidden to Japan
and she should have no power to raise money in other countries" provided

that agreement could be reached with other nations. 2

wanted the embargo on arms to apply only to Japan.

Attlee and Lansbury
The latter wanted "our

government to say at once, that no arms and no ammunition shall be exported

from this country to Japan."

Cripps would go one step farther, - because

the League had declared Japan the aggressor, he would send arms to China.

He too wanted to persuade the other nations not to supply Japan with arms,

but refusing arms to China, he believed, was another way of helping Japan.

4

By such action these Labour spokesmen believed that it would be difficult
for Japan to carry on aggression.
It has been pointed out above that British Labour wanted to settle
the Sino-Japanese question by peaceful means.

It has been shown, too, that

a good share of Labour believed that economic pressure should have been used

to accomplish this aim.

But, if this failed, would Labour have been willing
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to use military force to compel the aggressor to withdraw?

In the light

of statements by Labour leaders in the early years the answer must be "no"

There is little evidence that Labour supported such action.
dividual 8 came out in favor of military sanctions*

•

Only a few in-

Just how far L a bour

f

s

thoughts were from military sanctions may be illustrated by A tt lee's attitude towards strengthening Singapore in 1933 •
in favor of the base myself."*

He said, "I have never been

It seems that if Attlee were expecting to

use force against Japan, he would not have objected to making Singapore

strong*

On the other hand, this was consistent with his policy on disarm-

No ^abour group supported military sanctions until 1938 when the

ament

Labour Party did so*

It was not until 1936 that one Labourite, Sir Stafford Cripps, supportHe said, "It was our duty, in cooperation with the other

ed military action*

nations* •• to take every possible step. ..by armaments if necessary*

The

Rational Council of Labour called for "concerted effort" by all nations to
stop Japan in 1937.

5

This did not necessarily mean military action.

In

fact, Attlee a few months later said that no one was suggesting war on

Japan.

The policy advocated by the Labour Party placed emphasis on the strength
of disapproval being sufficient to stop aggression.

T hit

disapproval com-

bined with the Labour Party's vague recommendation of economic sanctions
was the main part of its proposed policy in regard to the attack on Manchuria.

England's policy should have been to persuade the League of Nations
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to act promptly and forcefully, and to secure the
cooperation of the United

States and the Soviet Union in this action.

It seems reasonable to conclude

that in September 1931, the League of Nations should
have clamped an embargo
on all goods to Japan immediately, blockaded Japan, and
attempted to persuade

the United States and the U.S.S.K. to do the same.

If the embargo had been

enforced, the blockade would have been virtually unnecessary since the
nations
of the League, the United States, and the U.S.S.R* included almost all
the

nations with goods to export.

A blockade, moreover, would have made clear

the world's determination to prevent aggression.

A blockade would have been

difficult to maintain because the United States and Great Britain did not
have naval bases from which to operate, as a result of the Washington Con-

ference.

At that time they had agreed not to strengthen any base in the

Pacific.

This factor would have made military and naval sanctions diffi-

cult to enforce, but a show of force might have stopped Japanese aggression.

If the Japanese had decided to smash such a blockage, they probably

could have done so.

In addition to taking action against Japan, China should

have been helped with loans and shipments of military supplies.

In this

manner China would have been better able to defend its territory against
invasion, making aggression less attractive to the Japanese militarists.

Unfortunately much of this was impossible to accomplish.
States would not have taken part in a blockade of Japan.

The United

Without the aid

of the United States it is probable that the League powers would have found

it estremely difficult to enforce a blockage if Japan had decided to defy

and break the blockade.

This being the case, it would have been better not

to have placed a blockade around Japan.

A defeat for the League blockade

undoubtedly would have destroyed the League.

It may be doubted, moreover,

that the United States would have sacrificed its trade with Japan by cooperat-
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ing with an embargo.

If Secretary of State, Stimson,
had been able to

••cure support for economic
sanctions, it would have been
concrete evidence
of the world's disapproval
of agression, and would have
been evidence of
the unity of Great Britain and the
United States which Japan
feared. Certainly, it would have been difficult
for Japan to obtain materials
with
which to wage war. One of two
alternatives would have happened in
this
event, either Japan would have had
to give up its plans for taking
Manchuria, or it would have found it
possible to continue its attack. If
the first
had occurred, the value of sanctions
would have been proved and the League

would have been strengthened.

If the second had occurred, it
would have

proved that economic sanctions unsupported
by military force are useless.
If the latter were the out come, this
action would at least have had some

positive result, because it would have destroyed
the illusion of many that
economic sanctions alone were necessary to prevent
agression.

Sanctions

having been tried and found wanting, the persons
believing in collective
security would have urged stronger measures when the
next blow fell.

Since

they had not been tried, these persons still continued
to think for many
years that economic sanctions alone would be sufficient.

If it had been impossible to persuade the United States
to place an

embargo on goods to Japan, the League was under obligation,
nevertheless,
to place an embargo on goods to Japan, and to boycott goods from Japan.
The imposition of economic sanctions would have been an expression
of the

League of Nations' opposition to aggression and its determination to act.
The British National Government and the Labour .Party chose to ignore
the possibility of such action.

Actually, the policy put into effect

by

the Government was as strong as the policy advocated by the Labour Party.
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The Labour Party seemed to be little concerned at the time
of the begin-

ning of hostilities.

Not until the Lytton Commission had been appointed and

made its report to the League of Nations, did the L&bour Party
begin to take
an active interest.

During the seme period the British Government was try-

ing to secure the withdrawal of both Japanese and Chinese troops, and for
a

month did place an embargo on the shipment of arms to both nations.

The

Government also supported the appointment of the Lytton Commission in

November of 1931.

Not until the autumn of 1932,

a full year

after the in-

vasion started, did the Labour Party propose that the League nations

withdraw their ambassadors from Tokyo, and suggest "measures of economic
ant:

financial constraint".

The British Government's policy failed to pre-

vent Japanese aggression, and the Labour Party's proposals came when Japanese success had been demonstrated by the creation of the puppet nation,

Manchukuo.

"
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Chapter III

Abyssinia

The Italo-Abyssinian dispute grew out of a clash of troops at
Walwal
on December 5, 1934.

Walwal was a watering place located in the disputed

frontier area between Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland.

It had been occu-

pied by the Italians in 1928, and the occupation had been uncontested until 1935

when Abyssinian troops, escorting an Anglo-Abyssinian boundary commission,
challenged the Italian garrison,
9, 1935 proposed arbitration.

reparations.

Abyssinia protested to Rome, and on Decern er

Mussolini in return demanded an apology and

It seems to be fairly well established that for about two

years before the V.alwal incident Mussolini had been directing military pre-

parations in Italian Somaliland and Eritrea for an attack on Abyssinia.
Halle Selassie, the ruler of Abyssinia, turned to the League of Nations.

While the League discussed the matter, Italy poured arms and troops into
Eritrea end Italian Somaliland.

In January, /byssinia invoked Articles XI

and XII of the Covenant of the League, and in March, Artiele XV."
1. Article XI states in part that any threat of war is "a matter of
concern to the whole League, and the Lea ue shall take any action

that it may deem, wise...."
Article XII states in part that if a dispute arises between members
of the League "likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the
matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry
by the Council, they agree in no case to resort to war until three
months after the award by the arbitration or the judicial decision ,
or the report by the Council,
Article XV states in part, "If there should arise between Members
of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is
not submitted to arbitration or judicial decisio n.*, the Members
of the League agree they will submit the matter to the Council."
"If a report by the council is unanimously agreed to by the
members thereof, other than the representetives of two or more of
the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League agree that
they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report."

Followin G the Abyssinian move, Italy agreed on
March 22, 1935, to
establish an arbitral commission if direct negotiations
should fail.

On

September 5th, this commission absolved both nations of any
responsibility
for the incident at

V.'alwal.

On O oto ber 1, 1935, Mussolini sent his

amy

into Abyssinia, and Abyssinia struggled to resist the attack. 1
Haile Selassie informed the League of the attack and asked
the League

to send observers to confirm his charge.

The League Council met on Octo-

ber 5, 1935, to study the report of its Committee of Thirteen -which
recommended bringing the hostilities to an end.
Committee of Six to make recommendations.

The Council then appointed a

A note from /byssinie asked the

Council to recognize the existence of war and to apply sanctions.

The Com-

mittee of Six, in its report, declared that Italy had violated the Covenant.
On October 19, 1935, the Committee of Eighteen, established by a committee
of the Assembly, recommended sanctions on Italy consisting of five parts:
"1.
2.
M
3.
"4.

an arms embargo against Italy;
an embargo on all loans and credits;
an embargo on imports from Italy vdth some exceptions;
an embargo on exports to Italy of transport animals,
rubber, aluminum, iron ore, scrap iron, tin, and strategic rare metals;
H
5. a provision for mutual support ingthe application of
economic and financial measures
11

These measures were accepted by most of the nations of the League, and
the United States placed an embargo on arms to both Abyssinia and Italy.

1.

The introductory section of this chapter is based largely on
Sohuman, op. cit ., Chapters V and VI.
Haines and Hoffman, op. cit ., pp. 375-30.

2.

Documents on International Affairs , John W. Y/heeler-Bennett and
Stephen Heald, editors. London: Humphrey Mi If ord-Oxford University Press, 1935, II, pp. 192-262.)
Quoted by Schuman, op. cit ., p. 188.
(
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This step was taken with British support*
In the meantime France and England were working behind
the

-.cones

to effect a settlement by buying Italy off with territorial
and economic

concessions from Abyssinia.

Out of this cr^ae the Roare-Laval plan #

This

plan specified that Britain and France would recommend to Bail* Selassie

that he cede part of Abyssinia to Italy;

in return, Abyssinia would re-

ceive a strip of Kritrea from Italy giving Abyssinia access to the Red

Sea.

In addition, Italy would be granted exclusive economic rights in

Southern Abyssinia.

This plan was abandoned, due to the upsurge of opinion

in Great britain, which forced Hoare from office.
On January 22, 1936, discussion in the League Council turned to the

practicability of placing an embargo on shipments of oil to Italy.
who replaced

Iloare

Eden,

at the oritish Foreign Office, urged its adoption, but

the reluctance of France to take this step, followed by a ministerial
crisis in

I

ranee, and the death of George V in England all led to delay

until March of 1936.

At that tiae, France urged the Committee of Thirteen

to make a final attempt to secure a peaceful settlement,
and Mussolini agreed in principle.

/byssinia agreed,

This caused more delay.

In the mean-

time, Italy completed the conquest of Abyssinia, and on May 1936 with the

occupation of Addis Ababa, Haile Selassie left the country.

The Council

met on May 12th to consider the new situation and postponed a final decision until June.

In the intervening period the nations indicated that the

sanctions should be lifted.

On July 15, 1936, sanctions against Italy

were repealed by the League of Nations.

Throughout this long crisis the policy advocated by British Labour

differed radically from that of the Government.

Labour members were dis-

turbed by the violation of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Labour

did not want to help Italy in its agression
by either passive or active

asistance.

Instead it sincerely wished to prevent this
attack on Abys-

sinnia from succeeding.

promptly in this crisis

That the League of Nations should act
firmly
-wag

ftnd

Labour's belief.

The following were some of the opinions expressed
by Labour and the

Labour Party.

The League of Nations should condemn Italy's
aggression and

impose sanctions which would cripple the attack.

from the League for its crime.

Italy should be expelled

All League members should withdraw their

ambassadors from Home to indicate their disapproval of Italy's attack
on
Abyssinia.

The Hoare-Laval deal was strongly opposed because the plan

would reward, not punish, the aggressor.

Any settlement must be made by

the League, so that the authority of the League would be vindicated.

Labour

also desired to enlist the cooperation of France and the United States.
In the summer of 1935, before the invasion began, Labour members

urged the Government to close the Suez Canal to Italian ships carrying
supplies and men.

When the danger of an Italian attack was apparent, but

before Italy's all-out attack, Attlee and Dalton proposed that in the event
of hostilities the Suez .anal be closed to Italian shipping.

This would

make it almost impossible for Italy to supply its army, 2500 miles from
home.

As early as October 2, 1935, Hugh Dalton, speaking before the Labour

Party's Annual Conference, said that the Suez Canal, alone, could be closed

very easily, and that such action would leave Italy helpless.*

Attlee advised

warning Italy that if she intended using force, the Suez Canal would be
closed to Italian armies.

2

Another type of support for Abyssinia to be

1.

Hugh Dalton, L.P. Annual Report , 1935, p. 155.

2.

Attlee, Commons, CCCII

,

June 7, 1935, cols. 2193-4

undertaken by Britain alone

»

suggested by

pos 8 ible courses of action to Commons,

he presented t«o

no help to Italy by any exports

whatsoever, and supply to Abyssinia of
the weapons of defense. 1

He also

attacked the Government's embargo on arms
to both Italy and Abyssinia.

He

would send arms to Abyssinia as soon as the
League declared that they were
needed for self-defense. 2

By and large the Labour groups believed that
the Italo-. byssinian
dispute was a matter to be settled by the League
of Nations.
of 1935, Labour said: "The duty of the League
is clear.

Peace from being outraged by Mussolini." 3

In September

It is to prevent

The General Council's report

to tho Trades Union Congress contained a resolution,
drawn up by fiftytwo representatives of Trade Union Centres and Labour
Parties at Geneva
in September of 19 35, in which they appealed to the League
to fulfill its

duty and to preserve peace and justice.
indicated the duty of the

Wgue

The imminent danger of war plainly

to apply the sanctions of the Covenant. 4

This resolution was sent to the President of the Council and the
Secretariat for distribution to the members of the Council.

Adams said that the

massing of Italian troops in North Africa "constitutes a danger such as
contemplated under Article 10 of the League", 5

He continued

by saying that

the League was involved in the /byssinian dispute. 6

Attlee was one of those who believed that the League should act
and must succeed in this crisis to remain in existence.

He said "This

incident... is a test of the reality of the League and the sanctity of the
1.

V. Adams, Commons , CCCIY, August 1, 1935, col. 2914.

2.

Ibid ., col. 2912.

3.

"All the World Over", Labour , Soptember 1935, III, p. 2.

4.

"General Council's Annual Report", T.U.C. Report , 1936, p. 185.

5.

V. Adams, Commons , CCCII, June 7, 1935, cols. 2204-5.

6.

Ibid., col. 2205.

1

Covenant of the League.*

Colonel V/edgewood bluntly stated that if the

League failed to enforce peace, the League would be dead as far as Labour
2

was concerned,

and later that the Ethiopian conflict was a question of

life and death for the League of Nations.

3

In 1936, however. Labour con-

tinued to support the League after its failure in June.

The National

Council of Labour reported, "The invasion of Abyssinia by Fascist Italy

constituted and still remains a 'threat 1 to the League of Nations."
Council wished to continue the "measures /sanctions/'
Italy.

adopted against

This was after Abyssinian resistance had stopped.

trates Labour's devotion to the League of Nations.

The

It illus-

It is true, however,

that after the failure of the League to prevent Italy from taking Ethiopia, the League no longer had any power to act.

Colonel 'iedgewood's pre-

diction had become a reality.

Because the League's authority should be vindicated, and because
Britain was a member of the League, any League decision should have been

supported by Britain.

Attlee asked the Government to inform Mussolini

that it would uphold the Covenant of the League.

If Italy failed to recog-

nize the authority of the League, then she would be declared an aggressor,
and Britain would act against an aggressor.

5

The National Council of

Labour called upon the British Government to make immediate proposals
in the League Council in order to define the duties of both Italy and

Ethiopia.

In addition, the Government was asked to "declare that /it/

will discharge its duties and obligations as a member of the League without
fear or favor. 11

6

1.

Attlee, Commons , CCCII, June 7, 1935, Col. 2194.

2.

Wedgewood, 0 amnions

3.

Wedgewood, Commons , CCCIV, August 1, 1935, col. 2937.

4.

"General Council's Annual Report", T.U.C. Report , 1936, p. 186.

5.

Attlee, Commons , CCCII, June 7, 1935, cols. 2193-4.
Report, 1935,
"Report of the National Council of Labour", L.P. Annual

6.

,

CCCIV, July 11, 1935, col. 569.
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It is not strange, considering Labour's
previously expressed senti-

ments, that it condemned the Hoare-Laval deal,
for it was clearly outside
of the framework and spirit of the League
of Nations.

As stated before,

this plan proposed that Britain and Prance would
recommend that /byssinia
cede to Italy the Tigre province and the Danskil
country southeast of

Eritrea along with much of Ogaden province.

In return Italy would give

Abyssinia a strip of Eritrea so that Abyssinia would have access
to the
•ea at Assab.

In addition, Italy would get exclusive economic rights
in

the southern half of Abyssinia.

Haile Selassie was not consulted, and, of

course, protested vigorously.*
The National Council of Labour correctly condemned the Hoare-Laval

plan.

It called the agreement a "gross violation of the League of Nations

and a betrayal of the Abyssinian people."

The resolution stated, also,

that the National Council of Labour condemned any form of settlement which

awarded territory and political and economic advantages to the aggressor
at the expense of the victim.

ther aggression.

Such a settlement would only encourage fur-

The Council called upon the League of Nations "to apply

effectively the policy of Sanctions. ••and refuse to recognize the invasion
and conquest of any portion of Abyssinian territory as the basis of settlement.

2

An editorial of Labour charged that the British government

had pledged its support to the League of nations, but within a monih of this
promise had agreed to a settlement which shocked the entire world.

The

editorial concluded that no British Government had ever so "basely betrayed"
its pledges.

This was Labour's answer to the Hoare-Laval deal.

1.

Schuman, op. cit ., p. 197.

2.

L.P. Annual ^oport , 1936, p. 33.

3.

"All the

r: 0

rld Over", Labour , January 1936, III, p. 98.

The

National Council of labour represented all Labour groups, and
as such can
be taken to be the official

s^nd

of British Labour*

This resolution stated

Labour's faith in sanctions, which will be discussed below.

Labour's oppo-

sition to the Hoare-Laval deal is significant because it shows that Labour
did not desire to appease the dictators.

This opposition to aggression was expressed by Henderson, who de-

manded that Italy should be expelled from the League.

On two occasions

in April 1936, he asked the Foreign Secretary to consider this proposal.*
Once again such action would not stop aggression, but would be an expression
of disapproval.

From the standpoint of League prestige, this would have

been preferable to letting Italy walk out of the League because she had been
"insulted" •

It was Henderson, too, who wanted the League States to with-

draw their ambassadors •

In the spring of 1936, he said on two occasions

that there was no reason why the ambassadors should not be withdrawn from
2

Rome.

He stated that such action would have the moral effect of showing
3

Italy how the other states regarded the attack upon Abyssinia*
The League action which had the enthusiastic approval of Labour
Labour's only regret was that they were

was the enforcement of sanctions*

not more inclusive.

By October 19, 1935, the League of Nations, through

its Committee of Eighteen, had adopted five proposals of sanctions as

stated above, and these proposals wore accepted by the overwhelming major-

ity of the League nations.

On the other hand, the League did not supply

Abyssinia with war materials - in fact, Britain denied arms to Abyssinia
as well as Italy - nor was en oil embargo placed, nor the Sues Canal
1.

Henderson, Commons , CCCXI, May 6, 1936, col. 1766.
Henderson, Commons , CCCXII, May 29, 1936, col. 2472.

2.

Henderson, Commons , CCCXI, pril 21, 1936, col. 1094.
Henderson, Commons , CCCXI, May 6, 1936, col. 1766.

3#

Henderson, Commons , CCCXII, Hay 29, 1936, cols. 2471-2.
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closed to Italian traffic.

Also, the sanctions which were adopted were

not too strictly enforced.

Almost all this to Ahyssinia were prevented

from reaching their destination.

France refused to send arms to Abyssinia,

and French officials at Djibuti "blocked shipments of *rms

"by

rail to Ahys-

After January of 1936, no goods were permitted to pass through

sinia*

French Somali land.
The application of sanctions had the whole-hearted support of British Labour,

Most followers believed that the sanctions would succeed and

would stop Italy

1

s

aggression.

There was some opr>osition within the

Labour groups - namely by Lansbury.

It was conceded

by some persons that

sanctions might lead to war. but others believed the opposite.

These

sanctions were to be a cooperative effort by members of the League.

There

were certain kinds of materials which might be kept out of Italy's hands,

thereby

sisJcing it

impossible for her to

w?»ge

an aggressive war.

Even after

the conquest of Abyssinia, the Labour Party did not want to stop the
sanctions, even if England had to continue them alone.

Labour agreed that

the sanctions levied did not have the desired effect, hut this they blamed

on the British Government.

Attlee cast his support squarely behind sanctions in a statement
that they would be effective if applied "promtly, fully, and whole-heartedly.

Grenfell believed that the League would win if it applied sanctions "calmly
and firmly".

*

Wedgewood also was in favor of sanctions.

U

In 1935. hefore

the Trades Union Congress the President, Mr. William Kern, said: "The npnlic*
1.

Schuman, op. clt.

,

2.

Attlee, Commons

CCCY, November ??,

3.

Grenfell, Commons, CCCV. November 22, 1935, col. lUl.

*K

Wedgewood, Commons, CCCV, November 82, 1935. col. 233.

,

p.

177*

1935. col. k? 9

tion of these economic and financial sections
would,
to restrain Italy's aggression." 1

posed sanctions on Italy.

I

believe, suffice

There were only two persons who op-

Lanabury said. "...I most profoundly disagree

with the use of the sanctions of war either by the League
of Nations or
unilaterally by our own Government."

If economic sanctions would lead to

war, he would refuse to support such a war.

2

This statement was made the

same day that Attlee, Grenfell, and Y;edgewood cast their
support in favor
of sanctions.

those in force.

Cripps was not much in favor of sanctions, particularly
He called them ores which had no effect. 5

These were

the only expressions of disfavor toward sanctions until a later date.

Although it wps contended by a few that sanctions oould lead to
war, some still indicat d their support.

Mr. J. Williams, according to

Labour and gag Resistance , supported sanctions even if the sanctions led
4

to war.

Mr. "William Kern admitted that sanctions may bring the League

powers to war, "but war is a certainty anyway unless Italy is restrained."^
There is good evidence that some ^bour groups were willing to go to war
if sanctions led to an Italian attack on a League member.

M r . V. Adams

stated in Commons that if sanctions did not stop Italy's war, he was willing to fight under the Covenant.

Q

Citrine told the Trades Union Congress

"There is only one way of dealing with a bully, and that is by the use of

force...

It may mean war, but that is a thing we have to face... If we fail

1.

"President's Address", T.U.C. Report , 1935, pp. 67-8.

2.

Lansbury, Commons , CCCV, November 22, 1935, col. 67.

3.

Cripps, Commons , CCCVTI, November 22, 1935, col. 2067.

4.

Covenanter, Labour and Tar Resistance . London i Victor Gollancz
and the New Fabian research Bureau, 1936, p. 11.

5.

"President's Address", T.U.C. Zleport , 1935, pp. 67-8.

6.

V. Adams, Commons, CiCIV, August 1, 1935, col. 2915.
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now . war is absolutely certain.

I

ask you what will happen to Germany
if

Italy can break her treaties..." 1

After Italy's conquest of Abyssinia

almost complete, Attlee said, "We were prepared
to stand for collective
security.

We asked for sanctions to be applied.

We were prepared to stand

up to the aggressor should the aggressor attack
the League Powers." 2
Thus it is clear that at least influential
elements in the Labour

movement were willing to use arms to prevent Italian
victory.

Such action

was not to be directed against Italy primarily, but
against aggression and

in defense of the League of Nations.

It is to be noted that although the

Labour party members thought that war might result, no one except
Lansbury

objected to sanctions.

This indicates one of two things:

that Labour

did not really expect war, or that Labour wai not afraid to face a war
for
the Lea,;ue of Nations.

The crucial problem in regard to sanctions was the selection of

materials to which Italy should be denied access.
approved of the sanctions voted by the League.
add more items to the list.

members of the League to sail to Italy.
fell

They wished, however, to

They desired to purchase no goods from Italy,

and did not want to supply Italy with any.

embargo on

Nearly all Labour groups

They wanted no ship of the

A blockade was proposed, and an

was believed to be the most effective way to stop Italy's

war machine.
Colonel Wedgewood was one of those who felt that the League sanctions
x

made a good beginning, but he wanted to add oil to the list.

Henderson

wanted more sanctions, although he thought that it was possible that Italy
1.

Sir Walter Citrine, T.PWC Report , 1935, p. 349.

2.

Attlee, Commons , CCCXIII, June 23, 1936, col. 1613.

3.

Wedgewood, Commons, CCCV, November 22, 1935, col. 233.

,

might be brought to terms if the sanctions of the
League were continued. 1
This was at the time when it was almost certain that
Abyssinia was fully
conquered.
Italy.

Henderson wanted a complete shipping embargo upon
goods to

2

On April 29, 1936, he asked why Mritain could
not place a ship-

ping embargo and refuse to allow ships of any members of the
League to
take goods to and from Italy.

Italy to her senses. 3

Such action, he felt, would quickly bring

Mr. V.. Adams hoped that the Government would not

help the aggressor by any exports whatsoever. 4

Wedgewood said that if

Mussolini were confronted with a blockade of fifty powers, there would
be no fight.

This was conditioned by 1'ussolini knowing the nations would

do as they had promised.

5

Many Labour leaders wished to add oil to the list of materials to
be denied Italy.

An oil embargo by the League of Nations was blocked by

Franoe. Wedgewood asked why the discussion of an oil embargo was postponed

at the League meeting.

He asked the Foreign Secretary to take steps to

stop the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company from sending oil to Italy.

g

In February

of 1936, Lees-Smith was of the opinion that an oil embargo with the coopora-

tion of the United States would exhaust the Italian supplies in three and
one half months at the current rate of consumption.

On the same day he

said that there had been a change in attitude in France which made it more

possible to get an oil embargo.

Q

V;edgewood commented that oil sanctions

might be risky, but that every good action is risky.

9

Attlee, less patient

1.

Henderson, Commons , CCCXI, May 6, 1936, col. 1766.

2.

Henderson, Co .onions , CCCXI, April 21, 1936, col. 109.

3.

Henderson, Coiamons, CCCXI I, April 29, 1936, col. 2472.

4.

Adams,

5.

Wedgewood, Commons , CCCV, November 23, 1935, col. 233.

6.

Wedgewood , Commons, CCCVII, December

7.

H.B. Lees-Smith, Commons, CCCIX, February 24, 1936, col. 67.

8.

Ibid,, ool. 71.
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Wedgewood, Commons, CCCIX, February 24, 1936, col. 127

B ommons

CCCIV, August 1, 1935, col. 2914.

5, 1935,

col. 304,
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than his colleagues, wanted to know why it took
four months to achieve

nothing in the way of oil sanctions. 1
In March of 1936. Henderson said that he was
disappointed because

no further sanctions had been put on Italy.

At that time he believed that

an oil embargo would not be effective until October or
November, but that
an oil embargo should be levied at once before Italy
had a chance to build
up stock for the period after the rainy serson.

coal, and steel to the sanctions list. 2

He wanted to add iron,

By May 6, 1936, Lees-Smith charged

that the Government had made no attempt to get an oil embargo. 3
Even after the conquest of Abyssinia, the Labour members of Parlia-

ment wished to continue the sanctions.

In June of 1936, when the conquest

was complete. Greenwood said that the British Government should still press
for sanctions at Geneva.

sanctions.

4

At the same time Attlee was in favor of keeping

This might be expected since /ttlee had opposed V.'inston Church-

ill's suggestion to withdraw sanctions in March. 6

Henderson said that since

no new sanctions had been levied for seven months, the policy was not one
of progressive sanctions.

7

He indicated by this that he wished to see more

sanctions placed on Italy.

If the League were to withdraw the sanctions

on Italy, Henderson wanted Britain to continue its sanctions, and to refuse

to supply Italy with war commodities.

He admitted that he did not believe

1.

Attlee, Commons

2.

Henderson, Commons. CCCX, April 9, 1936, col. 3049.

3.

Lees-Smith, Comaona

4.

Greenwood, Commons , CCCXIII, June 18, 1936, cols. 1216-7.

5.

Attlee, logons , CCCXIII, June 23, 1936, col. 1610.

6.

Attlee, Commons , CCCX, March 26, 1936, col. 1536.

7.

Henderson, Commons, CCCXI, May 6, 1936, col. 1764.

CCCIX, February 24, 1936, col. 147

,

CCCXI, May 6, 1936, cols. 1827-8.
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that this action by Britain alone would be
effective, but he wanted Bri1
tain to accept and carry out its obligations by going
it alone.

There is only one piece of evidence that any Labourite
wished to

repeal the sanctions against Italy.

Writing in the July

i

sue of Labour

in 1936, Dr. M. Follick said that there was no use continuing
an arms em-

bargo against Italy because Italy no longer needed oil.

The only thing which

could now be done to drive Italy from Abyssinia was to use an army of

500,000 men.

This was the only action left because the government would

not use "collective collaboration" to freeze her out by sanctions.**

In

other words the Government had let the situation reach the point where
sanctions no longer had any force.

This lone statement, however, cannot

be taken to mean that Labour^ followers wished to see sanctions repealed.
'"hat

action could the League have taken after the seizure of Abys-

sinia had become a fact?

conquest.

One possibility was to deny recognition to Italy's

In 1936, the National Council of Labour called "upon the League

of Nations... to refuse to recognize the invasion and conquest of any por-

tion of Abyssinia 1 s territory as the basis of settlement .

In July of

the same year Lansbury declared that it would be a "calamity" if the Bri4
w
de
tish Government recognized
jure" annexation of /byssinia by Italy*

In 1937, Ernest Bevin, as the President of the Trades Union Congress, said,
"VTo

shall protest with all our force against any recognition by the League

of Italy's v*ar and plunder in violation of the Covenant and all her treaty's

obligations."^
Such action had been supported during the Manchurian incident.
April 21, 1936, cols. 109-10.

1.

Henderson, Commons, CCCXI
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Dr. M. Follick, "Has Mussolini Really ?Jon", Labour, July 1936, III.
pp. 282-83.

3.

L.P. Annual Report, 1936, p. 33.

4.

Lansbury, Commons

5.

"President's Report", T.U.C. Report , 1937, p. 76.

,

oCCXV, July 31, 1936, col. 1906.

I

Hence, this was but a continuation of i-abour's policy in regard to aggres1

r

sion*

Such a policy would not stop aggression, but it would definitely
}

express disapproval of such methods.

In contrast, the Government reoog-

1

nized the cqnquest on April 16, 1938.
»
L working with the League of Nations, Labour
Besides
wanted Britain

to cooperate with at least two other nations during this crisis;

France and the United State s*

namely,

Both Henderson and Yedgewood "believed that

the cooperation of France should he enlisted*

During the crisis Franco

showed little inclination of sincerely desiring to prevent Italy's conquest
of Abyssinia*

Pierre Laval, French Foreign Minister during 1335 and the

early part of 1936, was more concerned with obtaining Italian aid against
Germany, and, therefore, did not want to alienate Italy.

mental in postponing an oil embargo by the League.

Laval w&3 instru-

M. Fl&ndin, Laval's

successor to the Foreign Offioe, did not change the French policy, and consequently, cooperation of France with Britain was not forthcoming,

^edge-

wood believed that France *s cooperation could be secured by pointing out
that if the effort to stop the w r failed, the Lacarno treaty would be
1

gone, and France would lose its prized security.

tially the same thing.

Henderson said substan-

This prediction was to come true.

France did

lose the protection of Locarno and of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
It was recognized by the Labour groups of Britain that if the co-

operation of the United States could be secured during the Abyssinian affair, cooperate action would have

a

better chance of success*

Wedgev^ood

said that he was very pleased by the Foreign Secretary's statement that

1#

Wedgewood, Commons , CCCIV, August 1, 1935, col. 2938.

2.

Henderson, Commons, CCCXI

,

April 21, 1936, col. 111.
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he had been in touch with the United States on this question.

The Colonel

"believed that it was within the hands of Britain and the United States

with the help of Trance to "preserve

1

*

the pe«ce of the world. 1

In connec-

tion with the proposed oil embargo, Lees-Smith commented that there was

hope and a chance of getting the United States to help.

If Britain wavered,

o

the United States would be less ant to help.
that an oil embargo,

As stated above he believed

nnd an agreement from the United States not to in-

crease exports of oil, would exhaust Italy's oil supply in three and one-

half months. 3
The efforts of the British Government, though having the same general aim, seemingly, as those of Labour, never were as energetic as Labour

would have liked.

Throughout the Abyssinian-Italo crisis, the British

Government worked to bring the dispute to a neaceful end before hostilities
began, and after *rmed conflict came, to bring it to a speedy end.
in Rome on June ?Hth and 25th,

1935#

While

5den t«gge*4eA a settlement, giving

Italy the portion of O^aden around Walwal, compensating Abyssinia with a
This suggestion

corridor through British Somaliland to the port of Zeila.
was refused by Mussolini.

The next move made by Britain came at the con-

ference of Great Britain, Italy, and France, held in
cuss the affair.

Au<

t

of 1935 to dis-

Here the British and French delegates suggested that

Great Britain, France and Italy lend their aid to Abyssinia.

Abyssinian

sovereignty was not to be impaired, but Italy's special interests were to

be recognized.

Once again |taly disapproved.

H

Wedgewood, Commons , CCCIV, August

2.

Lees-Smith, Commons

3.

Ibid,

,

col. 67.

,

1,

In the meantime, Britain

193^, col. 2939*

CCCIX, February ?M> 193^ cols. 68-9-
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had brought its fleet and naval bases up to full strength in the Mediterranean.

On September 10th, Hoare and Laval decided that if sanctions were
imposed by the League, they would make sure that the sanctions were limited
to financial and economic measures only.

Britain agreed to the sanctions

adopted by the League Assembly in October, but the o sanctions proved to
be ineffective.

On January 22, 1936, Eden urged the League to adopt an oil

France urged delay, and because of other added difficulties, the

embargo*

oil embargo was not adopted.

After the May 12th meeting of the Council,

by which time Addis /baba was occupied by Italian troops, Britain decided
that the sanctions had failed of their purpose and decided to urge their
repeal. The League nations agreed, and on July 15th, the sanctions against

Italy were officially ended*
In contrast to the Government's policy, Labour spokesmen urged

strong league action.

Such action was necessary to maintain the League

of Nations and collective security.

Thus. British Labour condemned the

Uoare-Laval deal as contrary to the ideals of the League.

Rather than re-

cognize Italy's aggression, it would be better to prevent that aggression.

To make it difficult for Italy to supply its military forces in Africa,
some Labourites urged the Government to close the Suez Canal to Italian

shipping.

Along the same line, Labour gave complete support to the League

Many
sanctions, regretting only that the sanctions were not more stringent.
led to war
indicated that they were in favor of sanctions even if sanctions

between Britain and Italy.

When the British Government decided that sanc-

to bring about their
tions no longer served a useful purpose, and helped

their continuance.
repeal, many objected and specifically requested

Abyssinia should not
They also requested that Italy's annexation of

79

bo recognized.

British Labour and the British Labour Party thus
showed

more devotion to the League of Nations as an instrument
of collective
security than did tho British Government.
If one starts with the assumption that it was to
the advantage of

Britain and other nations to prevent aggression, and maintain
the League
of Nations as a bulwark against aggression, then the
policy of the British

Labour group was logical. It was sensible to close the Suez Canal
and to
snnd military supplies to Abyssinia.

It naturally followed that Italy should

have been denied the resources to wage the war of conquest.

soning dictated the use of a naval blockade

arid

The same rea-

military forces to end

Italy's dream of an enlarged empire as quickly as possible - if peace were
to be maintained.

This latter phase British labour generally neglected,

except to|nake statements to the effect that Labour supported sanctions even
if i.iussolini did attack any League Power (i.e. Britain) because of this.

Perhaps a blockade was unnecessary, but there is some evidence that leads
one to believe that if the sanctions

hfid

attack would have ground to a halt.

Italy is a nation with limited natural

been more comprehensive, Italy's

resourvos, lacking coal, iron, and oil - ail essentials in constructing

weapons and waging a successful war.
Italy did not need for a short war.

The sanctions imposed wore those which

An oil embargo might have resulted in

a longer war, or even defeat for kussolini

'

s

army.

Certainly the air force

would have been grounded.
In some ways it is surprising that the British Government did not

adopt a more forceful policy in the crisis.

A considerable portion of the

British people seem to have been in favor of such a policy.

The Peaoe

Ballot, sponsored by the League of Nations bnion showed this to be true.
One of the questions in the Peace -.allot was, "Do you consider that,

80.

if

ft

nation insists on attacking another, the other
nations should combine

to compel it to stop by:

(a) economic and non-military
measures, and (b)

if necessary, military measurer,?"

Yes

No

a. 10,027,608

b.

The voting on the question was as
follows:

6,784,368

Doubtful

635,074
2,351.981

Abstentions

27 ,255

855 107

40,893

tJ»Mtt

1

This indicates that most of the people of Britain supported
economic sanctions, but indicates that only a little more than half
of the population

favored military action.

Thus it would seem that the British Government

could have counted on support for any economic sanctions it
desired to place

on Italy, but would have received

tary sanctions.

a

questionable amount of support for mili-

Helen Hiett, in discussing British opinion in Public Opinion

in the Italo-Ethlopian Dispute ,

states that the result of the Peace Bal-

lot was "a definite instruction to the government".

She also states that

the Ballot was the chief reason for Hoare's statement in September of 1935:
"The recent response of public opinion shows how completely the nations sup-

ports the government in full acceptance of the obligations of league Mem-

bership."

In a footnote she comments that a breakdown by weeks of the vote

from November of 1934 to May 1935 showed a steady increase in the number
of votes registered in favor of military sanctions, and a corresponding de-

crease in the number of voter, cast for the abolition of military and naval

aircraft.

2

This expression of opinion is one reason why all major political

parties supported the collective peace sj^stem in the general election held
in November of 1935.

Therefore, it seems a safe conclusion to state that

1.

Quoted by Schuman, op. cit . p. 175, fro..: 'mold J. Toynbee and
others, Survey of International Affairs. London: Humphrey Gilford'
Oxford University Press, 1935, II, p. 51.

2.

Helen Hiett, .Public Opinion in the I talo- Ethiopian Dispute . Geneva
Geneva Special Studies , Geneva Research Center, VII, February 1936,

,

No. 1, pp. 19-21.
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the British public would hare supported
any economic measures which
the
British Government and the League of
Nations undertook.
In spite of public support. Labour's
policy might have been difficult
to put into practice. Prance under
Laval, was not in favor of

plying

stringent sanctions on Italy, Laval wanted
Icaly' su^ort to checkmate
Germany, and, therefore, did not wish to
alienate Italy by supporting the

application of sanctions too vigorously. Therefore,
Trance's support at
this time was of doubtful quality. As stated
before, it was Laval who suc-

cessfully prevented, the addition of oil to the embargo
list. A second

difficulty standing in the way was the attitude of the United
States. The
United States

had banned the sale of arms and munitions to both
Italy and

Abyssinia. But would the United States also refused to send
other

goods to Italy such as oil? The American government did support a
moral
embargo on oil to Italy. In addition, the Neutrality Proclamation
of the

United States stated that the Government would not give protection to any
American cltiaen who traded with Italy. Some have contended that this was
a clear indication that the United States would not oppose a blockade of
Italy.

1

The denialof arms to both sides and the refusal to protect its

citizens who were trading with Italy was certainly a departure from the

traditional American policy of insisting upon the freedom of the seas
for neutral trade. Pranklln Koosevelt, moreover, was not friendly to

aggression. It seems probable that the United States would not have made

any move which would weakened collective action.
Another question concerned the tenor of British opinion if sanctions
had provoked Mussolini into attacking a League raenber. The Peac^ Ballot
shows divided support for military sanctions, giving some indication
1.

Henry Bamford Parkes, Recent America, A History of the United States
Since 1900. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 19^1, p. 590.

that if a conflict had come as a result of sanctions,
British opinion might
have turned against sanctions.

It is the author^ opinion that the British

people placed so much faith in the pnwer of economic sanctions
that thev

expected that no other means would be necessary to stop Italy.

Thev com-

pletely discounted the possibility of war arising from the enforcement
of
sanctions.

If war had resulted, the Peace Ballot indicated that only half-

hearted support would have been forth«oifting from the British people*
10,027,608 persons supported economic sanctions, but only 6,784,368 persons

voted in favor of iailitary taeasures.
slightly mor

On the basis of this evidence, only

than half of the British would have given support to mili-

tary sanctions in order to uphold collective action*
port, ?iowever, for collective security,

ikrt

There was solid sup-

did that support reach the

point of really supporting military sanctions?

All of these difficulties

combined, made effective collective action a doubtful matter.

In spite of the possible obstacles which might have made effective

military sanctions a questionable policy, Britain and the League of Nations
could have made the conquest of Abyssinia a difficult undertaking.

British Labour Party urged the Eiritish Government to take

suchjft

The

stand.

Even before the outbreak of hostilities the Labour Party suggested the clos-

ing of the Suez Canal to Italian shipping;
consider.

this step the Government did not

The Labour Party favored the application of sanctions by the

League nations during the crisis, while the Government seemingly agreed.

The British Government did support the sanctions levied by the League and
did propose the adding of oil to the embargo list, but was persuaded by

France to drop an oil embargo.

In the meantime, in contrast to the Govern-

ment's avowed aims, the lioare-Laval plan was evolved which met essentially
all of Italy's demands.

This *ep brought a strong protest from the L-bour

Party which believed that aggresion should not be rewirded.

Tftien

British Government indicated early in 1936, that it would urge the

the

Wgue

to repeal the sanctions, Labour again objected, and instead requested the

British Government to continue the sanctions, even if lifted by the Lepgue
of Rati ons«

Throughout

"the

entire affair the Labour Party maintained com-

plete loyalty to the principle of collective action.

It 'jiTi reasonable

to assume that if that principle hed been sincerely accepted and applied,

internation&l law could have been upheld.

.

Chapter IV

Rhineland

By the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, Articles

and

1*3,

Germany was forbidden to "maintain or construct any
fortification either
on the left hank of the Rhine or on the right bank
to the west of a line

drawn 50 kilometers to the last of the Rhine."

Germany was also forbidden

to send or keep armed forces in the same area.

Article hk specified that

any violation of the above provisions would be a "hostile
act" and "cal-

culated to disturb the peace of the world".

1

This restriction did not

satisfy France, which wanted an additional guarantee of aid from other

nations if an infraction of the provisions occurred. 2

These guarantees

Prance thought she had secured by the Locarno Treaty of 1925,

Article 2

of the Treaty contained the pledge of Germany and Belgium and also Germany
and France not to attack each other; this agreement did not hold if either

Article ^2

of the Treaty of Versailles were violated.

0r

Article U

read as follows:
"(1)

(2)

(3)

1.

2.

If one of the high contracting parties alleges that a
violation of Article 2 of the present treaty or a
breach of articles ^2 or ^3 of the Treaty of Versailles
has been or is being committed, it shall bring the
question at once before the Council of the League of
Nations.
As soon as the Council of the League of Hations is
satisfied that such a violation or breach has been
committed, it will notify its findings without delay
to the Powers signatory to the present treaty, who
severally agree that in such case they will each of
them come to the assistance of the power against
whom the act complained of is directed.
In case of flagrant violation of article 2 of the present treaty or of a flagrant breach of articles ^2
and U3 of the Treaty of Versailles by one of the high

Wolfers, op. cit., p.

Ibid ., p. U3
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contracting parties, each of the other contracting
parties hereby undertakes immediately to come to the
help of the party against whom such a violation or
breach has been directed as soon as said Power has
been able to satisfy itself that this violation
constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and that
by reason either of the crossing of the frontier or
of the outbreak of hostilities or of the assembly of
armed forces in the demilitarized zone immediate
action is necessary. Nevertheless, the Council of
the League of Nations, which will be seized of the
question in accordance with the first paragraph of
this article, will issue its findings, and the high
contracting parties undertake to act in accordance
with recommendations of the Council provided they
are concurred in by all the members other than the
representatives of the parties which have engaged in
hostilities. sl

Representatives of Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, and Great Britain
signed the Locarno Treaty.
In violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Treaty,

Hitler sent German troops into the demilitarized Rhineland March

7,

1936.

Hitler's move fortified his western border so that he could not be so
readily attacked during his contemplated advance into Central Ihirope.

The excuse given by Hitler was that France had broken the Locarno Fact

by the Franco-Russian Mutual Assistance Pact which had been signed on
May 2, 1935.
Thus, according to Hitler, the action of France released Germany

from its obligations under Locarno.

Even while troops moved into the

Rhineland, Hitler, speaking to the Reichstag, held out ueace offers with

regard to Western Europe, but no approach
south and east of Germany.

any action.

t*as

made to nations to the

Both France and England hesitated to take

According to some interpretations of the Locarno Pact, they

were entitled to use military force against Germany.

1.

Wolfers, op. cit., pp. ^5-6, footnote 25

The question before

*

France

England was whether or not
this deed was a

tion" of the Locarno Treaty.

If tt was

,

^

3

viola.

then France could use
force

immediately to drive German
troops fro, the Rhineland.

The French c »b-

inet met and decided to act
in accordance with Article U.
sec tion 1 0 f
the locarno Pact; that is,
to put the matter before the
League Council.

The Council handed down the
opinion that Germany had broken
the Treaty
of Versailles and the Locarno
Treaty, but did not record
any action to

compel

Gerry's

withdrawal from her new positions.

Thus. Hitler turned

his attention to Austria,
Czechoslovakia, and eventually Poland
and the
Ukraine with confidence that his
eastern frontier was well protected. 1
The re-occupation of the Rhineland
did not greatly alarm British
Labour, although, since Hitler had
come to power in Germany they had

opposed his acts and distrusted his promises.

Many members recognised,

however, that a new danger had been created
by this step, and that Ger-

many

•

s

action might lead to war.

They suggested that the matter be

referred to the League, which it was.

In this case. Labour members ex-

pressed opposition to British acquiescence in any
further aggression, or
to any nation acquiring a dominant position.

At the same time Labour

members piously hoped that France would remain convinced
that in the event

of a German attack upon France, Locarno would still be in
effect.
magazine, Labour

,

The

pointed out that "Germany's action in reoccupying

with her armed forces the demilitarized Rhineland has created
a most

dangerous situation.

be condoned;

...

2

It makes a contempt for public law that.

.

.cannot

Hugh Dalton noted the "limited character" and "the

absence of certain states" from Hitler's plan to keep the peace.
1.

Parts of the following sources have been used as the basis for
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Seton-Watson, op. cit. pp. 2U7-5O.
,

Schuman, op. cit. pp. 202-220.
Vera Kicheles Dean, Europe in Retreat
19^1 pp. f50-3.
,

.

Sew York: Alfred

,

2.
3.

"All the World Over", Labour April I936, III, p. 178.
Dalton, Commons CCCVII, March 9, 1936, col. 1927.
,

,

A.

Knopf,

Characteristically, Labour members held that this newly
created
danger to peace should be dealt with by the League of Hations.
26,

1936.

On March

two Labour members of the House of Commons referred to the League

Dalton wished to see a "League of Nations approach" instead

of Nations.

of just an approach to the problem from the French and British Tiewpoint. 1

Attlee criticised the Government proposals because they were based upon
Locarno instead of the League of Hations*

He sensed the threat of German

expansion to the east and urged that any agreement should apply everywhere
and not in Western Europe alone,
ing Hitler 1

8

Hugh Dalton was not opposed to accept-

proposal for the discussion of ways of maintaining peace in

Europe, but he did say that the talks should be blunt. *

Dalton wanted to

make clear to Hitler the idea that Britain would not stand idly by while

other nations were attacked,**

A few days later he expressed this idea

in a different form, "Let us say to the German people in all friendship

and in all frankness.

.We wish you no ill.

We recognize your title to

equality, equality in political status, and equality in economic opportunity. ..but we do not recognize the right of any nation... to an overbear-

ing and brutal predominance in the world.

n5

Greenwood agreed with Dalton

and added that all nations should be asked to take part in a general
conference.

In fact. Greenwood would

tt

sei«e H the opportunity.

1#

Dalton, Commons , CCCX, March 26, I936, col. 1^52.

2.

Attlee, Commons , CCCX, March 26, 1936, col. 1533.

3.

Dalton, Commons
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col.

,

CCCIX, March 9, 1936, col. I926.

1927.
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Dalton, Commons , CCCX, March 26, 1936, col. IU55.

6.

Greenwood, Commons, CCCIX, March 10,

1936, col.

1976.

Dalton added to the previous statement, "I hope we may be able
to

pursuade the French Government .... that the Locarno Treaty still stands
so
far as our relations with them are concerned in the event of an
aggressive

attack upon

them."'''

Thus Labour members were willing to consider

revision of exist-

ing Agreements with Germany through international fiction.

But they

opposed military action in the immediate Hhineland crisis.

Henderson

commented that Britain should disarm if she expected Germany to respect
the Treaty of Versailles.

The most revealing statement of Labour's

attitude toward the re-occupation of the Hhineland was made by Hugh
Dalton.

w

It is only right to say bluntly and frankly.

.

.the Labour Party

would not support, the taking of military sanctions or even economic
sanctions against Germany at this time, in order to put German troops
out of the German Rhineland.

"

In comparison Hitler has stayed within

German borders while Mussolini has not.^
In summing up Labour's policy toward Germany's re-occupation of
the Hhineland, it may well be said that the policy was a negative one.

While it was admitted that the danger of war was increased, no plan was

offered to lessen that danger.
one n*n speaks for a

i*roup,

Although it is dangerous to assume that
so in this case because

it seems safe to do

1
no one on Labour's side disagreed with Hugh Dalton s declaration that

the Labour Party would not support sanctions.

Dalton'

s

position teal

no aggression had been committed must have been accepted by the Labour

Party.

CCCIX, March 9, 19 36, col. 19?7-

1.

Dalton, Commons

2.

Henderson, Co-nmons , CCCIX, March 9, 1936, col. IS77.

3.

Dalton, Commons , CCOX, March 26, 1936, col.

,

In taking this stand, Dslton and
other Labour people failed
to

realize fully the significance and the
possible results of Germany's
action.

In the first place, as Seton-W»tson
wrote. Germany gained con-

siderably.

"Indeed.

froffl

the purely gtrategic standpointf

8ucc8 , gfal

re-occupation meant for Germany the double gain
of "making herself im-

pregnable in the west and of pchieving her maximum
offensive power in
the Vest also'."

1

This German action was an indication, as
well, of

the aggression to take place in Central Europe.

The failure to under-

stand tnis and the failure to propose effective
action to prevent the

realization of German ambitions appears in retrospect to
have been a serious weakness in the Labour Party

1

a

nosMon on foreign policy.

The lack of understanding can be illustrated by studying
Labour's

attitude toward disarmament and rearmament.
was still predominant.

The doctrine of disarmament

The re-occupation of the Rhineland did not bring

any sudden demand for more British arms, but there was increased
interest
in British military strength, most of which came some time after March
7.

1936.

There was criticism by Attlee of the Government's rearmament

program because there was no co-ordination between the various branches
of the military.

2

Lees-Smith was critical too, but because no defenses

had been prepared against air attacks. ^

The Labour Party Conference

took note of the strength of the dictators when it accepted a resolution

proposed by Hugh Dalton.

The resolution was as follows:

"That in view of the threatening attitude of the Dictatorships.... the armed strength of the countries loyal to the
League of Nations must be conditioned by the »rmed strength

1.

2.

3.

Seton-Watson, op. clt.

,

p.

2^9-

Attlee, Commons , CCCIX, March 9, I936, col. 18^9.
Lees-Smith, Commons, CCCXV, July 20, 1936, cols. 8^-5

90.

of the potential aggressors.
"The Conference, therefore, reaffirms the policy to maintain
such defense forces as are consistent with our country's responsibilities as a Member of the League of Nations, the preservation of people's rights and liberties, the continuance of
democratic institutions, and the observance of International
Law.

"Realizing the relationship between foreign policy and armaments, and... the deplorable record of the Government, the
Labour Party declines to accept responsibility for a purely
competitive BJUMttfc policy. It reserves full liberty to
criticize the rearmament program of the present Government ... H
,

This resolution is significant because it shows definitely the

change of the Labour Party's attitude toward rearmament.
ference did not meet until October

1936,

5,

Since the Con-

it cannot be said positively

that it came as a result of the Rhineland seizure.

Probably it came

as the result of the conflicts in Manchuria, Abyssinia, and Spain.

The

importance of this resolution is that the Labour Party favored basing
the amount of arms needed on Britain

1

s

obligations as a League member.

This would influence the Labour Party to oppose greatly increased

appropriations for arms because it could point to the strength of other
League members and claim that the combined strength of the League made
Taking this

a larger increase of military forces by Britain unnecessary.

into consideration along with the number of Labourites who earnestly de-

sired disarmament, it cannot be said that British Labour at this point

wanted to embark upon a strenuous rearmament program, but it

cajft

be

said that British Labour had come to the turning point in its disarmament campaign, and was starting on the path leading to British rearma^
merit.

While British Labour failed to recognize the most important aspect

of the situation. Labour did condemn the action of Germany in sending

I,

n
"Resolution by Hugh Halt on
carried, p. :-?Q7*

,

L.P. Annual Heport

,

1936, p.

18?.

troops into the Hhineland as the clear case of treaty
violation, which
it was.

The articles of the Treaty of Versailles were violated
hy this

move as well as Article

fc,

Section

1,

of the Locarno Treaty.

In view of

Labour's belief in the sanctity of treaties, it is not surprising
thst

Labour condemned the German move.

let, it is doubtful whether, if talks

had taken place concerning the right of Germany to occupy the Rhineland,
Labour leaders would have been opposed to German re-occupation.

Some

Labour leaders had been in favor of granting Germany equality by disarmament.

Would this not have given Germany eoua'lity with other nations

if she could fortify any part of her territory?

As previously mentioned

in this chapter Henderson stated that Germany had some justification be-

cause Britain had not disarmed.

Dalton*

s

statement that Labour would

not support the application of any type of sanctions against Germany also

bears out this contention.

Yet, it does seem inconsistent for Labour

to condemn Hitler's move as a violation of the treaties, and still

oppose any step to prevent the infraction from "becoming an accompli shed
fact.

Such an attitude is not the way to uphold international law,

which Labour leaders believed should guide all the activities of nations.
It has been contended that France and Britain did not have the

legal right to take military action against Germany in 1936, hut if

the purpose of these two nations was to prevent aggression, then this

was the time to act.

The legal basis for military action was stated in

the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Treaty.

3ome have contended

that this right did not exist when Germany occupied the Rhineland with

troops in 1936.

This opinion is "based on the wording of the Locarno

Treaty which states that immediate military action could be taken only

in case of "flagrant violation*.

According to some persons, the occupy

tion did not meet this definition because it was not a
prelimary step to

an attack on Jraace.
aid.

Therefore, Britain was not bound to come to France

1

Nevertheless, the issue wns referred to the League Council under

clause

1

of Article IV.

Action Against Germany would have been perfectly

legitimate when the Council condemned German action as a violation
of

both the leeaiae

Mi

Versailles Treaties, as it did on March 19, 1936.

The decision by the Locarno Powers against action to checkmate Germany
was due largely to the -oolicy of the British Government, which brought

pressure on yrence for a policy of conciliation and appeasement.

In the

end it was decided to take no action whatever. 1

Military action by Prance alone, or
woulrt almost

"by

France and Great Britain,

certainly have forced the German troops

to withdraw,

left

Germany unfortified in the west, and made it impossible for Germany to
turn to the South and

"East

to absorb Austria and Czechoslovakia, and to

attack Poland vithout being threatened with immediate attack by the
French army in the West.

From the standpoint of preventing aggression,

this is exactly what should have taicen place in March of 1936.

The real

problem, more apparent now than then, facing Britain and other nations

in 1936 was to find a way to prevent future aggression.

Hitler's

troops in the Rhineland, and the subsequent building of fortifications
in the area mode Hitler's western frontier secure from attack; thus he

could safely turn his attention to the South and Bast.
fate of Austria and Czechoslovakia.

It

sealed the

British Labour and the Labour

Party made the same error as the British and Jrench Governments.

1.

Haines and Hofftaan, op. cit.,

xrp.

39>96*

They

•

condemned the step

M

a treaty violation, hut neither
comprehended the

danger |« the sovereignty of the nations in Central
TSurope nor the
danger to world pe«ce.

Having failed to make the correct analysis of
the

situation, British Labour groups also failed to offer the
proper oourse

of action, which was to urge France to use its army in the
Thineland, and
to promise full British cooperation,

across the English Channel to Prance.

even to the extent of sending troops

Chapter V
Spain

In the summer of I936 the world was
confronted with new lnt er-

national complications growing out of the civil
war in Spain.
17.

1936.

On July

Spanish army units revolted against the Spanish
government.

The leader of the army revolt was Francisco Franco.
seize the government of Spain by a coup d'etat.

The plan was to

The coup failed, and

a civil war which was to last for three years "began.

Italy and Germany

sent troops, planes, and munitions to help Franco win the
civil war.

Volunteers came to the aid of the Spanish government, including both
men and materials from Russia.
tics of an international war.

of Mussolini and Hitler.

The civil war took on the characterisFranco won the war in 1939 with the aid

1

The civil war in Spain brought new complications for Britain.

A victory for Franco supported by Hitler and Mussolini meant that these
potential enemies could neutralize the British position at Gibraltar.

Other positions in Spain could be fortified which would make it impossible for Britain to use the western outlet of the Mediterranean Sea.
This would lengthen British communications with India and the Near

by several thousand miles if a European war broke out.
would also weaken the ability of France to wage war.

iMt

Fascist victory

Control of the

Balearic Islands could make it difficult for France to call upon her

1.

The introduction of this chapter is based largely upon the
following sources:
Seton-Watson, op. cit. , pp. 368- 39^.
Schuman, op. cit v Chapter VII passim.
Medlicott, op. cit. pi). 193-199.
Soward, op. cit.
pp. ?33-235«
,

,

reserve manpower in Africa, if the Fascist
powers used the islands as

bases against French shipping.

Victory in Spain would also give Prance

another frontier to defend in war.

Even if Spain did not enter a

European war, the possibility of Spain doing so
would necessitate the
stationing of military forces along the Spanish frontier
*nd

at Gibraltar,

thus weakening the ability of the Allies to
concentrate their forces

against Germany.
Jfrance

and j&xgland choae to ignore these potential dangers, and

decided to follow a policy of neutrality in a futile attempt
the Civil War.
Spain.

to

localize

On July 25, 1936, Prance forbade all arms shipments to

This was labeled Son-Intervention.

lead three weeks later.

Britain followed France's

Italy, Russia, Germany, and Portugal agreed to

this so-called Non-Int ervention.

As events developed, both France and

Britain adhered to their agreements, but Germany, Italy and Russia and
Portugal ignored Non-Intervention.

The result was that Madrid received

little help, while Franco received a large amount from Italy and Germany.

A Non-Int erventions Committee was set up in London to supervise
the application of the pledges.

Ho methods of punishing violations were

The British Government accepted this plan and maintained

proposed.

strict neutrality in the conflict.

The only time

thr.t

Britain adopted

a tough attitude was after shipping in the Mediterranean Sea had been

attacked mysteriously by submarines and planes.

A conference, called

for September 10, 1937» resulted in joint naval action against the
"pirates*

1

*

The sinkings ceased at once.

Other than this, the British

Government remained aloof from the Spanish Civil War.
This lack of action did not meet the approval of British Labour

96,

circles.

Labour definitely sympathized with the Spanish government and

left no doubt in anyone's mind as to their opposition to Franco.

The

policy of Uon-Int erven t ion was criticized with vigor, and its abandonment
was sought.

Labour wished to prevent the Rebels from receiving aid from

the outside, but it had no objection to the Loyalists receiving all possible
aid.

Such a course, they felt, would crush the rebellion and save Spain

for democracy.

This attitude was justified by the contention that the

Loyalist government had the support of a majority of the Spanish people,

and that it was entitled to treatment as the legal government.

The

Spanish Civil War was looked upon as a danger to the peace of the world;
thus this matter should be dealt with by the League of Sations.

case there was no

fttfetffci

In this

When British shipping was

for sanctions.

A

attacked, a few Labour leaders demanded protection for this ship-ring.
few reco*-nized the struggle in Sv-ain as

ft

threat to the balance of power

in relation to fascism vermin democracy, and a threat to the British

life-line through the Mediterranean Sea.
The Labour groups of Briton strewed the point that the Spanish

government was the legitimate regime, against -vhich conservative

fascist-minded groups had started a rebellion.

Wedgewood inquired in

elected by
Coimnons what it aattered if the Spanish government had been
a minority of the people.

It was the established government , against

which the army rose in rebellion.

1

On the same day Cocks stated that

of the people.
the Spanish government was supported by a majority

month

Uter Jones

said that the Spanish government was the

1.

col. 79Wedgewood, Commons , COCXVI, October 29, 1936.

2.

Cocks, Colons. CCCXTI, October 29,

col.

105.

ft

embodiment

of the popular will".

1

Grenfell said that the government was the
legal

government of Spain because it had an overwhelming
parliamentary majority;

he offered as proof the support of the government bv the
people in the
war.

2

There can he no doubt that the Spanish government was the
legal

government of Spain.
at the polls.

represented the will of the people as expressed

It

The army, led

fey

conserv- tive officers, wes In rebellion,

but the government retained wide porul?
areas.

support, particularly in urban

As Grenfell pointed out, the proof of this popular support lay in

the defense of the republic, which held cff the Rebels even though a large

part of the army had gone over to them.

Therefore, Labour's support and

desire to help the Spanish Government ooul^ be justified on both

jnoral

and legal bases.

Thus Labour supported Alvarez del Vayo^ when he charged that the

Rebels wore being supplied with arms.

The National Council of Labour

telegraphed Uden, who was in Geneva, on
effect:

3<_pt ember 30,

I936,

to this

"...in view of the fact that the French Government initiated

the policy with the whole-hearted support of the British Government,
the Hational Council of Labour regards It as the imperative duty of

these Governments to

the initiative immediately to have these

tajce

serious charges investigated and the findings published without delay."
The Labour Pnrty Conference upheld this view and added its insistence

Commons

CCCX7II, November 5, I936, col. 376.

1.

M. Jones,

?.

Grenfell, Commons , CCCXIX, January

3.

The Toreign Minister of the Loyalist Government,

h.

L.

,

P. Annual Report,

1936, p.

37'

1,

1937. cols.

151-2

U

on investigation and publication of the facts.
Union Congress asked for the same procedure. 2

A year later the Trades

These statements refer to

the violation of the Hon-Intervention Agreements.

As Rebels, Franco's

armies had no legal right to receive arms shipments from any nation, and
also the Ion-Intervention Agreements had provided that no arms he shipped
to either side in the Spanish Civil War.

If the Rebels were receiving

anas from foreign nations, this should he proved, and the facts published.
It was hoped that these methods would cause the nations helping Franco to

•top this aid.

This hostility to Franco is also illustrated in Hoel-Baker's six
point proposal of 1938.

Hoel-Baker included within this plan an embargo

on trade with parts of Spain controlled by Franco. *

This was consistent

with the attitude that the Spanish Rebels should receive no outside aid
against the legal government of Spain.

The Non-intervention Plan pro-

vided for this, but it was being broken daily by Germany and Italy.

The

least the Government could do, Ho el-Baker contended, was to keep Its
side of the bargain to the letter.

le alee proposed to impound any of

Franco's funds to recompense ship owners whose ships had bean sunk by the

Ibis was also an attempt to prevent Franco from receiving any

Hebels.
supplies.

h

The hostility to Franco was again illustrated by labour's wish to
prevent supplies of arms from reaching the Hebels.

From the very begin-

and Italy
ning of the Spanish Civil War, Labour heard rumors of Germany

Annual Report

1936, p. 37-

1.

L. P.

2.

"General Council's Report", T.U.O. Report

3.

932-^.
Ho el-Baker. Commons , CCCXXX7II, June 21, 1938, cols.

U.

,

,

1937. p. 173.

Ho el-Baker, Commons, CCCXXXTII, June 21, 1938. cols. 932-^.

sending supplies and men to help Franco.

As time went on, evidence

accumulated that the rumor had all too much "basis in fact.
Shortly after the revolt of the Spanish troops began, Morgan
Jones
asked if the rumors that Italy and Germany were sending supplies
to Spain

were true.
Europe. 1

If they were true, the situation was very serious for all
In October of I936, Cocks told the House of Commons that there

were several sources of information which proved that the Dictators were
sending help to Franco's armies. 2

Some time later Grenfell asserted,

"This influx of trained men from Germany and Italy into Spain must

"be

stopped, but it cannot be right to stop volunteers from one side only.

That would mean stopping volunteers from France and elsewhere while the

Germans are sending their trained divisions to win victory over the

Spanish people. H ^
There were many comments along the same lines which indicated
the Labour dislike of fascist troops in Spain.

throughout the Civil War.

This was continued

Henderson proposed to end all discussion as

to whether fascist troops were or were not in Spain; he called for a

committee of Investigation to go to Spain in order to find out if there
were Italian troops present.

His proposal had no chance as long as the

Conservative Government was in power.
to do to settle the controversy.

It was, however, the logical thing

If anyone were to find definite proof,

he should go to the scene of action.

On the other hand, Mussolini had

admitted the presence of Italian troops in Spain and had even sent conU

gratulations to victorious troops.

What more could anyone want?

Commons, CCCXV, July 27, I936, col. 1116.

1.

K. Jones,

2.

Cocks, Commons , CCCX7I, October 29, 19 36, col. 101.

3.

Grenfell, Commons , CCCXIX, January 19, 1937, col. 160.

k.

Henderson, Commons, CCCXXt, March 25, 1937,

col.-

31°9«

5
100.

Attlee charged that Bilbao had fallen under the impact
of foreign
artillery and foreign aircraft, yet the British Government
continued to
support Eon-Intervention.

Eenderson said that there was considerable

evidence that Hon-Int ervent ion was a "farce*

3

,

that foreign troops had

constantly aided the Rebels, and that German planes had "bombed Guernica. 1
Williams asked the British Government to "guarantee to the house that
they will in no way deviate from the terms submitted to the Non-intervention Coasaittee, and that in no circumstances would belligerent rights be

accorded

the Franco Regime

before the withdrawal of foreign troops." 2

As the fares of Hon-Intervention continued, Attlee charged that
Franco got supplies through Italian and German violation of international
law, while the Spanish government got none because the land frontiers

were closed. ^

Cocks said that he did not believe a word of the Dictators'

promises to withdraw troops from Spain.

of July

1,

Re pointed to Mussolini's speech

1937 in which II Buce said, "Volunteers will not be withdrawn.

The last word will be spoken by guns."**

Grenfell inquired whether the

Government should not demand the prompt withdrawal of foreign troops from
Spain.

Speaking before the Trades Union Congress In 1937t Sir Walter

Citrine said that the policy

of

the Labour Party "was to restrain by

force If necessary", the Hebels from being supplied with arms from Italy

and Germany. 6

2hle was the only reference to the use of force in this

1.

Henderson, Commons , CSCXXY, June

2.

F.

3.

Attlee, Commons , CCCXXVI

U.

Cocks, Commons , CCCXXJJI, Harch

5.

Grenfell, Commons , CCCXXXFII, June 21, 1938, col. IO3O.

6.

T.U.C. Report

6,

1937. col. 1571.

Williams, Ooramons , CCCOTI, July 26, 1937. col- ^3^.

,

,

July 30. 1937. cols. 3532-3*

1937. P- 262-

7,

193*. col.

16*51.
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connection.

It seems probable that a strong,

fina stand by the British

Government would have been sufficient to prevent foreign
troops from going
into Spain.

The Dictators were not ready to fight at that point.

The

above statements dearly indicate Labour»e opposition to the
presence of

Italian and German troops in Spain, and the desire for the
Government to

sake every attempt to secure their withdrawal.

Seedless to say, the

Government Ignored these protests.
It is significant that at the outset Labour did give Son-Interven-

tion its support, and continued to do so until the plan was oroved to be
unsuccessful.

It is also true that many statements indicating support

for the plan were qualified, by "if it is carried out".

Morgan Jones,

in discussing the mediation movement, said that he did not want this
latest move to slow down Son-Intervention.

Be wanted it to be fulfilled.

1

Grenfell said that he was for Son-Intervention if it would be fully

carried out, but it had not been.
ing the

M

farce" further.

There was no need, he said, for carry-

Attlee was moved to comment that Son-Inter-

vention could be Justified only by success. ^

Later, however, he said

that there should be an attempt to make a reality of Son-Intervention.
To do all this volunteers had to be withdrawn.

h

Henderson had criticised

Son-Intervention to the extent that he was forced to deny that he wanted
Son- Intervention abolished.^

Grenfell said that there could not be any

1.

N. Jones, Commons, 3CCXTIX, December 18, 1936, cols. 2S25-6.

2.

Grenfell, Commons , CCGXXX, January 19, 1937. col. 59.

3.

Attlee, Commons , CCCXX?, June 25, 1937. cols. 1550-1.

k.

Attlee, Commons , OCCXXTX, July 15. 1937. cols. 1588-9.

5,

Henderson, Commons , GCCX3T, June 25, 1937. col.

15<>9.

"

102.

peace in Surope until there was real Jfea-Intervention.
of 193S.

This was in June

1

Wnen Attlee stated in Commons that Labour accepted
Hon-Intervention until it was proved to be one-sided. Chamberlain was
moved to

interrupt with the comment th?t it was for a short ueriod. 2
In 1936, one of the conditions for Labour 1

s

support of T?on-Inter-

vention was that it be fully carried out, that no aid from any
source
should reach either side in the Spanish war.

This, Labour hoped, would

be to the advantage of the Spanish government.

Ernest Bevin urged the

Trades Union Congress to adopt a resolution which included the warning
that the utmost care should be taken to prevent Ron- Intervention from

hurting the Spanish government. 3

*ttlee's resolution, submitted to the

Labour Party's Conference of I936 and accepted, said, "...we demand
that our own Government and other Governments who have nut their hands
to this International Agreement should see that it is being fully

carried out.
The Trades Union Congress published the criticism made in July
1937 of tn « Government's policy by the Labour Party, that no effective

plans had been worked out for the com-olete cessation of foreign help
for franco's armies. 5

This indicated approval of the Party's statement.

,

2arly in 1937» Attlee accused the Government of permitting intervention

by the Axis to continue although It was the Cabinet which had played

CCCTJOCril, June 21,

1938. col. 102^.

1.

Grenfell, Commons

2.

Attlee and Chamberlain, Commons , CCCXXJtm, June

3-

T.U.C Report

h.

Attlee,

5,

"General Council's Annual Reroort", T.U.C. Report , 1937. p. 177-

L.

P.

,

,

1936. p.

23,

1938, col. 1352.
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,

I936. p^.
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a leading

mrt

in support of Non- Intervention.

had teen made to support intervention.

Nov, he charged, a shift

In the same speech he said th^t

he wanted a plan of control which would work.

He would place a definite

time limit to test the effectiveness of control.

If this plan were not

accepted, then Hon-Interventlon should he done away with. 1

Grenfell said

that he had been la favor of Hon-Intervention until it was proved
to he a

failure.

Cocks defended Labour's position hy saying that the "main

couv-

plaint" which the Labour Fsrty had against Non-intervention was that it
had been decided

M

to atop munitions, hut they stop then for the Govern-

ment and not for franco.

They decide to stop volunteers, hut they stop

them for the Government and not for Franco.*^
If Non-Intervention had "been successful in stop-olng the flow of

supplies to the combatants, it seems likely that Labour would have

supported Hon-Intervention more strongly.

There were many who hoped

that such a plan would localize the conflict.

They quickly saw thpt Non-

Intervention was being put into force by the democracies and being
by the Dictator nations.

1

jnored

This condition was harmful to the side which

Labour wanted to see victorious.
The expression of good will for the Spanish ^ovarnmant i3 shown

by one of Bb el-Baker's six proposals in his plan to be followed in S^ain.

He asked that anti-aircraft guns be taken off the non-intervention lists.
This would have given the Spanish government & chance to obtain a means

of defense against 0-erman and Italian planes in the service of Franco.
The government had practically no air force to protect its remaining
1.

Attlee, Coupons, CCGXXX, January 19, 1937. cols. 11>U.

2.

Orenfell, Commons , CCCXIX, January 19, 1937. col. V59*

3.

Cocks, Commons, CCOXXXII, March 9, 1938, col. 1972.

k.

Ho el-Baker, Commons, CCCXXXVII, June 21, 193*.

o<>

ls »

93^-

5

cities.

Anti-aircraft guns voul* have provided some defense against the

bombs which were dropped on Loyalist Spain.

Wedgewood objected to "British

pressure which led francs to close its frontiers.*

He had the some our-

pose as Bo el-Baker, - to let the Spanish government get supplies.
In view of the almost universal conviction in Labour circles the

Spanish government should win its fight against the Rebels and fascism,
and th*t Bon-Intervention hindered the Loyalists, it is not suro rising
that there are many statements which expressed opposition to Bon-Inter-

vention, and asked that it be abandoned.

The first instance of opposi-

tion to the Hon-Intervention Agreements came on September 10, 1936 at the

On this date Sir Walter Citrine asked the Govern-

Trades Union Congress.

mont to lift it 3 embargo in order to help the government of Spain.
1
in October of the same year at the Labour Party

Addison said thrt the Labour

Pr

rty would

s

conference, Christopher

*>MMtt a profound mistake

it by inference support ed the Bon-Intervention

planO

criticize Bon-Intervention as it was operating.

if

Both of these

groups, however, gave qualified support to Bon-Intervention.
the same year, the Labour members of the House of

Then

Colons began

Late in
to

Cocks in October asked

that the Spanish government be permitted to buy arms.

need for carryIn January 19JS, Grenfell sM-d that there was no

ing on a "farce".

had
In June Attlee commented th-t Bon-Intervention

1.

Wedgewood, Commons , CGCXOTII, June 21, 1938, c°l. 9&7.

2.

363-**.
Sir waiter Citrine, T.U.C. Report, 19 36, PP.

3.

17^.
Christopher Addison, L.P. Annual Report , 1936. p.

See p. 102.
5.
6.

ools. 106-7.
Cocks, Coupons, CCCXH, October 29, 1936.

Grenfell, Commons

,

CCC2XX, January 19,

IfjS* col.

159-

105

not been fairly applied.

He also gald that Hon- Intervention had
done

nothing to relieve international tension, or to shorten
the conflict.
Therefore, he demanded the end of Fon-Intervention. 1

ported by Henderson. 2

In this he was sup-

In July 1957, Attlee said that additional
proposals

would not make the plan work hut bring more unpleasant incidents.

He said

that the fascists supported Hon-Intervention because it
made a convenient

screen behind which to help Franco. I

tinued along the saoe lines.

Criticism

"by

other mexcberc con-

Cocks, Greenwood, Orenfell, and Attlee all

urged the abandonment of Hon-Intervention. i * § * 6

Greenwood said, "non-

intervention Agreement now. ...is a rotting corpse. "7

Grenfell summed

up the situation with the assertion that aggression was a fact and HonIntervention had "become a "farce".
The Trades TTnion Congress end the Labour Party's Conference

produced more evidence of the

<*aae

attitude.

Mr. W.J. 8, Squance moved

that the Congress press for the removal of the ban on the sale of arms

to Spain. *

Sir Charles Trevelyan proposed the following resolution which

Gobi mens ,

1.

Attlee,

2.

Henderson, Ccnmons

3.

Attlee, Conmons, GCCTJtn, July 15, 1937, cols. 1582-3.

U,

Cocks, Commons

5.

Attlee, Commons

,

COCXXXXIX, March 2 !, 19 38, col. 1^20.
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Attlee, Commons
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CCCXXXVTI
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Orenfell, Commons , CCCXXXTII, June 21, 1938, col. 1023
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received unanimous consent of the Labour Party'

s

Conference.

That this

Conference "...instruct the Hational Ixecutive Committee
to launch forth-

with a nation-wide campaign to compel the Government to
(1)

Abandon the so-called Son- Intervention
Agreement .
Restore to the ...Spanish Government its
rights under International Law to purchase arms and maintain its authority and
establish law and order in its territory.
.

(2)

The Hational Council of Labour had already passed such a resolution. 2

Here is additional evidence of Labour partisanship.
As it had done in the Ethiopian Crisis, the Labour Party asked
the Government to present the case of Spain to the League on the basis
that such a crisis, since it endangered the peace, was the concern of

the League.

Attlee and others of the Labour Party requested this inter-

vention of the League.

Such requests, however, were not as frequent,

nor as persistent as in the case of Abyssinia.

This is well illustrated

by the fact that the outbreak of the rebellion was not immediately
followed by demands that the League act.
It was not

until after the speech from the Throne, almost six

months after the civil war started, that Attlee criticised the Government because its policy had not been and would not be to co-operate with
the League of Batlons.^

On June 5th of the next year the Labour Party,

according to the Trades Union Congress, "demanded that the League act

under the Covenant and take up its responsibilities.

"

At the same

time the Congress considered Sir Walter Citrine's resolution calling for

212. Carried, p. 215.

1.

L.P. Annual Report ,

2.

"Report of the Hational Council of Labour", L.P. Annual Report ,

1937, P-

1937. P. 7.
1936, cols. 58-9.

3.

Attlee, Commons, CCCYII, December

k.

"General Councils Annual Report", T.U.O. Report, 1937. p. 177.

3,

Trades Union Congress

I

solidarity" with the Spanish Government's
Appeal

to the League of Rations.

It concluded that it was the duty of the

League to propose measures including the withdrawal of
foreign troops. 1
In June and July of 1937 this appeal for League action
was the

strongest.

Attlee, Henderson, Wedgewood, and Grenfell all said that
the

time had come for the League to act.

Attlee said the Spanish question

must be dealt with by the League of lations "where it can he dealt
with

more fully and with greater hope of peace." 2

Henderson's comment was

that the Government was guilty of "hypocrisy" unless Britain was "pre-

pared to face up to our obligations under the Covenant whatever the
consequences, "3

Wedgewood asked what the League was going to do. 1*

In

June, Henderson again said that the League should take some action.

The Government should ask for an immediate meeting of the Council of the
League.

On the same day Attlee demanded that the League

act.**

The number of demands for League action vcried inversely to the

number of plans concerning what the League might do in this case,

a

s

ingle request is recorded for sanctions by the League.

lot

It would seem

that if the Labour leaders had expected the League to act, they would

have proposed steps which the League could have taken.

The answer may

be that Labour had little hope of League action.

1.

T.U.C. Report , 1937. P- 266.

2.

Attlee, Contnons, CCCXXFI, July 7, 1937. cols. 3537-8.

3.

Henderson, Commons , CCCXXT, June 6, 1937, col. I569.

4.

Wedgewood, Commons, CCCXXX, March 25. 1937. col. 3159-

5.

Henderson, Commons , CCCXXY, June 25, 1937, col. 1568.

6.

Attlee, Commons, CCCXXV, June 25, 1937. col. 1553.

^

One test of the sincerity of a foreign policy could well be the
extent to which It would he backed by the determination to use force.

This was true In the oase of I5thiopla, v/here sanctions required the backing of force.

If Labour sincerely desired to prevent the Rebels from

winning, it would hare suggested the use of a fleet to enforoe a blockade.

This was suggested at one time, but one suggestion cannot be construed
to represent the organized policy of a group unless supported by the vote

of its followers.

Certainly the opinion of one man does not rep resent

the opinion of 10,000,000.
Cooks probably expressed the opinion of Labour as a whole when

he said that no one was suggesting the sending of the
take part in this oonflict.

arnqr

and navy to

All that Labour wanted was to peimit the

Spanish government to buy arms where it could. *

wanted Britain to go into Spain.

I

Attlee denied thnt he

The opinion of Wedgewood was similar.

He suggested the possibility of sending British troops to Spain to stop
the war, but in the next breath admitted that it was "impossible and

impractical".

He said that the Spanish would resent such a move, but

that they might welcome a League army.

He, too, would not

Bend troops

to Spain.

The sinking of British ships was another matter.

Henderson

•aid thnt ships sailing to the port of Bilbao were carrying on legal
U

operations, and thus should have the protection of the British Havy.

Wedgewood followed by praising the British Navy for providing the

1.

Cocks, Commons , CCCXVX, October ?9, 1936, col. 91.

2.

Attlee, Commons , CCCXXXIII, March 16, 193 g . co 1 * 53?.

3.

Wedgewood, Commons . CCCX7III, December 18, 1936. col.

k.

Henderson, Commons , CCCXXXX, March lk

t

1937, col.

?f?4l.

IO76.
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"Gebel yerjon* with eacorta, and recommended that it bo continued. 1

Grenfell waa of the opinion that if Britain protected British ahipa
in

Spaniah terbora, neither 'franco nor Muaaolinl would declare war. 2
alao believed that Britiah ahips should he protected.

Attlee

He said, "fake the

question of Majorca; it is quite possible to blockade Majorca.

Why

should any other power intervene, if Majorca belongs to General franco?^
It ia clear from the examples cited that Labour waa not ready to

go to war to force the defeat of franco , but that it would protect

British ahlpping on lawful buainesa.

This is not to be construed as

meaning that British Labour wished to fight in Spain; there is not
enough evidence to aupnort such a conclueion.

It was a minority opinion,

not the official opposition volley.

There ia little evidence that Labour thought primarily in terms

of balanoe of power.

The central theme of their speeches was that the

government of Spain was the legal government, and thus had very definite
rights under international law.

If the -government could win it a fight

for existence, it would be a victory for democracy.

There are, however,

hints that the idea of balance of power did enter into the thoughts of
Labour.

A victory by Franco would upset the balance already tinned in

favor of the dictators.

getting

rirras

Therefore, the Hebels should be prevented from

from any nation, and the government should not be pieced

on the same footing.

Thus,

Labour saw the struggle as a threat to

democracy, a n^rt of the balance of power.

1.
2.
3.

Then, too, a Rebel victory

would be dangerous to British shipping and to the
life-line of the
pire.

How was the time for the democracies

stand up to the dictators.

to

In support of the belief that a victory by
franco would upset the

balance between the dictators and the democracies, the
General Council*

Annual Report" of the Trades Union Congress

w=

I

rned that the presence of

foreign armies was a "challenge" to democracy. 1

Attlee said that if

democracy is to survive, it oust be prepared to stand up to the
2
dictators.

Grenfell warned that a Franco victory would put Spain in the "pocket of

Herr Hitler who would rule over Spain and have full control and command

of all the strategic points of advantage which the Spanish peninsula
affords. "'

The Rational Council of Labour said that the attempt of the

Fascist powers to change the "strategic balance of power in the Western

Mediterranean, and thus imperil the vital interests of Britain and

Trance" was a danger of war.

This was the lone reference that was

made directly to the balance of power.

levertheless here is evidence that labour was beginning to think
less in terms of collective security and more in terms of Britain.

feared a victory for France
the trade of the empire.

Britain herself.

'<:culd

It

put Fascism in a position to threaten

This was undesirable since it threatened

If a democratic government remained in Spain, it would

be no threat to this vital life-line.
In the Spanish question there were three important Issues at

stake for Britain, all of which had some relation to Britain's future

1.

"General Council's Annual Report", T.U.C. Report
CCCXIX, January 19,

1937. col.

,

1937, p. 176.

115.

2.

Attlee, Commons

3.

Grenfell, Oonmons. CCCXXXTII, June 21, 19 38, col. 10?9.

k.

,

"General Council's Annual Report", T.U.C. Report , 1937. PP.
178-9.

security.

In S^aln the Civil War

m$

a struggle between two opposing

groups who were ©t variance over the form of government desired for
Spain.

The Rebels, led hy Ihranco, wished to establish a Fascist govern-

ment; the loyalists wished to maintain a democratic form of government.

The former wished to limit persons! freedom, and protect certain groups.
The latter wanted to grant pergonal freedom
to "benefit the majority.

jfflflmlr*

reforms designed

If the fascist revolt succeeded,

n

~<vorr^ent

would he established \*hich was not only hostile to democracy in Spain,
hut also in Britain.

national

3 .aw.

The second i^.sue r^s the maintenance of inter-

The aid £?iven to Franco during the Spanish Civil War was

an illustration of the lack of respect for international lav or p^re^-

meats held by Italy and Germany.

At this time these two nations did

not hesitate to violate international lav any more than they had "before

or were to again.

To Britain, the maintenance of international law

wag important because Britain needed to know that certain "procedures

would be followed eo th*t the could plan for the future on that basis.
The third issu^ highly important as far as Britain was concerned, was
the threat to her coitwunications as pointed out in the introduction to

this chapter.

Because of this threat to Britain 1 © security, Britain should
have taken firm and decisive steos.
the problem to the League of Vations,

This would have eliminated taking

M

suggested by Labour leaders,

because by the outbreak of the Civil War, the League had been proven
incapable of action by its failure to prevent Italian selsure of
Abyssinia.

It is true that this was the result of non-supr>ort by the

major powers, but it is doubtful whether the League nations would
problems
haT© had any confidence in the ability of the League to meet

112.

as serious as the Spanish Civil War even if the
major powers had sought
to activate the league.
It is possible th*t Horn Intervention was the
correct policy to

follow at the outbreak of the Civil War.

There is some justification

for such a policy on the basis that the Spanish people had
the right to

adopt any form of government by any means they desired.

Also, the wish

to localize the conflict in an attempt to prevent the spread
of the

war to the rest of Europe is understandable.

If Britain had taken steps

to prevent outside aid from flowing into Spain,

have been limited to the Spanish peninsula.

then the conflict might

Such a step might have

made it possible, as well, for the Spanish .government
rebellion.

to put down the

It became impossible to restrict the hostilities to

Danish

forces because Germany ?nd Italy sent military forces to help the Hebel

amy

in complete disregard of the Fon-Intervention Agreements.

It was

at this point that Britain should have insisted upon the carrying out

of the Non-intervention Agreements by all nrtioas.

If this could not

be done, then Britain should have bloclcaded the Spanish Rebel coast
prevent Franco from receiving aid.

to

Furthermore, Britain should hatl

sent to the government forces, munitions, supplies, and possibly mili-

tary advisors.

The British Government, in addition, should have cooper-

ated with Hussia which was already helping the Loyalists with men and
supplies.

The stakes were too high to permit a £ebel victory.

As soon

as Eon- Intervention proved to be to the advantage of Franco, Hon-

Intervention should have been abandoned for Intervention - aid to the

Spanish government.

Only in this way could Britain have been positive

that her position at Gibraltar would not have been rendered valueless,

and the Mediterranean would have remained open to her shipping,

—

British security would have been maintained.
In contrast to the British Government, which
certainly did not

recognize publicly the threat to British interests of

a

faacist victory

in Spain, the Labour Party recognized that a victory
for Franco might

be detrimental to Britain.

During the Civil War the Labour P^rty was

more outspoken in its hostility to Tranco and the ideas he
represented.
The Party gave idealistic reasons for their attitude, euch
as the

menace to democracy and opposition to aggression, as well as practical
reasons Buch as the danger to the British life-line and possible upsetting of the balance of power in Europe, for its support of the

Spanish government.

The British Government adopted the policy of non-

intervention and maintained that policy to the end of the Civil

"'ar.

For a few months the Labour Party also gave its support to Hon-Intervention, but

hen

it became obvious that Gerraany and Italy were aid-

ing Franco v.lth men and arms, the Labour Party refused to support the

Government.

Because, as applied, Hon-Intervention worked to the dis-

advantage of the Spanish government, the Labour Party urged that nonintervention be done away with.

Instead.,

the Labour Party adopted the

principle that as the legal government, the Spanish /government should be

permitted to buy arms and munitions in sufficient quantities to sup-

press the rebellion.
partisanship,

This proposal demonstrated the Labour Farty's

Neither the Labour Party nor the British Government was

prepared to intervene actively in Spain to insure victory for the
Spanisn government.

Perhaps thi6 was the proper course; if this be

true, both the British Government and the Labour Party failed to take

tide stand.

Chapter VI

Austria

While there is extensive evidence to
show how British Labour

regarded the ouestions of Spain and Abyssinia,
there is considerably
less in the case of Austria.

There is so little evidence that it

U

difficult to determine exactly where Labour stood
on the latest threat
to the iXiropean security system.

The only certainty is that the Labour

farty wa 8 against the annexation of Austria by tiermany.
The gravity of the situation dia not justify this
lack of concern,

hitler had written in Heln Kampf that Austria oust be
joined to

the German ileich.

One unauccesai'ul attempt had oeen made in I93U by

tne murder of Ohancellor Dollfuss to sot up a Nazi
govesaml in Austria.

This attest went astray and tne attested coup failed, many of the
leaders ueiag executed..

But tuis was not to be

the last attempt, for

in 193b tae annexation of Austria took plaoe.

Dollfuss was succeeded by Dr. JichuBChnigg who struggled to koep
Austria free.

Hitler pushed his campaign to annex Austria in spite of

an agreement in 1936 to observe the independence of Austria.
wa8 invited to Berchtesgaden to discuss Austro-tterman
ruary l? t 193 g -

Schusohnigg

rel- tions on Feb-

Hitler accused the Chancellor of persecution of the

Austrians and announced that unless certain Nasi proposals were accented,
Oerm.-ny would invade Austria.

3chuschni,<g agreed to include two Marts'

in his cabinet and to grant full political freeaom for the Austrian

Nazis nnd amnesty for all imprisoned Nazis.

In return Hitler agreed to

respect Austrian independence.
Seyse-Inqvr rt,

Nazi, was appointed to tne cabinet post of

Interior and Public Security
which had control of th.
police to rces.
After »
by Seyse-Inq^rt to Hitler, Berlin
hinted at , customs
union
military eo-ordin,ticn. When Hitler'*
s.eech 0 f February *)th
fall.* to mention Austria
independence, SchuschnW tolled
before the
Austrian P.rli-ment saying that his «
cement with Hitler would be kept,
hut no more. On M,rch th Schuschnlg.
9
announced that a plebiscite would
he held, on Ri rch 1 3 l 9 *S. at which the
Austrian oeoole would c * their
hrllots for or gainst »n independent
Austria.
This announcement brought

nm

m

,

fresh iwKauU from Hitler, including
Sohuschni^s resignation and the
vithdr.,,
submit.

1

of the plebiscite.

To these demands Schuschni^ could
only

3eyss-Inpur,rt became Chancellor *nd reouested
German troops to

maintain order.

German troops mo Ted into Austria on Whrch
l?th, and

Austria became rert of the Greater German *elch.
IHiring this crisis,

the Invasion.

Bo threats

the British Government made no move to stop
-

ere made; no op-osition registered.

The

official British Government policy was surprized by the
Prime Minister
In the House of Go mi ons on Mrrch lU, iq3g.

German -ction; he denied

Mm*

H e protested against the

the British Government had given its en-

couragement or assent to the absorption of Austria into the Reich; he
stated th

t

Britain had held consultations

villi

vided for in the Stress* conference of April

France

19"55.

anrt

Italy as pro-

The hard fact was,

he admitted "th^t nothing could have arrested tnis action by Germany

unless we and others had been prepared to uae force

1.

Medlicott, on. clt., pp.

??V7

to

prevent it".

1

116

In the light of the development* In Austria
the Government decided to
increase its rerrmrment effort.

The Brltleh labour

M|

had Ion- recognized the Gernwn desire
to

eel2e Austria, and the danger* which might result.

were stated as enrly rs IfJJ.

After the

These Labour Views

for the customs union of

T>l«n

Germany nnd Austria had been vetoed by the Great Powers,
the Labour

Magwslne warned that the ouestlon would arise a^nin. 1
th*t Austria was one of the danger points of

ffiurope,

Attlee, who warned

wasted British in-

fluence used agninst flict^torshin, and for democracy Gainst a~
-ration
from any quarter.
thfit

Hitler's gestures promoted Cocks to predict in I935

if ifaseolini went into Abyssinia, Hitler

the end of the ye»r.^

to

Since the Labour member

ft

Into Vienna before

of Commons

'/ere

voicing

thoughts such as these, it is not sumrisin^ that the Labour Party's
Annunl Conference called uoon the British Oovernroemt to "take all the

measures v;ithin their power to restrain foreign a^re^sion a^Mn^t
Austria;

rnrl

thus *vort the new menace to r>eace which "fascism tB Central

Surope now involves".

k

Although some Labour m^nbers of Commons could see danger in the

Austrian situation, those who discussed the loan made to Austria in
August of 19"^ were opposed to this form of help to the Austrians.

1.

"Mitel !*! 9 * Labour Maga z ine
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Attlee, Commons

|,

Cocks, Commons
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,
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19 7 ^, »P*
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Pi,

19 VJ.

1*10-1.

tvo.

1933.

col.

f5*(«

M&«

Wt.
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Bevan, Jones and Wedgewood found grounds on which
to oppose the
loan.

This confusion was still evident in 1938 when Hitler
achieved
the Anschluss.

Labour Parliamentary members exoressed concern it the

threat to Austrian independence, hut uut forth no suggestions
for pre-

venting the threat from heing carried out.

Arthur Henderson rsked

Chanberlain to endorse Delbos 1 (the French Foreign Minister) statement
that the independence of Austria is "an essential element in *5urot>ean

peace".

Such a statement by Britain, Henderson said, would encourage the

people of Austria and bring hope to other

sma.ll

nations of UuropeJ

1

He

also asked the Government to reserve the right to bring the matter "before
the League Council. 5

Two days after the German troops crossed the border

of Austria, Attlee warned th~t if nothing were done this time, other
c

aggressions would follow.
the League be

c-

A little later in the day he suggested that

lied upon to formulate clans and to stop aggression, al-

though he did not mention Austria's case specifically.^

Both Attlee and Henderson were disturbed by the method which
Germany had followed in acquiring Austria.

Attlee said, "whatever

my

be one's views... with regard to whether Austria and Germany should be
one state, there can be but one opinion in deplorin g the manner in which
it has been brought about.

There has been

a

display of n^ked force at

1.

%

?.

J. Jones, Commons ,

3.

Wedgevood, Commons

k,

Henderson, Conmons , CCXXXII, March

5»

Loc.

6,

Attlee. Commons , CCCXXXIII, K»rch lk 9 1938, col. 1??0.

7.

Attlee, op» cit», cols. 16^5.

Bevan, Commons , CCLXXIV, February 7, 1933, cols. 139-^3CCLXXXV, February
,

7,

19^3, col. l u 80.

CCLXX2II, December ?0, 193?, cols. 96?-^.
?,

19^8,

col. 1?>7-

clt.

"

a Government which was preparing to consult the
people.

Had it been

certain t**t that consultation was going to favour the
union of Austria
and Germany, it would have been allowed to proceed
in neace.

feat force

X
has been taken, in Wf opinion, against the will of the
Austriana. »

Henderson said that no member of the Labour party would object
to selfdetermination, but that there had been no self-determination
expressed

by the Austrian people.

It was Henderson who had expressed the houe

that the British Government would urge the completion of the -olebacite

without external oressure.^

Attlee summed up with:

"We have first of

all to see the passing, or what looks like the passing of a great his-

toric State, Austria.

k

In spite of Mr. Attlee'

British Labour

s

regrets because Germany annexed Austria,

only expressed disapproval; no plan to prevent this

hart

event had been put forth.

Labour leaders were avart of the consequences

of German success in Austria, but could only condemn the method by which
annexation haA taken place; they could not offer a plan to prevent Qennan
victory.

The nearest approach to a plan was Hendersons suggestion th*t

Britain reserve the right to bring the question to the attention of the
League, and Attlee

1

desire that the League be convened to consider

s

ways to stop future aggression - both futile gestures.

Thus, Labour 1 s

spokemen were able to voice a warning and opposition, but unable to offer

any sensible program by which G-erman aggrandizement could be prevented
at Austrian expense,

CCCXXXIII, March lk, 193*. cols. 5>**.

1.

Attlee, Commons

2.

Henderson, Commons , CCCXXXIII, M*rch lU, 1938, col. 67.

3.

Henderson, Commons , CCCXXXXI, March 10, 1938, col. 21?0.

k.

Attlee, Commons, CCCXXXIII, Msrch

,

lK

193S, col. 53-
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If Britain sought to maintain the ideals of the League
of Notions
to maintain p balance of power in BuroT>e or to protect British
interests,

Gewan expansion had

to be prevented.

One way of preventing this expansion

would have been to guarantee Austrian independence, - by military aid if
necessary.

It is true that it would have been difficult to send direct

military aid to Austria.

Military aid could have been accomplished only

by an attack on Oermai^s western border and this necessitated the cooperation of Prance.

It is possible that Britain did not have sufficient

military power to make this guarantee in March of 1938.

If a strong posi-

tion in ^position to German desires were to have been taken, the early
months of 193*5 would have been the time to take that position.

A guaran-

tee of Austrian independence might not have saved Austria from attack

more then Poland was saved when a definite stand was finally taken.

tttyp

There

is one inrDortant difference; Austria and Czechoslovakia had fallen into

German hands without Britain and Trance giving any assurance of aid, or

making any real attejnpt to prevent their conquest.

3y 1939 Hitler probably

felt that Britain and France would nnce more permit

a

the precedent had not been established.

conquest.

In 19^8

It is possible that a direct

guarantee to Austria would have carried more weight, and might have prevented, or At least postponed, Hitler 1

e

move.

Also in 1938 there were

nore possible allies including Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Russia, and
if war had resulted, there was a good chance that Germany would have been
defeated.

Attlee's suggestion that the prohlem of aggression he discussed

by the League of Nations wss of no value at the time.

The League,

had no
after its failure to halt the Italian conquest of lithiopia

power to act because no nation believed that it could act.

A mutual

guarantee by the nations of 8urope to oome to e*eh
others* aid in case

of attack was far more practical.

As stated above, such a guarantee, if

backed by force, could hare prevented German aggression;
no other means
would suffice.
It is interesting to note the influence of the
Austrian episode

on disarmament and rearmament.

The desire for disarmament did not

dison-oear, but demands for disarmament were few.

M.

Jonos still wanted

to abolish air bombing, 1 and Labour still believed that the money
for
arras

could have been seved if the Government had followed a different

foreign policy.

The volume of printed and spoken words concerning dis-

armament was a mere trickle compared to that of 1935-36.

One of the re-

sults of the international events of the years before, as well as of
1938, was that Labour's agitation for disarmament was greatly diminished.

Writing in the February issue of Labour, J.
that Labour had been forced

bjr

3.

Middleton said

circumstance to accept rearmament.

Still

be did not believe that British arms could help achieve peace, but rather
that Ju^.t treaties would bring peace. *

The February issue of Labour

carried an editorial to the effect that while the Trades Unions recog-

nlzed the need for arms, they were not willing

to

give up any of their
U

rights such irking conditions and hours because of this need.
The Commons Debates of May, 1938, show that the Labour Perty

was seriously concerned with the condition and strength of the British
Commons , CCCXXXX, February

1938, col.

1.

M. Jones,

2.

"All the World Over", Labour , Kay, 1938, p. 195.

3.

J. S. Middleton,
February, 19 3&\

U.

P,

3O5.

"Labour's Lead for the Victory of Peace", Labour ,
p.

"All the World Over

",

132.

Labour , April, 1938,

V,

P-

170.

air force.

Attlee stated that not only did Britain lack equality
with

the German air force, hut in fact wn« falling hehind
in the attempt to

reach equality. 1

He suggested ae a remdy that fewer types of planes
he

constructed nnd greater standardization he hrou^t ahout in their manufacture.

Vedgewood, too, was concerned with the smnll numhers of

British war planes and wanted standardization of planes.'
Wedgewood was fully aware:

Of the danger,

"Labour is only too v/llling to defend itself,

to defend democracy, and to defend England at the present time."

thing

—

Army, Havy, Civil Service,

even civil rights

to the safety of the country, and I think to the

m*n

—

"lre*j<-

must give w»y

production of

U

aeroplanes."

ministry,^

Crippt charged that there was inefficiency In the air

and said there was a need for "immediate and drastic action"

to increase the production of airplanes and holster the nation's defenses

against air attacks.^
The author does not state, nor does he wish to suggest, that this

interest in air strength was the result of the anschluss alone.

These

examples serve simply to illustrate that British Lahour had "become aware

of Germany* s strength in the air, and of the threat of air
Britain.

-power to

If this strength was not equaled, Britain, too, might join

the list of German conquests.
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Chapter 711
C z echo so lovaki a

In October of 1938, Hitler acquired, as a result of the Munich
Conference, the C % echo s lovaki an Sudetenland.

The acceptance of Germany 1 g

demands at Munich by Great Britain and France represented the

dim** of

the appeasement policy as pursued by the British Government.

After Munich,

the British Government redoubled its rearmament effort.

The establishment

of a German protectorate over the remains of Czechoslovakia and the
seizure of Kernel led the British Government in Mrrch to pledge its support to Poland if any event threatened her independence.

appeasement had come.

The end of

It was the guarantee to Poland which led to

Britain's declaration of war on Germany, after the attack on Poland.
In the Sudeten area, desired

b,r

Hitler, lived many Germans who

were discontented and many who wished to be a part of Germany,

It was

clear in the early months of 19 3* that Germany wished to secury autonomy
for these Germans or to annex the Sudetenland.

This threat should have

brought certain treaties, which Czechoslovakia had signed with other
countries, into operation.

She had signed a treaty of alliance with

Russia in May of 1935 which stated th^t if one -Marty to the treaty were
attacked, the other would not aid the attacker.

If France came to the

aid of the victim, the other would also £ive military aid.

Thus, in this

case, if France gave military sup-port to Czechoslovakia, Russia would be

bound to aid Czechoslovakia.
with Czechoslovakia in 19?5.

France had signed a Mutual Assistance Pact

provided that if either were

attacked, the other would come to her assistance.

The only direct com-

mitment made by Britain to Czechoslovakia was that of

*

member of the

League, as provided for by Article X of the Covenant,

louring the crisis

Britain ignored that obligation; nor was the British Government v/illing
to give a new guarantee as to Czechoslovak! an independence.
ever, did have an alliance with France.

5hgland, how-

If France fulfilled its obliga-

tions to Czechoslovakia, there was little doubt thrt Britain would be drawn
into the war.

Aside from Britain's obligations to France, she could not

afford to gamble on the outcome of a war between Germany and France.
On March lU, 1938, M. Paul-Boncour, the French Foreign Minister,

assured M. Osusky, the Czechoslovak Minister, that France would carry out
the provisions of the treaties signed with Czechoslovakia in
1955.

The Russians, too, said their commitment.; still held.

19?U-

and

The British

Government's attitude was expressed by Prime Minister Chamberlain on

March ?Hth when he spld that Britain wished to see peace maintained, and
that certain treaty obligations such as Locarno would be fulfilled by

force if necessary.

There were other instances in which Britain would

resort to arms if necessary.

He admitted that Britain would not guaran-

tee Czechoslovakian independence, yet he did indicate th"t if war resulted, Britain might be drawn in.

On May lHth he expressed his belief

that Czechoslovakia should grant the German demands If "reasonable".

Throughout the summer of 1938 the Government expressed opposition to
any settlement of the Sudeten problem made as a result of force.

The German propaganda campaign opened with a manifesto issued

by Herr Henlein and the 3udeten-deutsche Parte! on March l6th.

1,

Parts of the following have been used as
duction to this chapter:

a

Kedlicott, op. cit. , l?7-?5?.
Soward, op. cit.
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Haines and Hoffman, oy. cit. pp. 5°L-517.
Dean, ov. cit. , pt>. 108-120.
Schuman, q-?. cit. , pp. 359-^56.
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,

This

basis for the intro-

waa followed on April ?Uth by the Karlsbad programme
which demanded the
"determination, legal recognition, and fall self- government
of the German
areas, removal of injustices inflicted since

1.0

lg,

m

profess German nationality and political philosophy".

i

f^n

liberty to

The Czech govern-

ment continued to seek agreement and tried to «void a complete
"break.

On May

7,

1938 the British and French Ministers informed M. Krofta that

they exoected Czechoslovakia to grant ell possible concessions; the

Prague Government indicated its willingness

to

do so promptly.

This was

followed by an intensive German propaganda campaign, end there were re-

ports of German mobilization of several divisions, in consequence of
which the Czechs moved large numbers of troops into the Suieten erea.

A draft of the nationalities Statute which granted considerable local
autonomy to the Sudetans, was given to the Sudet en-dent sche Part el

which indicated the Statute to be unacceptable.

A deadlock seemed to

be Inevitable.
At the end of July a further British attempt was made to 3olve

the problem.

An announcement was made that Lord Bund man had accepted

the Czechoslovak! an Invitation to act as a mediator betveen the Czech

Government and its minorities.

During August, Bunciman kept the two

parties in contact, but all Czech offers were refused by the Sudeten
Germans.

On four occasions between July ?6th and September 1st,

Seville Henderson told the German Foreign Office that German military
preparations might cause the Runciman mission to fail, and threaten
the peace of Europe.

of Sudeten Germans.

German propaganda told of plundering and beating

The Germans 1 military preparations on September

12th on both the French and Czech frontiers represented force behind
Hitler* s demand on the fifteenth for the union of the Sudetenland with

1?5.

Sernumy.

This led to a revolt of the Sudeten* which was
easily put down

by Czech troops.
The final stage of British mediation "began with Chamberlain 1
1
visit to Berchtesgaden on September lSth.

Hitler told Chaabsrlain that

an invasion of Czechoslovakia wns imminent and could only be
avoided if

& guarantee were siven by Britain that it would accept the principle of
self-determination.

On his return to London he consulted the cabinet

and held conferences with S^ladier ?md Bonnet.

These conferences re-

sulted in the Anglo-French proposals sent to the Gsech Government on
September 19th including these points:
(1) that the keeping of the Sudeten Deutsch

within Czechoslovakia endangered both

Czechoslovakia and SSuropemi peace;
(?) that areas in which rnora than fifty

percent of the population were German

would have to be ceded;
(3) that

w

soma international body" should

arrange for the adjustment of the frontiers and exchange of -nopulrtlon;
(U) that th& British Government would guaran-

tee the new boundaries of Osecbo Slovakia,

fhese proposals were accented by Pra^ic.

Again in (V>de*ber*r Chamberlain

met Hitler who demanded the cession of certain areas by October 1st with-

out a plebncite.

*Fhese demands

who refused to accept them.
in a speech attacking Benes.

were went without comment to the Czechs

Hitler attacked verbally again, this time
Der Fuehrer countered the mobilisation of

Chamberlain,
the British fleet and the Trench army by an invitation asking

Waaler,

and Mussolini to come to Monica.
The agreement reached here

provided for the occupation of territory
in five stage* between October
1st and 10th; the holding of plebiscite*
within those areas; and the
assurance that German guarantees would be
given, after the settlement of
the question of the Polish and Hungarian
minorities. The latter two pro-

visions were not fulfilled. *nd in March
1939 the remaining fragments

of Czechoslovakia were absorbed by Germany.
The British Labour Party was critical of the
Government

•

s

policy.

Labour believed that Czechoslovakia should not be
asked or forced to
give up any part of her territory to Germany.

Instead, L-tbour nr?ed

the Government to give a definite guarantee that "Britain
would protect

Czechoslovakia*

s

integrity.

Thi* step the Government refused to take.

Some believed that the League of Bations was ^till capable of
consider-

ing the problem.

When tbe Hxuieiman mission left for Czechoslovakia,

only conditional approval was expressed.

After proposals for tbe divid-

ing of Czechoslovakia had been supported b^ the Government, opposition

was quickly expressed. The result of Munich was to prove to the Labour

Party that Hitler* s word was of no value and that democracy had suffered
a severe diplomatic defeat.

In spite of criticism of the Munich agree-

ment, the Labour Party did give assent to Chamber lpin*

trip to Munich,

s

indicating that the Labour P^rty, as well as the Ilovornment, was will-

ing to support almost any effort to avoid war.
There were several dangers which some of Labour*

could see in the approaching crisis in Czechoslovakia.
the country itself was apparent.

proponents

8

The danger to

As early as January of 19?7t *M

article in Labour pointed out that the international tension might
lead to a rupture.

If this came, it might be that Czechoslovakia t/culd

be Hitler*

first victim,

a

route to the Ukraine. 1

since that nation was located alone
the German

In March of 193^. Greenwood said,

"I

can conceive

a possible situation in which Germany's
jack-boot will he lifted and east
2
• shadow over Czechoslovakia.'
In July Morgan Jones added his warning
that Czechoslovakia w«s being "daily menaced". 3

Wedgewood warned the

Government that every time the "tyrants" are presented
an ally, war becomes more inevitable. 1*

Dr. Gerhard Schacher warned th-t if
Czechoslo-

vakia fell, the way would be clear for Hitler, not only
to the »*lack
Sea, but also to a push towards the coast of the
Mediterranean, and ad-

vance to Poland and the Baltic, and finally the way to Russia". '

A

month after Munich, Wedgewood spw one of the first results of Munich
was
in the fact that the nations of Eastern Surope are being "chained
to
c

the chariot wheel of Germany".

Because of the dangers involved in this conflict, a few Labourites

wanted the League of Nations convened to discuss the problem.
said,

Henderson

"....I suggest that now is the time for the League. ..to call xxoon

the nations of Central Flurope to meet and see whether or not it is not

possible to hammer out some sort of settlement".^
I93S.
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In July, Morgan Jones said that in his judgment "we have to build
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upon the basis of the League.
be founded.

Upon that rock the temple of peace
must

If it is 90 founded, no matter what rains
of criticism may

descend upon it, nor what winds of adversity may
whistle upon it. the
1
etructure will stand, for it will he founded upon
the rock".

After

Munich, Clement Attlee criticised the Government
because no attempt had

been made to bring the question before the League of
Nations. 2
Labour, commenting upon the sending of Lord Runciman
to Czech-

oslovakia, said, "Lord Tlunciman»s mission to Czechoslovakia
must be re-

ceived with conditional approval,

If he has been sent merely as an ad-

visor and conciliator in order to smooth the path of negotiation,
it is
a welcome sign that the Government is at last aware of its responsibilities to the cause of international appeasement".

The editorial expressed

disappointment, however, because Chambrlain had neglected to state th-t

pressure would not be exerted upon the Czechoalovakian Government to make
greater concessions to the Sudeten Germans, "As Mr. Jones urged, the
C z echo s lovakl an Government must be allowed to determine for themselves

at what point unity, indeoendence and integrity of their st"te demand

that they ehall put a limit" to their concessions.

Months before Lord Runciman went to Czechoslovakia, Labourites

urged the British Government to take a stand on the question, maintain
that position, and seek joint action with France and Russia.

In Febru-

ary of 1938, Wedgewood asked the Foreign Minister whether any "approach
had been made to the government of the Soviet Union of Socialist

Commons , CCCXXXVIII, July 26, 1938, cols. ?971-2.

1.

M. Jones,

?..

Attlee, Commons

3.

"All the World Over", Labour

,

CCCXXXIX, October
,

3,

August,

1938, col.

<}8.

1938, V. p. ?6£.

Hepublies concerning the possibility of
Joint or parallel action in
connection with Czechoslovakia or whether any
such steps are being taken

via Prance or the league?-

When Sir John Simon said, "Ho.\
Wedgewood

continued with. "In view of the increased danger
of the situation to
Czechoslovakia, would it not be advisable even
now to make approaches
to Hussla and France with regard to concerted
action x,hen next this sort

of thing takes place." 1

Arthur Henderson advocated that Britain give
to

Czechoslovakia a definite com: itment.

He justified such

ft

move by re-

ferring to the statements of those who claimed that the
First World War

would have been avoided if Britain had made a similar commitment
in
19 lU.

2

Wedgewood said he hoped th»t at some time the Government would

stand firm because it was the best way to avoid war. *

On September

8,

1938, the National Council of Labour stated:

"The British Government must leave no doubt in the
aind of the German Government that they will unite
with the French and Soviet Governments to resist any
attack upon Czechoslovakia.
Peaceful change can come only through friendly
negotiations. Labour can not acquiesce In the des«
truction of the rule of law by savage aggression."

The Trades Union Congress took

ft

similar stand, adding, "The Labour

Movement urges the British Government to give this lead, confident such

a policy would have the solid support of the British people."-*

October the editors of Labour wrote:

1.

In

"From the beginning the Labour

Wedgewood and Simon, CoTmons , CCCXXXII, February 21, 1938, cols.
17-8.
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Henderson, Commons , CCCXXXIII, March lH, 1938, col. 71.
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Party he. urged upou the Sovernaent
the necessity for makin,
» flra stend
against aggression. 1,1

The taking of a firm stand. Labour
believed, included a guarantee
of
Chechoslovakia* 8 independence, and the
prevention of dividing Czechoslovakia.

Mis. Wilkinson and Arthur Henderson both
wished to give the Chechoslovakians
a definite guarantee of independence. Miss
Wilkinson asked if the Government had given or intended to give any
guarantee to Czechoslovakia

so that

her independence would be respected in case
of any action taken against
her similar to that against Austria. 2

Henderson said.

H

suggest that in

the event of France fulfilling her League and Treaty
obligations, as a

result of aggression against Czechoslovakia, and
this being followed by

invasion or an attack upon French territory this country
will be involved.,

whether we wish it or not.

The Prime Minister prides himself upon his

ability to face up to realities;

I

hope he will face up to that, and make

it plain where the 3ritish Government stands.

It is no use allowing the

German Government to imagine that if they attack Czechoslovakia, all that
the British Government will do will be the same as they have done in the
lest few days over Austria. "3

<£

eJk

flay8 i at er

he said,

1

we are already

pledged to Czechoslovakia as we are to every other country belonging to
the League.

All that would happen in the event of a pledge being given

to Czechoslovakia is that it would constitute a specific pledge and would

impose no greater obligations on this country than are imposed by our
U
general pledge under the League Covenant."
Labour felt that such guarantees would stop any threat of war.

The editorial said that British Labour

h

1.

"All the World Over", Labour , October, 19 38,

2.

Miss 311 en Wilkinson. Commons . CCCXXXXIX, March 16, 1938. col.
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Henderson, Commons , CCCXXXIII, March lU. lqxg, col. 71.

h.

Ibid., col. tf*f§.

p.

supported the British Government •

a

stand over the oriels in
Czechoslovakia

and helieved that some relief had come as a
temporary result.
is clear.

"The Moral

On the only two occasions when the peaceful
states have united

to resist fascist terrorism - the first at Kyon that resistance has
"been

completely successful.
Morgan Jones spoke in July:

hy all means let the Czecho-

"

slovakia Government strive with all its might to arrive

at an agreeable

settlement with the representatives of the Germans in the Sudeten
Lands
hut they must he allowed to determine for themselves at what point." 2

The National Council of Labour issued the following resolution on Septem-

her 20, I938:

"The National Council of Labour

views with dismay the

reported proposals of the British and French Governments for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia under the brutal threat of armed force

"by

lazi Germany and without prior consultation with the Czechoslovakiaa
Government."^
words:

The Trades Union Congress expressed the same view in these

"Kvery consideration of democracy likewise forhids the dlsmember-

ment of the Ceeehoslovaklau State by the subjection of the Sudeten German

regions to Nazi Government control.

British Labour emphatically repudi-

ates the right of the British or any government to use diplomatic or

other pressure to compel acceptance of humiliation."**
Hot only did some wish to prevent the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia,

"but

Labour was opposed to seeing Germany profit at the expense

1.

"All the World Over", Labour, June,

2.

K. Jones, Commons ,

193*3,

CCCXOTIII, July

V. p.

218.

1938, col. 2969.
complete ouotatlon from this source ^iven on pp. ''127-128 of this
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chapter.
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of Czechoslovakia. 1

Henderson and Wedgewood claimed that the
German

minority of the Sudetenland never were part
of Germany. 2
about the other minorities living in the
Sudetenland.

Wedgewood asked

Should they be

given to Germany along with the Germanst'
After Munich, labour leaders pointed out the danger
of taking
Hitler*

b

word at face value in the future.

distrust the German Chancellor.

Wedgewood said, "Frankly I..,

We do not trust him, and we are

anxious for the future of our country far more than are those
who nut
their faith in him.

Having that anxiety for the future, we are determined

to keep our powder dry and tighten our belts, and to have the fighting

aeroplanes by the next crisis." U
_

Hhe magazine, Labour

,

was sarcastic.

"The JOLLY of relying on the promises is shown only too clearly by the

violation of the many pledges to Czechoslovakia by Germany at the time

of the seizure of Austria.

Morrison said that Britain had only the

word of the dictators that they would keep the peace. ^

The implication

was that the pledge meant little.
When Chamberlain announced that he was going to Munich, Attlee
sale!

that he welcomed the "fresh opportunity" of further discussions

1.

"All the World Over", Labour, August, 193S, Y, p. 266.

2.

Henderson, Commons , CCCXXXIII, M.-rch 2^, 1938, col. 1^87.

3t

Wedgewood, Oomaons. CCCXXXYI, June

k.

Wedgewood, Commons , CCCXTXIX, October

5.

"All the World Over", Labour

6.

H.

,

3,

I93S, col. 2U88.

1938, col. 2I3.

October, 1938. I. P-

Morrison, Commons, CCCXXXXX, October U, 1938, col. 179-

133

which may lead

to prevention of war.

am sure that every member of

"I

this House is desirous of neglecting no chance
of preserving peace without sacrificing principles." 1

After Chamberlain had brought hack from

Munich "peace in our time", Attlee was not
was not peace but an anaistice.

2

He said that it

"We have felt humiliation.

been & victory for reason and humanity.
force."

so charitable.

This has not

It has been a victory for brute

He continued to say that th- Labour Party could not accept
the

map because it was the "equivalent to the destruction of a
state."

The

failure to tell the Czechoslovakia^ that Britain would not stand by
was
a "betrayal".^

"...this is the time for a new peace conference and an

all-in peace conference.

Let us call in the good offices of the United

States of America, and let us not exclude the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics.

I

pleaded many months ago in this House that we wanted a

peace conference before the next war, but then

I

did not assume that the

next war would be complete defeat, and that is why the Munich Conference

was not a real peace conference.
tice."

h

It was only the delivery of an arais-

Attlee, however, offered no plan to put before such a confer-

ence.

Lansbury expressed the minority and pacifist opinion.

He could

only express relief at the outcome of the Conference because war had

been avoided.

"Let us remember what price would have been paid if there

had been war.

It

is all very well to talk of the nrice that is being

COOXXXIX, September 2S, 19 38, col. ?6

1.

Attlee,

?,

Attlee, Commons, CCCXXXIX, October

3.

Ibid.

^.

Ibid., cols. 65-6.

,

Ooiiii-ons,

col. 60.

3,

193&\ col. 51.

i

paid today in what Is called humiliation and
degradation and power politics, but I would remind the House that,
according to figures presented

in various parts of the world, from diseases,
from war itself end from

other causes, over 100,000,000 persons lost taeir
lives in the last war." 1

He expressed approval of Chamberlain*

I

method of achieving a settlement:

"Unless you are willing to meet men face to face and that is why

I

appreciate so much what the Prime Minister did in going
to see Herr

Hitler - how do you expect to get any sort of discussion
or any agreetaent

with them?"

Irfinsbury

war throughout this period.

had supported any policy which would avoid
Since he was an extreme pacifist, no price

was too high to pay for peace.
in regard to agression.

That viewpoint colored all his thinking

The serious diplomatic defeat at Munich did

not cause him to abandon his life-time beliefs.

Few in Labours ranks could accept Lansbury*
followed the Attlee line of reasoning.

s

view.

Morrison

He said, "...we have an element

of dishonour in this business, and we know it.

I

think it is the case

that we did betray the Czechs or if you like, that we had to.... Are we

saved from an early war?

Are we given a reasonable time in xvhich -people

can live in peace and comfort without being subject to the fear of war
all the timet

Th-t is the kind of peace our people want.

that we are not saved from war.

The answer is

We have only the word of one or two

dictators that they will keep the peace.

But evidence is on record -

need not recite it now - of case after case where Eerr Hitler has made
either diplomatic or military of "endive, and said,

1.

Lansbury, Commons

2.

Ibid.

October

3,

,

CCGXXXIX, November
19^8, col. 91.
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'This is the last

193&. col. 89
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word, the last spot of bother you are going
to have, the la 3t surprise;
it is the last hit of territory I want,' and
he ha s consistently broken

his word."

Grenfell proposed the return of British Foreign
Policy to

the League of Kations. ?

He taso said, "The fact is that democracy
has

suffered a cruel defeat."-'
'i'he

attitude of British Labour and the British Labour £arty
dur-

ing the Chechoslovakian affair indicated a considerable
change of policy
froiii

that recommended during the Manchurian crisis.

The policy supported

during this critical period, however, was not greatly different from that

of the British Government.

In the first place, the League of Nations no

longer occupied the dominant position in Labours policy.

There was only

infrequent reference to the League in 1933; this indicates that Labour

had recognized the League's inability to act.

Any reference to League

action was futile, as shewn in the case of Austria.

The British Govern-

ment, of course, made no attempt to work through the League of Stations.

While contending that Britain was pledged by the Covenant of the League
to maintain Czechoslovakia's independence, Labour pressed for a specific

commitment

to

maintain the independence of Czechoslovakia.

The Oovern-

ment under Chamberlain refused to give such a cocanitment, although

Chamberlain did admit that if war resulted, Britain might be drawn

in.

Labour still wished to prevent aggression, and now wished to work within
the framework of the treaties signed by Cz echo Slovakia, JTrance, and Russia,

supported by Britain.

1.

2.
3-

This did not rule out discussion with Hitler, but

136.

Labour, although approving beforehand
of the Munich meeting a a an
opportunity to preserve peace "without
sacrificing principles" 1 condemned
,
the

outcome of Munich as surrender.
Even though Labour urged giving a
definite commitment to Chechoslovakia, - did Labour believe that this
alone would prevent Hitler from

pressing his demands against Czechoslovakia, -

0r

was Labour genuinely

willing to back up that pledge by force if
necessary?
determine.

It is difficult to

Wedgewood said that he hoped Britain would take
a definite

stand, that was the best way to avoid war.

said that the British Government should
resist aggression.

tt

The National Council of Labour

unite H with Prance and Russia to

The Trades Union Congress took the same position.

Henderson said that such a stand would prevent war.

He wished to make

clear to Germany the fact that the Government would not be
guilty of the
same policy as it had been in regard to Austria. 2

All of these statements,

while they sound unyielding, were no guarantee that Labour was
willing to
go to war over Czechoslovakia.

Henderson's statement that a strong stand

would prevent war is the key to the answer.

Labour probably was not will-

ing to fight a war over Czechoslovakia, and had the naive idea that words
alone would prevent aggression.
As far as the Labour Party's -olan went, it was essentially correct.

Britain should have given a specific -pledge to use her military forces to
maintain the independence of Czechoslovakia.

At the same time,

the

British Government should have communicated with the French and Russian
Governments and pledged its cooperation if they fulfilled the provisions

1.

Attlee, Commons , CCCXXX2X, October

2.
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chapter.

1938, col. 26.

of the alliance with Cache Slovakia.

These pledge* should have been

•0 definite that there would have been no
doubt left in Hitler's mind

about England's willingness to go to war
for Czechoslovakia.

Many have

contended that this step would have forced
Hitler to back down.

However,

there is some evidence that no such pledge
would have stouped *itler from

marching into Czechoslovakia.

The Huremburg Trials brought out
testimony

that Hitler had deployed troops at strategic
joints along the frontier of

Czechoslovakia on September 23,

193*5.

ready to advance across the frontier.

By the next day the troops were
The Hew York Times reported that

according to records kept by an adjutant of Hitler, named
Schmurdt, "This

aggressive move was taken only after careful preparations.

The German

army had spent the summer orecticing to overwhelm the Czech
defenses,
and Konrad Henrioh, Czech Hazi leader, had been put in charge
of the

Freikorps to provide the necessary incidents for war."

At the same time

Hitler had so much contempt for the lack of strength in England and
France

(feat

he sent only five divisions tc his western frontier to rein-

force the border troops and labor battalions.

They alone, he thought,

would be enough to hold off any attack there.

In addition, he was con-

vinced that France would not act and that England would do nothing without France.

Hitler did think that Russia mi^ht oome to the aid of

Czechoslovakia, but that this aid xvould be only in the form of planes.

Events proved that Hitler's sun-oosition was entirely correct.

The question

of whether Hitler would have marched into Czechoslovakia in the face of

a France and England >repared to defend that country, remains unanswered.
It is now known that he was prepared to do so, but he had confidence

that he moved with impunity.*

1.

"Germans Poised for Attack at Munich Talk, Court Hears", Hew York
Time*, XCV, Hovember 27, 19^5, Section I, pp. 1 and 12.

A more important question was whether England
and France were
strong enough in 1938 to act.

Th*t question remains unanswered al ao
.

It does seem, however, that military «ction
was justified for two reasons:

first, Czechoslovakia, a democracy, was the victim
of aggression; and,

secondly, some action was necessary to prevent the
aggrandizement of

Germany before she hecame
prevent German expansion.

so

powerful that no coalition of powers could

It seems probable that the combined strength

of Russia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland would have offset any weakness
of
Sngland and France.

If all these nations had moved their military forces

against Germany, she would have been forced to fight on three fronts
simultaneously, greatly coisplic-ting Hitler's problem of defense.

This

factor might have brought about the defeat of Germany in less time than

required when war did

come.

A preventive war in 193g might have been,

in the long run, a better altern tive than appeasement at Munich.
The British Government chose the policy of mediation and appease-

ment rather than the alternative of war.

Lord Runciman went to Czecho-

slovakia in the hope thpt an agreement could be worked out between the

Sudeten Germans and Czechoslovakia.

His mission failed because, as it

is now known, Germany was not sincerely supporting the Sudeten Germans
to correct injustices but as an excuse to

eventually all of Czechoslovakia.

an.;

ex the Sudetenland and

After the failure of the Runciman

mission, Chamberlain entered into direct negotiations with Hitler, ending in the Munich Accord and German victory.

The Labour Party was

opposed to giving Germany the Sudetenland, and urged as a preventive

a specific guarantee of support to Czechoslovakia.

This guarantee,

the Labour Party believed, would both deter German dem? nds and prevent
war.

Kowhere was the request for the pledge of support bolstered by

the demand to use force, if Germany
insisted on annexing the Sudeten*****

The

LeW

Part y ,s

««t

power of » mechanized, military force.
in such

ft

contest; victory for Hitler.

the strength of words versus
the

There could he only one outcome

Conclusion

An examination of the attitude of the "British Labour Party and
British labour towards foreign policy during the years, 1931-19^8,
shows
that the Labour Party often disagreed with the policy pn* into
effect by
the British Government.

At the same time,

there were occasions when the

Labour Party actually g-ve its supr>ort to the Government's policy while

claiming to be opposed to it.

Both the Labour Party and the British

Government sincerely wished to prevent the outbreak of war in

"Gurope,

but frequently disagreed as to the way in which the objective cnuld be

effectively accomplished.

Both groups wanted disarmament, but the

Government, under the pressure of events, came much sooner to the con-

clusion that it was necessary for Britain to rearm.

The Labour Party,

also, had greater faith in collective security as an effective means of

preventing aggression by the fascist diet tors.

The Labour Party con-

demned the policy of appeasement as short-sighted, and was more outspoken in its hostility to the fascist ideology.

In spite of the fact

the Labour Party criticized the British Government's foreign policy, it
is doubtful whether the policy advocated by the Labour Party would have

changed the course of events during the period, 1931-1938.
During the major part of this period, the British Labour Party

pursued the illusive goal of multilateral disarmament.

At home the

Labour Party opposed the appropriations for British armaments until

November of 1937,

<>

n the grounds that Britain's prmed strength was suf-

ficient to protect Britain.

The Labour Party snd the Government both

desired disarmament; the latter wished to balance the budget, and the
former hoped money not appropriated for arms coulo be used for social

services.

Both al 80 believed, for

a time,

(the Government until I93H,

the Labour P*rty until 1937) that increased
armaments were unnecessary

for Britain's security.

The Government's T>lan of 193U to increase
the

efficiency of the air force became a full-fledged rearmament
program in
M*rch of I936.
not necessary

The Labour Party believed th-t increased armaments
were
aft

th*t time because the combined strength of the n
tions

of the League was sufficient to provide security, and th-t a sensible
foreign policy would make a Virge rearmament program unnecessary.

It

was not until Hovember of I937, with Abyssinia conquered, the Tfoinelsnd
re-occupied, and the Spanish Government f^ced with defeat that the Labour

"^rty

g-^ve

its su^oort to the Government's rearmament program.

inconsistently criticized the

-arograja

Then, it

because the British air force could

not meet the threat of the German air force.
As indicated above, the Labour Party's sup ort for British re-

armament was party conditioned by faith in the collective <^eurity ideal
si*

which the Labour P^rty thought the League 9$ Nations eoul

1

mvide.

The

British frovernment did not place nearly ps much faith as the Labour Pnrty
did in the League of Hations as SB instrument of peace

m$

security,

The

policy followed by the Government and th*t ^dvoc^ted by the Labour pprty
during the Japanese invasion of Manchurir

m&

l

he Italian invasion of

Abyssinia in 1935 illustrate the difference of opinion.

In the case of

Manchuria the British Government sought to achieve its ends by h-ving the
league of Nations act as a mediator.
ment of the undeclared

Vftf

It also urged the direct settle-

between China

*>n^

Jsp»n.

The Government gave

its support to the anointment of the I^ytton Commission to investigate

conditions in Manchurir, and accented the League's decision not to

recognise conquest by force,

^en

the fceague trembly considered the

lhp,

report of the Lytton commission.

Sir John Simon in a pro-Japanese
speech

before the Assembly called attention to the
*arts of the reoort tending
to cast discredit on China,

cott.

such as anti-foreign propaganda and the
boy-

It was his belief that direct negotiations
would be best and that

the League might be able to assist these talks.

The Labour Party felt

that strong disapproval should be expressed by
the League of Nations, -

the disapproval to take the form of the withdrawal
of ministers from

Tokyo by the member states of the League.

The Labour Party also urged

the member states of the League to adopt measures of
"economic and finan-

cial constraint".

It is problematical whether these steps would have

brought about the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Manchuria.

The

difference between the attitudes of the Government and the Labour Party
was not one that opposed League of Hations activity in 19^1-19"^, while
the other opposed League of Nations activity.

The basic difference was

that while the Government was reluctant to antagonize Japan by urging

League to take any steps of
*to T>ut

a

concrete nature, the Labour Party proposed

it 8 disapproval into a specific plan of action to be undertaken

by the League of Nations.
In the case of Abyssinia, the question of collective action came
to the fore again.

The Conservative Government, after much ecmi vocation,

gave surmort to the sanctions adopted by the League of Nations, and did

indicate its support of an oil embargo.

The Labour Party strongly sup-

ported League sanctions against Italy, and urged the adoption of still
more stringent measures, including an oil embargo.

The adoption of

effective sanctions, the Labour Party argued, would make it impossible
for Italy to conquer Abyssinia.

This would not bring on war, but, on the

contrary, prevent one; Italy would not dare to attack the combined strength

of League of Hatlons.

The Government evidently did not share this
view

because fear* worked out a plan with Laval which *ould
h-ve given Italy
territory along vith economic concessions, thus making it
possible for
Italy to achieve Its aims without war.

The failure of the attenmt to

coerce Italy by the League sanctions was evident by the early part
of

in July the league lifted its sanctions.

1936.

The Abyssinian crisis

was the high point of the collective .action policy of both tha Govern-

ment and the Labour Prrty.

After 1936, the Government

attention to the Leagu* of Hations as

1

-.aid

little

me^ns of praventir^ agression.

The Labour Party, however, still urged the Qove^nment to bring inteiw

national problems, such as the Civil War in Sxain, and the annexation of
Austria and the Sudetanl^nd of Czechoslovakia by Germany to the attention

of the League of ITations.

It is to be noted th"t recuests in the«e

cases .ere not as frequent nor as urgant as before

193^,

inserting

thpt faith had changed to hope.

The yhole of British foreign policy since I919 can be described
easement, but the p~rticulrr phase of rppe^se^nt associated vith

as a

;

Ji'cvi

lie Chamberlain may be tald to have bogun on January

.y

the CJentlenien

1

s

followed during

Austria

tn<\

agreement was signed in
aicst

Borne.

1937* vh«i|

The policy mMi the one

of the Civil War in Spain, and the annexation of

the Sudetenl?nd.

Chamberlain 1

s

policy van

dedicate*"* to

achieving an agreement between the democracies and the fascist states.
The agreement was to come as a result of discussions, but the urogram
involved concessions to the Axis aa well as willingness to accent a
fait accoiiioli.
I

II

It is concession that came to be most closely associated

*

with the policy of appeasement although apnea.sement
the acceptance of the fait accoKrpli .

vras

often nerely

The latter was true in regard to

both the Civil War in Spain and the anschluss of Austria.
policy of appeasement reached its climax;

At Munich the

Hitler received all that he

demanded*
In the meantime the Labour Party urged the abandonment
of non-

intervention in Spain, for a policy which would aid the Spanish government.

As regards Austria, the Labour Party mildly suggested th?t the

matter be brought before the League of Batten*, and there its policy
stopped.

Perhaps the Labour Party felt that there could be no objection

to Germany incorporating Austria because the Austrians were Germans.
did,

It

however, object to the way in which the union was brought about.

When the threat to Czechoslovakia developed the Party again suggested
that the Leagae of fictions consider the problem.

It also urged the

British Government to pledge its aid to Czechoslovakia if any attempt
was made to impair its sovereignty.

This step would keep Czechoslovakia

intact and prevent the outbreak of war.

By such a suggestion the Labour

Party indicated its definite opposition to the policy of appeasement.
Yet the Labour Party did not take the out-right position that Britain
should use force to protect Czechoslovakia.

was all thnt was necessary.

Vftien

A guarantee they considered,

Chamberlain made the dramatic announce-

ment that Hitler had invited him to Munich, Attlee expressed his approval

of Chamberlain's acceptance of the invitation.

It seems Impossible that

Attlee could not have known the probable outcome.

After the Munich Agree-

ment was announced the Labour Party, except the pacifist wing led by

Lansbury, condemned it as betrayal, an act unworthy of Britain.

The

Labour Party, however, had not offered a real alternative to appeasement at Munich.

Perhaps the reason for that failure was that the League

&5.
of Nations uoon which the Labour
Party ba, ed

Ul

foroign policy

^

was no longer even potentially
able to handle a crisis a .
serious as the
one in September of If*. Throughout
the Csecho Slovakia* crisis,
the
Government had taken the lead in urging
concessions hy Cs echo Slovakia to
Germany, while the labour P*rty had
opposed appeasement and urged that

Chechoslovakia alone he permitted to decide
what concessions she would
she would grant to Germany.
It has been charged by some persons,

Frederick

L.

Schumann for

example, that some Conservative P.rty members
and leaders of the Govern-

ment were sympathetic to fascist ideology.

The reason for the attitude

was the fear of communism, SO me even looking
to the fascist dictators
for a check on the growth and spread of communism.
not

The labour P-rty did

share this distrust of communism, probably because
the labour

believed in evolutionary socialism.
the lesser of the two evils.

F-

rty

To the Labour Farty communism was

In Spain, the fascist and communist

ideologies came into open conflict.

Gercany and Italy gave *id to the

Pabels while Bussie helped the Spanish government.

It is not surprising,

since many conservatives were sympathetic to fuse Ism, that the Government

adopted the oolicy of Non-intervention.

To the Labour P*rty a fascist

victory seemed the more threatening of the two as far as Britain and
particularly British Labour was concerned.

For that reason, the Labour

Party after first sun-porting Non-intervention, changed its viewpoint and
urged that the Spanish government be permitted to purchase /nat-ever was

necessary to defeat Franco and his followers.
in other instances also.

This difference was evident

The Labour Party urged the Gov

nment to seek the

co-oper-tion of Russia, to be better able to meet the threat of aggression,
while the Government shied away from any outright co-operation with

Russia.

It seems reasonably

eUa*

that hostility to or sympathy for

fascism or communism influenced the foreign policy of
both the Governrentfs
rnd the British Labour Party's attitude, but with
different results.

The Labour Party's attitude towards foreign policy was
based

primarily

«$#ft two

lective security.

major principles, international disarmament and colThe former would make agression impossible, and the

latter vould crush exy aggression.
stones of

the-

These two ideals remained the key-

labour Party's foreign policy during much of 1931-1938.

Even rt the time of Munich the Labour Party found it impossible to com-

pletely forget its hopes of accomplishing peace end security
the League of Rations.

the Governmert to

tr^ke

by

For this reason the Labour P?rty seldom urged

unilateral action, the one exception being the

proposed f&ar**t«« of Czechoslovakia's integrity.
failed to halt aggression by

th<*

The Government

After the League had

fascist states, the Labour P*rty seemed

unable to bring forth any alternative
Rations Policy*.

guarded-

fittM

to what it called

ft

"League of

much sooner to the conclusion that

the twin ideals of disarmament nnd collective security could not be
realized, but the Labour Party from the beginning to the

m&

of the period,

1931-1938, disliked the policy of appeasement, and vas desirous of pre-

venting the spread of fe?cism; indeed, the Lfbour Perty coveted the end

of fascism.

Appendix A

Abbreviations

Conmons

L.P. Annual Report

House of Commons, Hansard 9
Debates
.

. . . •

s

Parliamentary

Report of the Annual Conference of the
Labour Party

T.U.C. Report

Report of the Proceedings of the Trades
Union Congress

I.3P.T.U

International federation of Trades Unions

L.S.I

Labour and Socialist International
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:
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